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This dissertation is concerned with aspects of

Quine's philosophy directly connected with his thesis of

indeterminacy of translation and his views on relativity
of ontology.
In Chapter I,

discuss observation sentences.

I

Quine makes claims which fall into two clearly distin-

guishable groups
tion sentences.

,

which

I

call two accounts of observa-

These accounts are difficult to recon-

This discussion provides the necessary background

cile.

for explicating the underdetermination and indeterminacy

theses
In Chapter II, I make use of Harre

'

s

distinction

between reticular and explanatory theories.

I

consider

two arguments for applying the underdetermination thesis

even to reticular theories.

Only the first assumes that

there are only denumerably many names
The underdetermination thesis is needed in Quine's

argument for indeterminacy of translation, as Quine

(iii)

I

i

<

<

I

l

i

i

il

li/

describes indeterminacy as underdetermination
in second
intension.
The indeterminacy thesis has
two parts.

First,

alternative, incompatible manuals of
translation are compatible with speakers' dispositions to
verbal behavior.
Second, analytical hypotheses, about
translation of the

referential apparatus

,

are not about any matter of fact

and so are not genuine scientific hypotheses.

The argument

for the first part requires the underdetermination
thesis.

That for the second reiqhiffes Quine’s views
about meaning,

reference, and propositional attitudes.
In Chapter III, I reconstruct Quine’s argument
that

ontology must be relative if statements about reference
are to be meaningful.

The reconstruction depends on my

earlier discussions of Quine’s views about reference,

quantification, and translation.

I

conclude with explana-

tion and criticism of ontological relativity.

I

argue

that Quine’s resolution of problems resulting from in-

determinacy is inadequate.
My criticisms of Quine’s views on ontological rela-

tivity and observation sentences throw serious doubt on
some of his important claims about meaning and reference
and about related issues in the philosophy of science.

(iv)
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PREFACE
My interest in Quine's work developed
as

with some puzzlement, Word and Object

.

I

studied,

It soon became

clear that an understanding of that work depended
on some
understanding of Quine's epistemology and philosophy
of

science.

In particular, it seemed necessary to come
to

grips with Quine's conception of observation sentences.
This was needed to understand the reasons for
Quine's

claims in Word and Object about the yield of the linguist

ter

s

method.

My attempt to do this resulted in Chap-

I

Some of Quine's later discussions of indeterminacy

make it clear that this thesis is very closely related
to his claim that physical theory is underdetermined by
all possible observations.

As Quine puts it, indetermi-

nacy is underdetermination in "second intension."

Thus,

the first section of Chapter II is devoted To explica-

tion of the underdetermination thesis.

section of that chapter,

I

In the second

discuss the indeterminacy thesis

directly
In Chapter III, I take up one very important consequence

of

the indeterminacy thesis.

I

discuss Quine's argu-

ment for "ontological relativity."

According to Quine,

it is necessary to introduce ontological relativity pri-

marily because indeterminacy of reference
applies to one’s
own case, and this causes difficulties
for the theory of
reference.
The indeterminacy of reference is in turn
a
consequence, in part, of the indeterminacy of
translation.
Thus, the first chapter and the first part of
the
sec-

ond chapter provide the necessary tools for my
explica-

tion of the thesis of indeterminacy of translation,
while

raising some serious philosophical issues on their own.
The third chapter draws out some of the consequences
of
the thesis of indeterminacy of translation.

general structure of the thesis.

Now

This is the

will say in more

I

detail how the parts of the thesis fit together.

Chapter

I

has two major parts.

I

begin the discussion

of observation sentences by considering the claims about
such sentences made by Quine in various places.

These

claims are made primarily (though not exclusively) in con-

nection with Quine’s discussions of language-learning, of
evidence, and of the indeterminacy thesis.

There are two

quite different accounts of observation sentences that
appear, though not explicitly, in Quine’s works.

I

ex-

plicate these and offer a suggestion as to how they are
related.

Then

I

discuss the relation, for Quine, of

observation and theory.
In the second part of the chapter,

I

discuss the

definition of 'observation sentence’ given by Quine in
Word and Object and elaborated upon in "Epistemology

ix

Naturalized."

In my discussion I point out how the
defi-

nition is related to the claims about observation
sentences
discussed in the first section. Finally, I sketch
a view
of observation sentences that Quine rejects as
a basic

account.

It is a view that is quite similar to Quine’s

second account, and this is the reason for introducing
it in some detail.

In Section 1(C) and again in Section

11(B) of Chapter I,

I

make some claims about the bearing

of the indeterminacy thesis and related views on Quine’s

account of observation sentences.

I

return to these

claims in Chapter II, at the end of the first section, and

again at the end of the section, when the grounds for my

claims should be clearer to the reader.

Chapter II is devoted to explicating the thesis of

indeterminacy of translation.

As

I

have already noted,

an understanding of Quine’s claim that physical theory
is underdetermined by all possible data is needed for this

explication.

I

consider this claim in the first

section.

The concept of an observation sentence is used in Quine

explanation of the thesis of underdetermination of physical
theory.

In order to explicate this thesis,

of Harre

'

s

I

make use

distinction between reticular and explanatory

theories and consider whether Quine would hold that the

underdetermination thesis applies to both kinds of theories.
Then

I

argue that it is only on Quine’s first account of

observation sentences

,

according to which they are

theory-

neutral , that the underdetermination thesis could hold in

X

any straightforward way.
In the second half of Chapter II,

I

turn to the thesis

of indeterminacy of translation in a more
direct way.

begin by describing the thesis, which
to consider tin two parts.

the thesis separately.

I

I

I

find it convenient

discuss these two parts of

Thus, in Subsection A,

I

try to

show what Quine’s reasons for holding that there are
al-

ternative, incompatible manuals of translation, each of

which is compatible with all of a speakers'
to verbal behavior.

dispositions

This requires a short discussion of

what Quine takes to be the methodological restrictions on
the field linguist.

In Section B,

I

turn to the second

part of the indeterminacy thesis, according to which some

purported hypotheses made by the field linguist--analytical

hypotheses--are not genuine hypotheses.

I

consider three

different interpretations of this part of the thesis, the
first two of which

Chapter III

I

reject.

c cntinues

the discussion of indeterminacy

of translation by considering one of its consequences.

Quine argues in the essay "Ontological Relativity" that
the thesis of indeterminacy of translation implies that

"there is no difference between a rabbit and each of its

parts."

The argument for this conclusion is somewhat

obscure.

It is seen to be a result of two facts about the

indeterminacy thesis:

First, reference (and not just

translation) is indeterminate.

Second, the indeterminacy

X

1

thesis applies to one's own use of one's language.
Thus, the first part of my discussion is intended
to
show why, given Quine's discussions of reference,
I am

concerned with general terms.

I

then consider some

reasons why Quine takes reference to be indeterminate.
This requires a discussion of some of Quine's views on

quantification, since Quine takes quantification to be
an "encapsulation" of reference.

I

then defend Quine's

claim that indeterminacy applies to one's own case if it
applies to the interlinguistic case.
Quine's argument elucidated,

I

With these parts of

consider some reconstruc-

i

tions of the argument according to which there is no

difference between a rabbit and each of its parts.

I

show that Quine rejects this argument, as he has it in

mind in "Ontological Relativity," because it requires that
one accept incompatible manuals of translation.
I

Though

formulate an argument with the same conclusion that is

not subject to Quine's

criticism, the conclusion is con-

ditional upon the acceptance of an appropriate kind of
manual.

My argument is thus not so serious a threat to

Quine's treatment of reference as was the argument he had
in mind.

Quine's introduction of ontological relativity makes

explicit that questions about and statements of the reference of a term can be made only relative to the acceptance of some manual of translation and a

.

Ian-*,

guage. So it shows why the arguments whose conclusion was

Xll
that there is no difference between
a rabbit and each of
its parts does not go through.
This solution involves
Quine
a sort of regress, however.
The final section
of Chapter III is an attempt to
explicate Quine's

m

proposal for stopping this regress.

I

find no way of

explication the proposal that will be acceptable,
given
indeterminacy of translation and indeterminacy
of reference.

take this to be a serious shortcoming of
Quine's

I

philosophy of language, since it means that he cannot
give an adequate account of semantical statements
about
the reference of linguistic items.
I

wish to thank Professor Quine

,

who very kindly sent

me his most recent bibliography and a number of reprints

of recent publications

,

as well as a copy of the unpub-

lished Carus Lectures for 1971.

The latter was particu-

larly valuable in my examination of Quine's work.

Nonny Burack's intelligence and efficiency in typing
a penultimate draft of the dissertation is greatly ap-

preciated

.

Bruce Aune and Jeffrey Sicha read many drafts of my
work.

Their criticisms and requests for clarification,

though not always appreciated at the time, greatly improved the final product.

For these, and for the many

we have had while I have been a graduate

student,

I

thank them.

I

look forward to many more.
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CHAPTER

I

OBSERVATION SENTENCES

INTRODUCTION
This first chapter, on observation sentences, is in

large part introductory

chapters

.

In Chapter

taken up later.

I

;

it is preparatory to succeeding

,

I

introduce several of the topics

The thesis of underdetermination of

theories and that of indeterminacy of translation, discussed in Chapter II, make substantial use of the concept
of an observation sentence.

These two theses provide much

of the motivation for discussing observation sentences.

Observation sentences are important also in Quine's discussions of language-learning, of evidence for theories,
\

and of meaning.

In "Epistemology Naturalized," he pro-

vides a statement of the role of observation sentences in
his philosophy.

Clarification of the notion of observation sentences is a good thing, for the
notion is fundamental in two connections.
These two correspond to the duality that
the
I remarked upon early in this lecture:
duality between concept and doctrine, between knowing what a sentence means and
knowing whether it is true. The observaa

i

.

2

tion sentence is basic to both enterprises.
Observation sentences
are the repository of evidence for
scientific hypotheses.
Its relation
to meaning is fundamental too, since
observation sentences are the ones
we are in a position to learn to
understand first, both as children
and as field linguists.
.

.

.

The ways in which observation sentences are sup-

posed to be basic to knowledge and meaning will become

clearer in Chapters

II.

and III.

My aim in this chap _

ter is to clarify Quine's conception of an observation

sentence in preparation for the discussions in those
chapters.

This chapter has two main divisions.

first section,

In the

examine Quine's claims about the role

I

of observation sentences in language-learning.

This

examination uncovers some major theses about observation
sentences.
of

In the second section,

I

examine the definition

'observation sentence' given in "Epistemology

Naturalized."

This examination includes a comparison

with the definition given in Word and Object , 2 of which
Quine claims the "Epistemology Naturalized" definition
to be a clarification.

I

also consider in that section

some objections to Quine's conception of an observation

sentence

v

.

:

.

.

3

I.

OBSERVATION SENTENCES AND LANGUAGE-LEARNING

A.

The First Account
I

distinguish two accounts of observation sentences

to be found in Quine's writings-.
of course

,

The distinction is not,

explicitly made by Quine

.

I

characterize

the first, or primary, account by a discussion of
seven

claims about observation sentences that are implicit or

explicit in some of Quine's discussions.
5

I

In this sub-

discuss these seven claims and provide tex-

tual support for my attribution of each to Quine.

The

claims are
(1)

Learning some observation sentences
is a necessary condition of learning
to speak a language.

(2)

Observation sentences are sentences
that can be learned by ostension.

(3)

Observation sentences do not refer
or contain referring items

(4)

Observation sentences are learned as
single units; they do not have
terms as parts

(5)

An observation sentence can be learned
independently of other sentences and
terms.
Learning an observation sentence requires no prior linguistic
acquisition

(6)

An observation sentence has meaning of
its own, apart from its role in a theory.

.

.

4

An observation sentence is accepted
or rejected on its own, apart from
its role in a theory

(7)

The first claim is supported by Quine in his
(1969a),

where he says

,

Observation sentences are the ones we
are in a position to understand first, both
as children and as field linguists.
For
observation sentences are precisely the o
ones that we can correlate with observable
circumstances of the occasion of the utterance or assent independently of variations in the past histories of individual
informants.
They afford the only entry to
a language 3
.

.

.

,

'

.

Further support is given the claim in Quine’s article
"The Grades of Theoreticity

.

He says there,

V

Such [observation] sentences are
necessarily our entering wedge into
our first language.
.

.

.

Observation sentences have this special role, he
says

,

because the only we can begin to learn a language

is by connecting the utterances we hear with the stimula-

tions we undergo at the time of hearing them.

We, in

turn, utter the sounds and are confirmed in these utterances
by speakers who undergo the same stimulations.

As we

shall see later, this explanation of how observation

sentences are learned is very important to Quine’s whole

account
This support for the first claim leads to the

second claim:
(2)

Observation sentences are sentences that
can be learned by ostension.

.

:

^

:

5

Not every speaker learns every observation
sentence by

ostension, of course.

That is not Quine's claim.

Rather,

he claims that observation sentences are of
the sort

appropriate for learning by ostension.
poirit

He makes this

clearly in his "Grades of Theoreticity "
An observation sentence may have
been learned in the ostensive way only
by some speakers and in other ways by
others.
What distinguishes it is just
that the general usage conforms to concurrent observation in about the way
that it would if everyone had learned
it ostensively 5
•

.

.

It does not matter how an observation sentence

has in fact been learned by a speaker.

servation sentence

,

If it is an ob-

it will be related to observation and

stimulation in such a way that the speaker could have
learned it by ostension.
The third claim is related to the second, since

referring items cannot be learned ostensively.

That
\

claim is
(3)

Observation sentences do not refer or
contain referring items.

According to Quine

,

the learning of observation sen-

tences precedes any learning of a theory of objects.
Such a theory of objects, on Quine's view, comes into play

when language comes to have a referring use.

It is neces-

sary for this that the learner have learned some observa-

tion sentences.

But the learning of observation sentences

.

?

,

,

6

(or some of these) must precede the
acquisition of a

theory
The third claim comes out more clearly in
Word and

Object

.

In Section 10

,

Quine claims that the meaning of

an observation sentence is its stimulus meaning.

As he

puts it

Their stimulus meanings may without fear
of contradiction be said to do full
justice to their meanings.
Because their meanings are their stimulus meanings

observations sentences can be translated on the basis of
speakers' dispositions to verbal behavior.

indeterminacy involved

The only

in their translation is the

"residual" indeterminacy that is due to the translation
of native speakers' terms for assent and dissent.

purposes in Word and Object

,

For his

Quine is willing to ignore

that indeterminacy.

While observation sentences can be translated this
way, terms cannot be.
(3)

with an example.

Quine makes the point made in claim
As we will see in Chapter II, the

distinction between a one-word observation sentence and
a related term is very important.

Given the definition

of 'observation sentence' in Word and Ob j ect

,

the "meaning"

of two one-word observation sentences may be the same, even

though the extensions of their related terms may differ.
The observation sentence 'Rabbit', for example, can
be translated on the basis of the speakers' dispositions
to verbal behavior, but the associated term 'rabbit'

7

cannot be.

The translation of 'rabbit*, the term,
re-

quires accepting (more or less arbitrarily)
some set
of analytic hypotheses.
These analytic hypotheses go beyond anything implicit in native speakers' dispositions
to verbal behavior.

The moral

I

draw from section 12 is that, where re-

ference is involved, translation is indeterminate--even
given the acceptance of hypotheses about assent and
dissent.

Since translation of observation sentences is

no t indeterminate, given such hypotheses, these sentences
'

do not involve reference.

8

Quine puts this point in "The Roots of Reference"
by saying that the learning of observation sentences

does not involve a theory of objects.

9

I

be additional support for the third claim.

take this to

Learning those

parts of a language that involve reference requires

learning a theory.

Since learning observation sentences

does not require learning a theory,

I

take it that such

learning does not require or include the learning of parts
of language that involve reference.

From Quine's treatment of the learning of observation

sentences by ostension in Word and Object and "Grades of

Theoreticity

,

(4)

"

we have the related claim

Observation sentences are learned
as single units
they do not have
terms as parts. 0
:

"

,

8

In discussing the importance of the
distinction be-

tween terms and sentences in Chapter
Quine says

of Word and Object

I

,

,

'Red* and 'Square', when used in isolation.
are likewise best looked upon
as sentences.
Most sentences are longer.
But even a longer sentence may still be
learned as a single unit, like 'Ouch',
'Red'
and 'Square'
by a direct conditioning
to some sensory stimulation. 11
.

.

,

Claim (4) has some interesting consequences.

An example

of an observation sentence that is longer than the ex-

amples cited in the previous quotation is
The cat is on the mat.

This example is used by Quine in "Grades of Theoreticity

.

According to claim (4), this sentence does not contain
the term 'cat', except (to use a Quinean example) in the

sense that 'Socrates' contains a 'rat'.

misleading to write the sentence as

I

It is perhaps

have done.

It might,

better be written as
Thecatisonthemat
to show that the usual conventions about spacing are not

being made use of.
From claim (3) we know that this sentence does not

refer to cats.

It is not

"about" a cat except in the limited

sende that when there is or appears to be a cat on the

mat one who has learned this observation .[sentence is

disposed (other things being equal) to respond to the

.

.

.

9

stimulation it evokes by uttering the sentence,
and not
otherwise
According to this conception of the observation
sentence, one could have learned this sentence
and utter it
in the appropriate situation, yet not
be disposed either

to respond to any questions about the cat

oi?

about cats

or to token any other "related" sentences such
as
The mat is under the cat.
This seems surprising.
a more fully developed theory

One might suppose that, in
,

some observation sentences

would be associated with one another in such a way that
one would not be said to have learned a given observa-

tion sentence unless one had also learned other, related

observation sentences.

If this were so, we still might

not expect the speaker to have the ability to answer

questions about cats after having learned the observation
sentence
The cat is on the mat.
But we would expect him to have learned some other ob-

servation sentences.

Among these might be

Cat

There is a cat.
This is a cat.
This is a mat.
The cat is grey.
The mat is brown.
The mat is under the cat

10

This is not so, however.

Quine distinguishes among

various methods of learning language

some of which re-

,

quire prior linguistic acquisitions,
others of which do
not.
Learning by ostension does not, and observation

sentences can be learned by ostension 12
.

As

I

have already noted, in the discussion of

claim (2), observation sentences are of the sort
of
sentence that can be learned by ostension.

Though not

every speaker actually learns all observation sentence
this way

every observation sentence could -have been

,

so learned.

A related claim is made by Quine in "Epistemology

Naturalized

.

V

He notes in that essay an important dif-

ference between observation sentences and theoretical
sentences.

Observation sentences have "empirical con-

sequences*' of their own, while theoretical sentences

do not.

Theoretical sentences have (empirical) meaning

only by virtue of belonging to

a.!

a whole has such consequences
.

o

language that taken
Similarly, observation

sentences are judged--accepted or rejected--on their own.
They "face the tribunal of sensory evidence" on their
own, while more theoretical sentences are judged only in
a body.

On the whole, it is theories to which evidence

applies and not sentences
V

;

,

observation sentences are an

:

.

.

11

exception.

I

have already noted (pages

6

•

and 7)

that observation sentences are independent
in that

their learning requires no prior linguistic
acquisition.
That there are two additional ways in which
observation

sentences have a sort of independence that other sentences do not have is suggested by this discussion of
•

These considerations give us support for the

last claims about observation sentences that characterize

this account
(5)

An observation sentence can be learned
independently of other sentences and
terms
Learning an observation sentence requires no prior linguistic
acquisition
.

(6)

An observation sentence has meaning of its
own, apart from its role in a theory.

(7)

An observation sentence is accepted or
rejected on its own, apart from its
role in a theory.

Claims (5), (6), and (7) can be summarized in a Humean

phrase:

Observation sentences are loose and separate.

It might, of course, still be true as a matter of

fact

that one observation sentence is ordinarily learned

in association with another.

The sentences "about"

cats listed earlier might well be learned together, by at

least some language-learners.

But on Quine's view of

observation sentences given in his discussions of languagelearning,

learning one observation sentence does not

require learning any other observation sentences

"

.

12

What, then, is it to "learn" an
observation sentence
There are really two questions here:
How, on Quine’s
account, does one learn an observation
sentence? What
has one learned when one has learned
an observation sen-*

tence?

Initially, one

l earns

observation sentences by

ostension, and any such sentences can be learned
in this
way.

What is learned is a kind of behavior:

the sentence.

the use of

Learning an observation sentence is

developing a disposition to utter the sentence in some

particular set of (i.e., the appropriate) circumstances.
When one has learned an observation sentence--by whatever

method--one is disposed to respond to certain stimuli by
the production ofecertain sounds or symbols.

Ostensive learning
.

,

Quine says, requires a "sense

of similarity, a sense of subjectively natural kinds." 16

When learning by ostension, one must come to discern

relevantly similar circumstances.

matter of trial and error.
,

our errors

This procedure is a

We make mistakes and correct

The sense of similarity is described also

as a sort of innate prelinguistic quality space. 16

In both "Natural Kinds" and "Grades of Theoreticity

Quine says that ostensive learning is "an implicit case
of induction nl 9

But the sense in which this is so is

rather obscure.

It is obvious, as even Quine says, that

the learner does not infer some general statement about
the use of a sentence from sentences of the form

13

T 1 ottered

’A*

in circumstances C at

uttered

’A’

in circumstances C at t
2

t]_

•

;

\

t 2 ottered

’A'

in circumstances C at t
3

and statements about the utterer having received approval

upon himself having uttered

’A'

various times.

already seen, learning ob-

As we have

in circumstances C at

servation sentences requires no prior linguistic acquisition, and such inference

tions

— of

does require linguistic acquisi-

rather a sophisticated sort.

Quine says of the sort of induction involved,
This learning process is a process of induction.
The other fellow has affirmed or
assented to the observation term or sentence
in question, or has approved our assent to
it, amid various scenes that were somewhat
similar to one another; and we predict that
he will do likewise in similar scenes hereafter.
.

.

.

The generality reached by our induction is
rather a habit than a law, since we do not
have words to state it with; we are only'
then engaged in learning to put a word to the
generality in question. What we learn by the
induction is the full range of scenes
or
stimulatory situations to which the word
is appropriate--in short its stimulus meaning.
,

,

.

,

.
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Both the statement that the learner predicts ^
future

verbal behavior of a speaker and the statement
that we
learn the full range of stimulatory situations are

misleading.

Such a description of the learning process

attributes to the learner quite complex linguistic abilities
abilities which he surely does not have in the early
stages of language-learning, and which, according to
Quine, are not needed for learning observation sentences.

Quine does not explain in what sense one learns "the
full range of scenes.

.

.

to which the word is appropriate."

One does not learn that the stimulatory situations to

which a sentence is appropriate are of a certain sort
This description would attribute too much to the learner.
It seems more nearly correct--and closer to what

Quine describes when he discusses ostension--to say that
to learn an observation sentence is to acquire .the habit

or disposition to utter a sentence, or to assent to or

dissent from it, in a particular sort of circumstance.
When we say that a child has learned an observation sentence
we should not say that he has acquired knowledge or that

he makes predictions, as Quine’s description of induction

might suggest.

As Quine says, "the generality reached

by our induction is rather a habit than a law.

.

.

"21
.

We should then say, then, that the child has acquired a

habit

.

.
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B.

The Second Account; And A Reconciliation
In the account of observation
sentences discussed

in Subsection A, the following are
among the seven

claims attributed to Quine:
(3)

an<^

•

Observation sentences do not
refer or contain referring items
Observation sentences are learned

as single units; they do not
have terms as parts

These claims will be especially important in my discussion, in the next Subsection, of how the learner comes
to be a full-fledged speaker of the language

,

having

caught on to the theory of enduring bodies.
There appears to be a different account of observa-

tion sentences in Quine’s work, in which claims (3) and
(4)

are not made.

Such an account would avoid some of

the problems raised in the next Subsection.

According

to this second account of observation sentences

sentences do involve reference.

,

these

The sentence

The cat is on the mat,
.

for example, is, on this second account, about cats.
Quine introduces this account in many places.

Word and Ob j ect

,

after giving a definition of ’observa-

tion sentence’, he says

v

In

Our version of observation sentences
departs from a philosophical tradition
in allowing the sentences to be about
ordinary things instead of requiring
22
them to report sense data.
.

.

.

.

16

In "Epistemology Naturalized,"

he makes a similar

statement, again after presenting a definition
of ’observation sentence'.
He says there,
There is generally no subjectivity in the
phrasing of observation sentences as
we are now conceiving them;
they will
usually be about bodies
Since the
distinguishing trait of an observation
sentence is intersub j ective agreement
under agreeing stimulation, a corporeal
subject matter is likelier than not
,

.

.

In the discussion of observation sentences in

"Grades of Theoreticity

,

"

he says,

Observation sentences at their
strictest are sentences that we
learned to use or could have
learned to use, by direct conditioning to socially shared
concurrent stimulation. Typically,
they are sentences about external
things, not sense-data .^*4
,

Clearly

,

observation sentences as described in

these three passages do refer and contain referring
items.
(3)

They do have terms as parts.

and (4) are false on this account.

So, claims

This is es-

pecially puzzling since each of the three passages
quoted follows a definition or discussion of ’observation sentence* that conforms with the seven claims made
in the first account*

ferent

The two apparently quite dif-

accounts seem to require reconciliation, since

the passages in question appear as glosses on the first

account

,

.
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We have already seen that according
to the second

account claims (3) and (4) are false.
(2)

and (5)

Two related claims,

are also false on this account.

These

claims were
(2)

Observation sentences are sentences
that can be learned by ostension.

(5)

An Observation sentence can be
learned independently of other
sentences and terms
Learning of
an observation sentence requires
no prior linguistic acquisition.

cl

and

.

Consider claim (5) first.

On the second account,

observation sentences do contain terms.

The distinction

between one-word sentences and terms is no longer impor,

since observation sentences now involve reference

and thus a theory of objects.

Since the sentence

The cat is on the mat
is now supposed to contain the term ’cat’

,

we can expect

one who has learned this sentence to have learned the

following sentences as well:
Cat
Mat.

This was not the case on the first account.

Since the

observation sentence is not a unit learned as a whole on
this account, one would not say (on this account) that a

learner has learned the first sentence unless he has
also learned the second and the third.

While it is not

clear that learning an observation sentence requires

.
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££ior

linguistic acquisition, it
is clear that observation
sentences are not learned
independently of other sentences
and terms
In considering the
second claim, that observation

sentences are sentences that
can be learned by ostension,
the "aboutness" of these
sentences, on the second
account,
important.
Quine's account of learning
by ostension
was built on a stimulus-response
model of learning.
Individual sentences were learned
as units.
To learn a
sentence was to acquire a
disposition to use the sentence
in appropriate circumstances
(or at least in circumstances
similar to those in which the
sentence was uttered and in
which one was rewarded for
uttering it).
It was im-

portant in Quine's account of
ostensive learning of observation sentences that these sentences
were a first step
!oward learning physical theory.
On the second account, however,
these sentences al-

ready

i nvolve

a theory of objects.

physical objects.

.

They are (typically)

While Quine's discussion

of ostensive learning by a stimulus-response
method might

account for the acquisition of dispositions
to verbal behavior, it does not account for the acquisition
of a

theory.

Quine is quite clear about this matter.

This

sort of consideration was one motivation for
his charac-

terization of observation sentences as described in
the
first account.

-
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These considerations suggest an
explanation of the
two quite different accounts of the
observation sentence.
The first account is prominent in
Quine's discussions of
language-learning, though it also appears elsewhere.
This
account might, then, be a preliminary or only
partial
account.

It might be that it is limited to the
observa-

tion sentences as used by language-learners,
but not as
used by full-fledged speakers of the language.

Something like

this is,

I

think, correct.

But we

should keep in mind that Quine's discussion of observation sentences in Chapter II of Word and Ob j ect
in

Epistemology Naturalized"

and

are general discussions

and are not restricted to observation sentences as used
by learners of a language.
in Word and Object

,

Observation sentences are,

explicated solely in terms of the

circumstances of utterance, stimulations that prompt
speakers to assent or dissent when queried with such
a sentence.

If the reconciliation is to be made, some-

thing more must be said about the difference between the

sentences for a learner and the sentences for full-

fledged speakers of a language.
When we ask what the difference between the learner
and the speaker is, we find that the speaker of the

language has a theory of the world that is embodied in

^

,

.
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his language.

theory.

The learner, at this stage, has no such

And, indeed, the difference between the two

accounts is that for the first no theory is involved
in

observation sentences while for the second a theory is
involved
The primary account of observation sentences is
I

claim, the first account.

This is the account that

is needed if observation sentences

are "necessarily

our entering wedge into our first language.

It is

the account made use of in the discussions of indetermi-

nacy of translation and underdetermination of theories.
I

explain, or explain away, the second account as

the view of observation sentences from within a theory

Observation sentences
as units

,

terance.

,

Quine says

,

.

are to be considered

keyed as wholes to the circumstances of ut-

When we consider the observation sentence

from the vantage point of some theory, we describe the
circumstances in terms of our theory.

Observation

sentences are typically about physical objects because
the theory in which we describe the circumstances of

their utterance is typically a theory of physical objects.
And when the observation sentences are viewed from within
a theory

,

they can be thought of as having grammatical

parts with semantical functions.
terms that refer to objects.

i

They have as parts

But that is just because

.
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we are no longer viewing the
observation sentence in isolation but are bringing into play those
elements of lan-

guage such as quantification and identity
that involve a
theory of objects. The discrepancy between
the two accounts is only apparent.
The difference is a difference
of point of view.
Whether Quine can successfully reconcile
the two views expressed in his work is
difficult
to de-1

termine.

In Section C of this Chapter

I

discuss one

difficulty with the suggested reconciliation.
ii

I

C.

Observation Sentences and Theory

In Chapter

discuss some additional difficulties.

I

have argued that the account of observation sentences

needed by Quine for his account of language-learning is
the account
I

I

discussed in Subsection A.

In that Subsection

considered seven claims about observation sentences

The first of these was that learning some observation sen-

tences is a necessary condition of learning to speak a

language
•

.

It might be added that learning observation

sentences is a necessary condition for learning a theory,

though observation sentences do not themselves involve
a theory at this stage.

Quine and Ullian say that after

learning some observation sentences a speaker can gradually catch on the theory of physical objects.

And when

this is accomplished, the observation sentences can be

used as

sentences

that have structure and reference.

22

We can, they say, "attribute
corporeal reference to

component words" of these sentences,
once they are seen
from the vantage point of a theory 27
.

We have already seen that one can
be said to have

learned an observation sentence without
having acquired
any knowledge as such.
To learn an observation sentence
is to acquire a habit of a specified
sort.

One could,

for example, have learned the observation
sentence 'Dog',
or That’s a dog', and yet have no knowledge
of dogs, no

idea what a dog is.

Using the observation sentence, i.e.,

uttering it in the appropriate circumstances

does not

,

involve reference to a dog.
Given the nature of observation sentences
they provide an entrance into the language?

,

how do

How does the

learning of observation sentences enable one to "catch
on" to the theory of enduring bodies?

The significance

of these questions becomes more apparent if we put the

question in a different way:

What, on Quine's view, is

the relation between observation sentences and theory?

These are the questions

I

discuss in this Subsection.

In his discussions of objectivity in language-learning

Quine says some things that bear on these questions.
the first chapter of Word and Object

,

In

he says the following

In general, if a term is to be learned
by induction from observed instances

8

23

where it is applied, the instances
have to resemble one another in two
ways:
they have to be enough alike
from the learner's point of view,
from occasion to occasion, to afford him a basis of similarity to
generalize upon, and they have to
be enough alike from simultaneous
distinct points of view to enable
the teacher and learner to share the
appropriate occasions. 2
He goes on to say that terms for observable
physical

objects generally meet these requirements, "and thus
if is that such objects are focal to reference and

thought. "29

The idea that terms are to be learned

by induction is presented in the antecedent of a

conditional and one might be loathe to attribute this
view to Quine.

Nevertheless,

I

think we can do so,

since he is concerned in that section to explain what

kinds of instances might conform to these requirements.
There is something odd in Quine's talk of a term's

being learned by induction.

Either the learner learns

the term by making an inductive inference

or induction

is merely the development or acquisition of a habit.

Surely the learner cannot be supposed to be making

inductive inference.

an

This supposition would require that

he make some inf erence--perhaps that he infer a general

statement from a group of instances, for example.

This

use of inference would require sophisticated linguistic

behavior, including the use of predicates and quantification.

If the learner were able to use

this complicated

.
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apparatus
terms.

,

he would already have learned the use
of such

But it is just such learning that is to
be ex-

plained.

The learning of terms cannot be explicated

in terms of a method that requires that
the learner al-

ready be able to use such terms
In my earlier discussion of learning observation

sentences (pp. 12-14),

I

noted that Quine explained the

learning of such sentences in terms of a sort of induction.
There induction involved the acquisition of a habit of

uttering a sentence in circumstances of an appropriate
^•dnd

.

The habit, it was claimed by Quine, is acquired

by the learner when the teacher repeats the sentences
in question in similar situations and rewards the learner

for doing so.

It would have to be this sort of induction

that is involved in the learning of terms as well.

Given

this understanding of what is involved in learning terms
by induction, we can now consider how the language-

learner comes to catch on to the theory of objects.
In the first sentence of the quotation it is as-

sumed that the term to be learned is being applied in
a variety of instances.

It must be the teacher, and

not the learner, who is thus applying the term.

The

language learner is assumed to have learned only the
•use of observation sentences, and these do not

(at

.
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this stage)

contain terms, except in the sense that

Socrates' contains

'rat'.

In any case, the learner

is, by hypothesis, incapable of applying
terms in any

instances

,

whether they in any sense appear in the

observation sentences he has learned or not.
We cannot suppose either that the learner has

learned the application of a term in any instance at
all.

What is to be explained here is how the applica-

tion of terms is learned.

The only linguistic abilities

he has thus far developed are those involving observa-

tion sentences

He has learned these

.

stimulus-response conditioning.

by a form of

He is specifically

assumed not to have yet begun to learn the application
of terms

There are different kinds of examples one might use
in explicating this passage.

The teacher may use the

term being taught as one-word sentences, for example.
If the term to be learned is

use the one-word sentence

'cat', the teacher would

'Cat'.

Or the teacher might

use a number of different sentences

,

each containing

/

(in some sense) the term 'cat*.

Suppose the teacher uses the one-word sentence
'Cat'

exclusively.

What stands out is that the learning

situation is identical to that in which the observation
sentence is learned as a whole as a response to some

,
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stimulation of an appropriate sort.

There is no reason

to suppose that this same learning
situation could result in the child’s learning the
application of the term

associated with the observation situation.

If it could

do so, then observation sentences would
not have the

special role claimed for them by Quine.

Language-

learning could begin with the learning of observation
terms

just as well as with the learning of observation

sentences

.

Quine, of course, denies that this is so.

One might suppose that the teacher does not use
the one-word sentence, but just uses the term ’cat’.

But

the teacher's use of term rather than sentence does not

show itself in the learning situation.

There are no

behavioral differences to clue the learner.

Using the

term and uttering the sentence come to the same thing

insofar as the learner is concerned.

This does not pro-

vide a way for the learner to distinguish between terms
and sentences and thus to learn to apply the term.
The suggestion that the teacher uses one-word sen-

tences to teach the associated term is unpromising.

Sup-

pose instead that the teacher uses a variety of sentences

each containing the term to be used.

example of 'cat'.

I

use the

Among these sentences might be:

The cat is on the mat
The cat is on the hearth.
The cat is eating.
.

k

Again,

:

.

.

.
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This is the cat.
There is the cat
The cat is grey.
The cat is chasing the mouse

From the repeated use of sentences such
as these in

appropriate occasions accessible to both teacher
and
learner, the teacher is to bring it about that
the

language-learner learns to use the term 'cat’, and that
he acquires the theory of ordinary bodies for
its use.

Such a theory is required because the learner is
to learn
the application of the term.
It seems that what is to happen is that the learner

come to see that all these sentences have something in
common.

For the learner, these sentences were already

learned as observation sentences.

They do not therefore

contain, for him, the word ’cat’, except in the sense

that

'

common
iii-

’

contains ’on* and ’rabbit' contains 'rabbi'.
-it

i

There is something that all the occasions on which these

sentences might be used correctly have in common.

We

might say that each involves a cat (or a cat stimulation)
It is suggested that the learner comes to associate these

two "commons "--the common occurrence of 'cat' and the

common occurrence of a cat

— and

thus learn to apply the

term 'cat' to cats.
One should note, however, that the sentences have

more in common than

that each contains, in this sense,

,
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'cat'.

ca

,

Each also contains a 'the', a 'th', a
’thee’, a
and so on.
There is no reason to suppose that
’cat

should be picked out as the

word, or even as the or an

important word, that the sentences have in
common.
If we suppose that the learner has also
learned

the observation sentence
Cat
•
i

however, the suggestion that he picks out ’cat’ becomes
more plausible.

This addition would at least cut down

the number of sign designs that the sentences have in

common.

It seems initially plausible that

should

’cat*

be picked out rather than ’c* or ’a’ or 'ca' or 'at',

and so on.
This is not really so plausible, however.

We might

suppose that the word that the sentences have in common
is

'at'.

The occurrence of the "one-word" sentence is

misleading.

The

'c'

in this sentence might have a

special, and rather peculiar, function:

it might en-

sure that the sentence does not begin with the letter
'a'

(perhaps because of some tribal taboo)^
My general claim is that if sentences are learned

as wholes in the way Quine describes the learning of

observation sentences

,

then there is no clear-cut

way of picking out from the sentences those sign designs
that function as words

or significant units of speech

for the full-fledged speaker of the language.

We have

1

.

.
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already seen the difficulties with
'oat'.
sentences might

The observation

be written as follows to show
their

structure for the full-fledged speaker:
Thee at is on the mat.
Thee at is on the hearth
Thee at is eating.
and so on.

The addition to the list of
Cat

is misleading.
is actually

The term

in the "one-word" sentence

'at', and the sentence does after all have

structure of a sort.

The initial letter

'c'

occurs

because of some convention or taboo about the ways in

which a sentence may begin.
This part of Quine's explanation of the learning
of terms founders on what would seem to be a simple

problem.
"that

picking out the sign designs in the sentences

function as words

.

We need from Quine some explana-

tion of how it is that the child comes to see that these

sentences have in common the sign design 'cat' in some
way other than that in which they have in common the
sign design 'at'.

Though

Quinedoesn't discuss this

matter in connection with language-learning, he does
raise the problem of determining what are the significant
units of speech in his (1961b).
An explanation of how the child manages to pick
V

out the relevant items (e.g., cats)

in the occasions
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of utterance is even more difficult,
especially for Quine.
The only learning theory that Quine
provides is a stimulusresponse theory.
But I shall maintain that, in the
light
of Quine's views on translation
(discussed in Chapter II),
his account of stimulus-response
learning cannot ex-

plain how one catches on to one theory (e.g.,
that of
enduring bodies) rather than some other theory.
As we shall see in Chapter II

,

there are special

problems about the application of general terms

The

.

use of general terms involves a theory of objects 30
.

General terms are introduced together with identity
and quantification (or their natural language counterP^-^Ts

)

.

These items involve theoretical commitments

Quine claims that alternative
are consistent

,

.

incompatible theories

with all possible observation sentences.

For him, the learning of a number of observation sen-

tences (even all of them) is not sufficient for learning
a theory.

The ostensive method is inadequate for teaching

what Quine calls a theory of enduring bodies

,

and this

method is the only method that Quine presents.
An additional problem is posed by the interaction
of the teacher and the student of a language.

As we shall

see in Chapter II, it is Quine's view that nothing in

their dispositions to verbal behavior uniquely pick out
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a theory.

All

of their dispositions to verbal
behavior

are consistent with alternative,
incompatible theories
of the world 32
.

Given this view, Quine cannot explain

how the language-learner comes to catch on to
a particular
theory on the basis of the teacher's utterances in
special

circumstances

.

Those utterances are consistent with

different, and incompatible, theories 33
.

There are two separate problems here

:

First

,

the

observation sentences do not uniquely pick out any one
theory;

they are consistent with different theories.

Even if the child were completely rational and had access
to all possible observation sentences

,

these sentences

would not determine that he catch on to one theory rather
than another.

Second, even if the child did in some way

catch on the some theory of the world, there would be
no way for his teacher to determine which theory he had
\

caught on to.

Similarly, the child could not catch on

to the teacher's theory by considering the sentences

uttered by the teacher in certain conditions.

These

utterances would be consistent with different theories.
On Quine's account, observation sentences are

learned ostensively and independently of any other lin-

guistic acquisitions.

The ostensive learning is ex-

plained in terms of the acquisition of linguistic habits

r

.
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by stimulus-response conditioning.

Quine provides no

explanation of how, given this account of
observation
sentences, the learner is to go beyond these
sentences
to learn the use of general terms and the
concomitant

theory of objects.

3

His failure to do so is important,

not just for his discussion of language-learning,
but
for his epistemological views

.

Observation sentences

are to provide evidence for theories.

Unless we know

more about the relation between observation and theoretical
sentences

,

we do not know how observation sentences

can have the evidential function Quine claims them
to have

II.

DEFINITIONS
In Section I,

tion sentences
learning.

,

I

discussed the functions of observa-

particularly their role in language-

My discussion brought out seven claims made

by Quine in connection with what

first account.

I

have called his

These were:

(1)

Learning some observation sentences is a necessary condition
of learning to speak a language.

(2)

Observation sentences are sentences
that can be learned by ostension.

(3)

Observation sentences do not refer
or contain referring items.

.

.
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Observation sentences are learned
as single units
they do not have
terms as parts

(4)

;

An observation sentence can be learned
independently of other sentences and
terms
Learning an observation sentence requires no prior linguistic

(5)

^

.

acquisition

(6)

An observation sentence has meaning
of its own, apart from its role
in a theory

(7)

An observation sentence is accepted
or rejected on its own, apart from
its role in a theory.

In this section,

observation sentence

I

'

consider the definition of

offered by Quine

as opposed to

,

the more general characterization provided by the seven

claims.

In Subsection A,

I

present the definition as

given in Word and Ob j ect and elaborated upon in

Epistemology Naturalized."

Then

I

consider some short-

comings of the formulations of the definition.

Subsection B,

I

In

consider an objection to Quine's concep-

tion of observation sentences based on the views of other

contemporary philosophers.

in Subsection C,

provide a brief summary of the chapter.

I

Statements of the Definition

A.
(

Finally,

i

)

Criteria for the definition
In Chapter II of Word and Object

,

Quine develops

a definition of observation sentence that is

to be suit-

.

'
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able for his discussion of translation
and meaning.

His

primary criteria for such a definition
are that it allow
minimal scope for collateral information
and that it

be given

m

behavioral terms, that is, in terms of

native speakers’ dispositions to verbal
behavior.
To define

'observation sentence', Quine first in-

troduces two other concepts, that of stimulus
meaning and
that of the occasion sentence.
Stimulus meaning
is

introduced in terms of the methods of a linguist attempting a translation of the language of a "hitherto

untouched people. "35

It

supposed that the only

data available to the linguist are the native speakers'

dispositions to behavior, including and especially their
dispositions to verbal behavior.
liminary studies

,

After making some pre-

the linguist develops hypotheses to

the effect that certain of the natives'

utterances are

sentences, and perhaps working hypotheses about these
sentences.

He also develops hypotheses about what to

count as assent and dissent in the native speakers

language
The stimulus meaning of a sentence is the ordered

pair of the class of stimulations that would prompt
assent to the sentence and the class of stimulations that

would prompt dissent.

Stimulations that would inhibit

V

response are not included in the stimulus meaning.

The

i

35

classes of stimulations are to include
all stimulations
that would prompt dissent or assent,
not just those that
the linguist actually perceives or
even just those that
actually occur.
Stimulus meaning is defined for a

sentence, for a speaker, at a time.

This allows that

stimulus meaning might differ from speaker to
speaker
and might differ for a given speaker from
time to time.

When it comes to defining 'observation sentence',
Quine first points out that these sentences are to
be

those whose stimulus meanings do not vary under the

influence of collateral information.

He says of ob-

servation sentences that
their stimulus meanings may without
fear of contradiction be said to do
full justice to their meanings.
These
are the occasion sentences that wear
their meanings on their sleeves. 36

After introducing the notion of "degrees of observationality,"

he says

In behavioral terms
an occasion
sentence may be said to be the more
observational the more nearly its
stimulus meanings for different
speakers tend to coincide. 37
,

The meaning of an observation sentence is its stim-

ulus meaning-

Stimulus meaning is defined relative to

persons and times.

Nevertheless Quine claims that he

has uncovered a social or intersub j ective

observationality

.

notion of

This claim rests on the further claim

,

36

that the stimulus meaning of observation
sentences
does not vary with differences in
collateral information.
This further claim apparently is based
on the way
in which observation sentences are
said to be learned,

by ostension.

Quine says

In discussing degrees of observationality

,

If a sentence is one that (like 'Red'
and 'Rabbit’) is inculcated mostly
by something like direct ostension,
the uniformity will lie at the surface
and there will be little variation in
stimulus meaning; the sentence will
be highly observational.
If it is one
that (like 'Bachelor') is inculcated
through connections with other sentences, linking up thus indirectly
with past stimulations of other sorts
than those that serve directly to
prompt present assent to the sentence, then its stimulus meaning will
vary with the speakers pasts and the
sentence will count as very unobservational ^8
'

.

In "On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation,"

Quine makes use of the term 'observation sentence' in his

statement of the thesis of underdetermination of theories.
He says there that the concept was introduced in Word and
.

Ob j ect

and has since been clarified in "Epistemology

Naturalized."

I

want now to turn to the definition of

and discussion of the term given in "Epistemology Natura-

lized."

As we shall see, this definition appears to be

quite different from that given in Word and Object
of-

.

One

the virtues of the discussion in the later paper is

^

,
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that it brings out some of what Quine
takes to be important considerations in the development
of the concept
of an observation sentence.

Before arriving at a satisfactory definition,
Quine
offers and then rejects several formulations.
He says

that

vaguely speaking, what we want of observation sentences is that they be
the ones in closest causal proximity
to the sensory receptors 40
.

.

This consideration is one that we came upon in
"Grades
of Theoreticity

,

"

where observation sentences were said

to be at the "basic level for

conceptualization of the

"unprocessed information" provided by the firing of
nerve endings. 41

According to the first formulation,
The sentence is an observation sentence
if our verdict depends only on the
sensory stimulation present at the
time 4z
.

This formulation of the definition is rejected on the

ground that language-learning requires the storing of
some information without which one would have no basis

for assenting to or dissenting from a queried observa-

tion sentence.^
The second formulation meets this objection, but
is subject to another.

formulation

According to the second
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A sentence is an observation sentence if all verdicts on it depend
on present sensory stimulation and
on no stored information beyond what
goes into understanding the sentence. 44

Naturally, Quine rejects this definition.

He does not

believe that it is possible to distinguish between
in-

formation that goes into understanding a sentence
and

information that goes beyond this

He argues against

.

such a distinction, for example, in his rejection
of
the analytic-synthetic distinction.

1

^

Quine finally accepts the following definition:
An observation sentence is one on which
all speakers of the same language give
the same verdict when given the same
concurrent stimulation. To put the
point negatively an observation sentence is one that is not sensitive to
differences in past experience within
the community. 46
,

This definition seems quite unlike that given in

Word and Ob j ect
elaboration.

,

It does not contain any reference to

stimulus meanings
•

of which it is supposed to be an

,

which was an important concept in

the discussion of observation sentences in Word and

Object

.

Quine would argue, however, that the defini-

tions are equivalent, since for a sentence to have the
same stimulus meaning for two speakers would require
that the two speakers agree in their verdicts under the

same concurrent stimulation.

"
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Quine gives a "behavioral definition"
for observa-

tion sentences in "Methodological
Reflections on Current
Linguistic Theory" that is like that in
Word and Object
He says that
.

An observation sentence is a sentence
whose stimulus meaning is the same for
just about all speakers of the language. ^7

This definition, like the
^ orc

Object

^

,

behavioral definition in

makes use of ’stimulus meaning'.

It,

too, would pick out the same observation sentences
as
the definition given in Word and Object

Quine.

,

according to

Note, however, that these behavioral definitions

assume that all speakers have had pretty much the same

training, and so have learned the use of roughly the same

observation sentences.
Let us turn again to the definition of

'observation

sentence' given by Quine in "Epistemology Naturalized."
He gave both a positive and a negative formulation.

Con-

sider for the moment only the positive statement of the

definition.

The definition is supposed to meet two

criteria:
(1)

According to it, observation sentences are "to be the ones in
closest causal proximity to the
sensory receptors
.

and

( 2 )

It does not rely on a distinction
between the information that goes
into understanding a sentence

.

,
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and the information that goes
beyond this understanding.

The positive statement of the definition
does

not satisfy both (1) and (2), if (1)

is

taken on a

natural reading to be
A sentence is an observation sentence
if and only if it is one of those
in closest causal proximity to
the sensory receptors

(3)

The positive statement satisfies (1) only if
(1) is

construed more weakly as
If a sentence is one of those
in closest causal proximity to
the sensory receptors it is an
observation sentence.

(4)

The positive statement does not satisfy the converse of
(4).

is

,

This failure is the price of satisfying (2), that

of avoiding the distinction between information that

goes into understanding a sentence and other information.

Such sentences as

There have been black dogs

will be an observation sentence.

So will any other sen-

tence on which there is community-wide agreement.

might include such sentences as
2

+

2

=

4

and
The valence of oxygen is -2

given the appropriate community of speakers.

These

This

.
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sentences are not in close
proximity to the sensory receptors, as Quine explains the
phrase.
The causal proximity to sensory receptors is
explained by Quine's account
of the learning Q f observation
sentences by stimulusresponse conditioning. 48

A statement made before he gives
the definition might
suggest that Quine is aware of and
willing to accept this
result.

Discussing the fact that there is likely
to
be community -wide agreement on,
and indeed acceptance of,
such sentences as ’There have been
black dogs', he says,
My rejection of the analyticity
notion
just means drawing no line between
what goes into the mere understanding
of the sentences of a language and
what else the community sees eye-toeye on.
I doubt that an objective
distinction can be made between
meaning and such collateral information as is community-wide 4 9

Another interpretation of this passage, however, is
that
Quine is here noting only that his criterion for
analyticity
(community-wide acceptance)
as
•

does not exclude such sentences

There have been black dogs

'

,

and explaining why

that result is acceptable.
It also happens that such sentences

along with what

might be called analytic sentences are also not excluded
by Quine's definition of 'observation sentence'.

If

Quine is right about the consequences of the claim that

observation sentences can be learned ostensively

,

then
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he can be fairly confident that
(4) will hold, though

there might be some question about
that.

But, unless

he can put appropriate additional
restrictions

on

that definition, the converse of
(4) will not hold.

The

problem arises because members of the
community would
assent to such sentences as *2 + 2 = 4’ and
'There

have been black dogs', and so would agree in
their
verdicts under the same concurrent stimulations.

The

restriction needed would have to express Quine's intuition that the response to queries about observation
sentences [but not that to queries about "analytic"
ones]

is causally related to the stimulations
under

which the sentence is queried.

Moreover, it would

have to express this intuition in extensional, and

preferably behavioral, terms.

I

am quite pessimistic

about the chances for the success of such an attempt.
It is open to Quine, of course, to simply accept this

result as a necessary evil to be submitted to in order
to avoid dependence on an extremely problematic dis-

tinction, one which he thinks cannot be made.
It is not clear that the definition picks out

all those sentences that are in closest proximity to
the sensory receptors.

That is, it is not clear that

it meets even the weak form of criterion (1).

If there

were significant differences within the community in
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training, it might well result that different persons

learned different "observation" sentences.

This dif-

ference might have the effect of inhibiting some members
of the community from responding to queries of some

sentences
on

,

and thus prohibit community-wide agreement

a verdict

.

Such a difficulty could be avoided in

a fairly simple way

the light of Quine

Wo^d

an<3 Ob j

ect

.

’

,

s

and one that seems appropriate in

remarks about stimulus meaning in

One might say that an inhibited re-

sponse is not a verdict and so does not imply disagree men ~t under concurrent stimulation.

And, one might add,

what is really at issue is not the responses of all

speakers of the language but the responses of all the
speakers of the language who give a verdict.

This

would resolve the supposed difficulty and allow the
definition to conform the the first criterion.
(

ii )

'

Positive and Negative Formulations
The difficulties with the definition that

I

have

already discussed come up again in connection with its

positive and negative formulations.

Consideration of

these formulations should be instructive, for it should
show where the difficulty lies.

The two statements of

the definition are not equivalent.
V

According to the

,

.

4 4

negative statement
an observation sentence is one
that
is not sensitive to differences
in
past experience within the speech

community

According to the positive statement,
an observation sentence is one on
which all speakers of the same
language give the same verdict when
.

given the same concurrent stimulation.

The positive statement does not distinguish
between
(a)

sentences upon which all members
of the community agree because
as a matter of fact they have

had similar or shared past
experiences
and
(b)

sentences that are not sensitive
to differences in past experience.

Quine's positive formulation makes use only of the notion
of community-wide agreement under same concurrent stimulation.

This notion is to be an adequate representation,

in behavioral terms

,

of the dispositional notion of

sensitivity to differences in past experience that occurs
in the negative formulation.

Consideration of an example of a sentence that conforms to the positive statement but not to the negative

statement might help make this point clear.
of Quine's examples of a sentence on

Consider one

which we can expect

.

,

;
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community -wide agreement
There have been black dogs.
shall argue that, though Quine may be
right about actual
community agreement, and thus that the
sentence conforms
to the positive statement of the definition,
the sentence
does not conform to the negative statement.
As a conI

sequence, a new way of putting the difficulty
discussed

earlier

is that the positive formulation fails
to ade-

quately

capture the dispositional notion of sensitivity.

Community agreement is

a product of the members of the

community having in fact shared

experiences

.

relevantly similar

They need not have done so

,

of course

and had they not done so the sentence would not be an

observation sentence.
All members of the community need not have had the
s ame

kind

of experience.

Some may have had, in the past,

a direct confrontation with a black dog

.

Others may have

some general knowledge about dogs and have additional

information of various sorts to decide that dogs probably come in a variety of colors, including black. Others

may have seen pictures of or have been told about black
dogs
We can suppose, however, that some member of the

community had no such experience (direct or indirect)
of dogs at all.

Such a person might respond to the

.
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query
Have there been black dogs?
in a variety of ways under
situations of stimulation in
which the other members of the
community would assent.
If the person were queried in
an "irrelevant" stimulus

situation, he would probably give an inhibited
response.
This would not count as a verdict.
In other situations

,

depending on the stimulation

and information given the person, we might get
a dis-

senting verdict, an assenting verdict, or an
inhibited
response.

verdict

,

We are interested primarily in the dissenting

for such a verdict would change the sentence

from an observation sentence to a non-observation sentence, on the first Cor positive) formulation of the

definition
Consider the sorts of stimulations and information
we might offer.

If we were to show the person a (non-

black) dog and perhaps tell him a little about how dogs

function in our society (as hunters, pets, and so on),
his response when queried could reasonably be positive,

negative, or inhibited.

That would depend, in part, on

other information at his disposal.

His response might

be inhibited, for example, if he knew only that some

sorts of animals occur in a variety of colors and others
in only a very limited range (sparrows and lions, for example).
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He might be inclined to dissent
if the stimulation given

involved a white husky and the information
included some
discussion of the husky's performance in
snowy countries.
At this point, the sentence in
question is not
an ob-

servation sentence, on either definition.
If we were to continue our questioning,
however, we

should be able to provide stimulation and
information

sufficient to elicit- an assenting verdict.

The simplest

thing to do would be to show the person a
black dog and

provide the information that it was a dog.

We could

certainly expect an assenting verdict under that
condition.
He should also be disposed thereafter

sentence under all stimulations
of the community.

,

to assent to the

as do the other members

On the basis of this new experience,

he would join the rest of the members of his community.
The sentence has become an observation sentence

according to the positive statement of the definition.
But, according to the negative statement, it would not
be an observation sentence.

that the sentence

experience.

is_

The story

I

have told shows

sensitive to differences in past

It is precisely because the sentence is

thus sensitive that the changes in our speakers response

have occurred.
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The difference between the two
statements is, as
I have noted,
that the negative statement makes
use
° f the dispositional
notion of sensitivity to differences whereas the positive statement
is concerned
,

only with agreement of verdict over the
community.
The verdict one makes can, in cases
such as the one

I

have discussed, be based, in part, on one's
past ex-

perience-including the experience of learning observation sentences.
Surely there are many sentences such that
(a)

had the members of the speech
community had past experiences
that differed in certain ways
the members would differ in
their verdicts under the same
concurrent stimulation

and yet such that
(b)

as a matter of fact the members
have had the same kind of or
relevantly similar experiences
and thus agree on the verdict.

Any such sentences conform to the positive statement of
the definition but not to the negative statement.

Both the positive and the negative formulations of
the definition embody principles that are important to

Quine.

The positive formulation brings out the notions

of objectivity and intersubjectivity by its emphasis on
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agreement among members of the community
of speakers.
It is important to Quine’s task
in the first chapters of
Word and Object to have an objective
criterion
of

observationality

.

mtersubjectivity

In his accounts of language-learning
is very important.

two notions are very closely related.

For Quine, these
This is, in

part, the point of the account of
language-learning ac-

cording to which ostension, socially inculcated
responses,
and stimulus-response conditioning play a
necessary
role in such learning.

The positive statement of the

definition is supposed to reflect the result of these

teaching and learning methods

,

for it is observation

sentences that are said to be learned by them.
In a sense, the negative formulation of the defi-

nition is also supposed to bring out the objective
nature of observation sentences.

What it tries to get

are those responses that all members have in common

irrespective of differences in past experiences
stress here, as it was in Word and Object

,

.

The

is on those

sentences to which collateral information would make
no difference.

Quine, of course, finds there to be

grave difficulties in attempts to distinguish between

community-wide collateral information and information

.
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that goes into meaning. 50

if he is to use this nega-

tive formulation, he needs to explain
what "sensitivity"
is and to show how appeals to
sensitivity avoid the dif-

ficulties he finds in distinguishing between
collateral

information and information that goes into meaning
of a
sentence
Quine's objections to such a distinction might
lead

him to reject such examples as 'There have been
black
dogs'.
"the

He might hold that any "speaker" who was at
odds

rest of the community on such a sentence was

not really a member of the relevant speaker community.
The speakers bizzare verbal behavior would be said to

show this 51
.

When the speaker's behavior comes into

line with that of the community, he becomes a member
of the community.

This suggestion would presuppose that the change
in the speaker's dispositions to verbal behavior is

not a matter of his having had certain experiences (and
thus the appropriate collateral information) but rather
of his having now learned the language.

This move,

of course, is simply to make the distinction between

what information goes into meaning and what goes beyond
as collateral information at a different level.

Should

.
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the distinction be made at that
level, it could equally
well be made within the language

Another way of putting my objection is
that Quine
needs some way of determining what
is to count
as

"speaking a language" or "being a member
of a speaker
community." For Quine, any method of making
such a

determination must not make use of the distinction
between the information involved in meaning
and communitywide collateral information.
On the other hand, no
one would wish to allow any

disagreement between two

speakers to count as a difference in the language
they
speak.

Speakers of the same language can have genuine

disagreements

.

Yet is difficult to see how one could

avoid this result without drawing a distinction like the
one Quine rejects.

Difficulties about determining

language is and
come up again.

I

who are its speakers will

discuss Quine’s suggestion about the

means of determining membership in a community of
speakers in subsection (iv) of this chapter.
(iii)

Degrees of observationality
The positive formulation of the definition of

servation sentence' has an interesting weakness.
tends

'ob-

It

to include any sentence whatever as an observation

sentence.

This is because the only criterion for observa-

:

.
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tionality is agreement within a community
of speakers.
If

a community were educated in a
sufficiently authori-

tarian manner, it would be possible to ensure
that all
members of the community agree on any sentence.
A

Leibnitzian dictator might ensure that all members
of
his community assent to the sentence
of petit perceptions

'

observation sentence.

.

'Apperceptions are

This sentence would then be an
This result is certainly non-

intuitive
Though there is a tendency

for the positive formu-

lation of the definition to include any sentence whatever as an observation sentence, it seems likely that

there are in fact, according to the positive formulation,
very few (if any) observation sentences.

Many sentences

that might be expected to count as observation sentences

would be excluded by the definition.

Here are some

examples
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

The
The
The
The
The

middle C on that piano is flat.
circuit breaker is tripped.
muffler if blown.
dancer on the left is doing a pli£.
Phillips screwdriver is on the bench. 52

These sentences might be commonly used by the members
of some subgroup within the community.

that all members

oJf

the subgroup

All are sentences

would give the same

verdict on under the same concurrent stimulations

.

They

"

,
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are not, however, sentences that
all members of the

speaker community at large would in fact
agree on.
Thus
they are not, according to the
definition, observation
sentences.
The lack of agreement does not seem
to
reflect the theoretical

(as opposed to observational)

nature of such sentences.

It reflects the knowledge

of the speakers of the language about the
objects or

activities involved.

In short, the disagreement on the

verdict seems to be due to differences in past
experiences.
They are sentences that are to use a phrase from
the

,

negative formulation,

experience

"sensitive to differences in past

.

Consider in this connection such sentences
Red

,

Table'

,

and 'Rabbit*

.

as

These sentences are used

by Quine as examples of observation sentences.

They

should then--unlike the five sentences discussed above-not be sensitive to differences in past experience within the speech community.

It is obvious, however, that

agreement on these sentences is due to the fact that
all or most members of the speech community have had

relevantly similar experiences.

It was, in most cases

by virtue of training in the language--hearing utterances
of the appropriate sentence in the appropriate circumstances

and so on--that the speakers acquired their dispositions

,
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to assent to or dissent from
the queried sentences

under various situations of stimulation.

This point

raises the question whether one must
have learned
these sentences in order to be a speaker
of the language,
and thus whether one must have had the
appropriate

stimulations with the concomitant training.
Quine considers this suggestion in Word and
Object

when he introduces the notion of degrees of
observationality
'Red' and 'Rabbit' are both treated as
observation
.

sentences.

'Red'

is, however, said to be more observa-

tional that 'Rabbit*.
There is less scope for collateral
information in deciding whether
a glimpsed thing is red than in
deciding whether it is a rabbit 53
.

.

admits
of 'Red*

,

however

,

that there is

,

even in the case

some scope for collateral information.

formation about lighting conditions

,

In-

and knowledge about

their relevance, might affect one's response to the query
'Red?'

under some stimulations.

Though the role of collateral information in the
case of color words is

played down by Quine

clear that such information is important.

,

it seems

Suppose that

one were in the presence of what appeared to be a red

rabbit and were queried 'Red?'

Knowing what we do of

, .

.
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rabbits we might well dissent, even
though there were
no other reason to suppose that there
was anything
funny about the situation.
Rabbits are not characteristically red. This collateral information
would lead
one to dissent, perhaps on the assumption
that something had been done to the lighting.
Someone not

having this knowledge would, presumably, assent
to the
sentence
Many such cases could be constructed by the use of

examples of natural objects that occur in only some
colors

.

A sophisticated user of the language is aware

moreover, of such things as subtle effects of differences
in lighting on the appearance of an object and the

effects of such things as drugs on the observer.
This awareness will enter into his judgments.

admits this

,

Quine

but treats it as though it were of impor-

tance only in those cases in which something odd occurs
In fact, this knowledge must always come into play.

The

judgment that an object is red, even when made in normal
conditions, is conditioned by the assumption that the
conditions are normal.

Thus the collateral information

about the effects of light on the appearance of the object is called into play in the assent to or dissent

from the queried sentence.
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Thus, the positive formulation is so
strong that
few, if any, sentences turn out to
be in fact observation
sentences.
It does not take into account errors
in

application of collateral information such as
principles
relating lighting conditions to color. On
the other
hand, because one can be trained to assent
to virtually
any sentence in virtually any circumstances

it allows

,

any sentence at all to be an observation sentence,
given
the appropriate training of the members of the
speech

community.
useless.

The negative formulation seems to be quite

Every sentence is sensitive to differences in

past experience.

Even color sentences

such as

must be learned in appropriate circumstances

’Red*

Such

.

sentences are obviously sensitive to differences in the
of different speakers.

There is no guarantee

that every member of what one would want to call a

speech community will have had relevantly similar experiences.

Perhaps most important, the use of even

color sentences

,

which are most observational

,

requires

the application of collateral principles and collateral

information or hypotheses about present conditions and
own’s own present recognitional capacities.
(iv)

The absolute standard

One of the weaknesses

I

found in Quine's defini-

tion concerned the difficulty of identifying a community

.

:
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of speakers.

I

was concerned that distinguishing
such

a community might require a distinction
similar to the

analytic-synthetic distinction,

a distinction between

information pertaining to meaning and community-wide
collateral information 54
.

I

was also concerned that,

without such a distinction, Quine might be unable
to
distinguish cases in which speakers disagreed over
the facts from those in which they were speaking
dif-

ferent languages
Quine considers the problem of presenting a cri-

terion for membership

in a community of speakers

And what is the criterion of membership in the same community? Simply
general fluency of dialogue. This
criterion admits of degrees and
indeed we may usefully take the community more narrowly for some studies
than for others. What count as observation sentences for a community of
specialists would not always so count
for a larger community 55
,

.

This passage speaks directly to my objections in

connection with such sentences as 'The circuit breaker
is tripped'.

Such sentences seemed to be cases of ob-

servation sentences, yet they would be excluded from
the class of observation sentences on Quine's definition.

Sentences like these, he says are
for some subgroup of the community

observation sentences
.

Such groups are

to be considered, for some studies, to be speakers of

^

.
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a different language, one with
a different class of observa-

tion sentences, from the rest of
their "community." Since
the responses of the members of
the subgroup are sufficiently bizarre compared to those of
the rest of the
larger community, we count them, for
some purposes, as
a separate community.

One person may,

I

assume, belong to a number of

different such linguistic communities.

The philosopher

who plays ragtime and the auto mechanic who
is a

devotee of the ballet belong to several different
sub-

communities
of dialogue
in

.

I

am not convinced that "general fluency

is a satisfactory criterion for membership

a community of speakers.

My reasons for this will

come up in the following discussion of Quine’s claims

about the objectivity of observation sentences as he

conceives of them.
Quine says that one important aspect of his defi-

nition is that observation sentences are not subjective.
On his definition, he says,
a corporeal subject matter is likelier
than not

He compares his view with an older view according to

which such sentences are associated with
a subjective sensory subject
matter
.
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Quine says that the rejection
of the older view
by other philosophers has
resulted in a reaction that
he calls "epistemological
nihilism." He finds this
nihilism to be reflected somewhat
in the attitudes
of such contemporary philosophers
as N. R. Hanson,
T.

S.

Kuhn, and Michael Polanyi.

He says of these

philosophers that they tend
to belittle the role of evidence
and to accentuate cultural relativism.
Hanson ventured even to
discredit the idea of observation,
.

.

arguing that so-called observations
vary from observer to observer with
the amount of knowledge that the
observers bring with them 57
.

Quine's account, as we have seen, depends
on inter
subjective agreement on observation sentences
under

similar stimulations.

He claims that collateral in-

formation is irrelevant to these sentences.

He must,

therefore, respond to a view of the sort described
in
this quotation.

He does so in a discussion of an

example used by Hanson:
The veteran physicist looks at some
apparatus and sees an x-ray tube. The
neophyte, looking at the same place,
observes rather 'a glass and metal
instrument replete with wires, reflectors, screws, lamps, and pushbuttons.'
One man's observation is

.

.
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another man’s closed book or
flight of fancy. The notion
of observation as the impartial
and objective source of evidence
fop science is bcinkpupt ^ 8
.

Note that the objectivity in
question here is not, at
least directly, concerned with the
objects to which
such sentences may refer.
Indeed, in this part of
his discussion Quine makes use of
the primary account
of observation sentences, according
to which they are
not about anything since they have
no semantical
,

function
Quine

s

response to this view is interesting.

On

the one hand, he seems to think that it is
correct and
to claim that he has already handled such
examples by

introducing the notion of variation in observationality
according to "the width of the community considered "59
.

On the other hand, he maintains, against what he
takes
to be the denial by such philosophers as Kuhn and
Hanson,

that the observation sentences are

the impartial and

objective source of evidence for science.
In maintaining that observation sentences are the

impartial and objective source of evidence, Quine
introduces what he calls an "absolute standard" for

observationality
Now my answer to the x-ray example
was already hinted a little while
back:
what counts as an observa-
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tion sentence varies with the
width of community considered.
But
we can also get an absolute
s tandard by taking
in all speakers
of the language, or most. 60
Since Quine accepts variation
within the community about what is an observation
sentence, it is especially important that he provide
a criterion for membership in the community that will
alow the application
of the absolute standard.
The criterion he has suggested is "simply general fluency of
dialogue. "61 His
acceptance of the example of the x-ray tube
suggests

that this criterion is problematic.

To some degree,

subgroups within the larger community do not
have general
fluency of dialogue with other speakers of their
language.

We need to distinguish those whose lack of gen-

eral fluency is due to their being members of some
sub-

group of the community (as well as of the larger community)

and those who are not members of the community.

Quine does not say enough here about what is to be re-

quired for "general fluency" to determine whether the
criterion will be adequate.
Quine’s suggestion, in his presentation of the ex-

ample of the x-ray tube, that observation sentences are
the objective source of evidence for science is also
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problematic.

It is not clear how
observation sentences

as he construes them can
serve this function.

next section

In the

consider a general view that is in
important respects like the one Quine
ascribes
I

to Kuhn,

Hanson, and Polanyi.

Then

I

consider briefly Quine’s

claim that this view implies the
bankruptcy of observation as a source of evidence, and
consider whether on
his own account of observation
sentences these sentences
can serve as the impartial and objective
source
of

evidence for science.
B.

An Opposing View of Observation Sentences

When he introduced the notion of an observation
sen-

tence in Word and Object

,

Quine said that he could

say

"without fear of

contradiction" that the stimulus meaning
of observation sentences does full justice to their
meaning
His views on observation sentences are not, however,
so

lacking in controversy as this statement suggests
this subsection
.

I

.

In

consider the views of some philosophers

who would disagree with Quine's conception of observa-

tion sentences.
Quine notes in "Epistemology Naturalized"

that

Kuhn, Hanson, and Polanyi would raise objections to his

definition.

I

discussed his response to one such ob-

jection in the last section.

In this section I want to
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consider the objections in more
detail.
In introduce
the general view in which I am
interested by discussing
some claims made by Kuhn in The
Structure of Scientific
I then consider a
-.^Xi'- LU tion
refinement of the general
view based on some arguments given
by Bruce Aune in
.

Knowledge

Mind and Nature

.

6 3

In response to anticipated objections
to his def-

inition of observation sentences, Quine
suggests an
absolute standard. When this standard is
applied, all
or most speakers of the language must agree
on their

verdict for a sentence to be considered to be
an observation sentence.

The intuition is that while some members

of the community might form sub- communities
in their

agreement about certain sentences that other members
of the community disagree about,

there will be some group

of sentences that all members of the larger community

agree on.
One obvious subgroup is the scientific community.
In proposing his absolute standard, Quine supposes that

when a member of the scientific community utters 'Red'
he is using the same sentence as a member of the larger

community who is not a member of the scientific community.

All members of the larger community are sup-

posed to agree on the verdict about the same sentence.
Some philosophers, because they disagree with Quine's

claim about the meaning of observation sentences
deny that this is so.

,

would

5

.
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Consider Kuhn's views, as given in
his (1962).
For
him, the very conception of what
it is to be a physical
object is determined by the conceptual
scheme of
the

speaker. The utterance 'Physical object'
by a Newtonian,
for example, is about a different kind
of object than. is
the utterance of ’Physical object'
by an Einsteinian.

Phys-

ical objects have radically different
properties in the
different conceptual schemes. 6l+
Kuhn presents this position in a discussion
of the

concepts of space, time, and mass.
The physical referents of the Newtonian
concepts are by no means identical
with those of the Einsteinian concepts
that bear the same name.
(Newtonian
mass is conserved; Einsteinian is convertible with energy.
Only at low
relative velocities may the two be
measured in the same way, and even
then they must not be conceived to
be the same. 6

Both scientists say that physical objects have mass; but
in using the sign design

'mass', they ascribe radically

different properties to objects.

Kuhn calls this "the

displacement of the conceptual network through which
scientists view the world" when one scientific view
succeeds another. 66

It is almost as though two people

have used the name 'Tom' but were referring to different

people
Kuhn's emphasis in this book is on the influence
of theories, or paradigms, on what is observed.

For him,

65

the difference between the
paradigm of the scientific

community and that of the other members
of the larger
community would result in their speaking
different

lan-

guages

even though they might make use of
some of the
same sign designs.
Kuhn would deny that the use of an
,

observation sentence such

.as

'Red’

by members of the

scientific community is the same as that of
the rest
of the community.

He would object to Quine's ab-

solute standard on the ground that it falsely
supposes
’Red'

to have the same meaning for all members of
the

putative larger speech community.
While Kuhn’s position is very interesting, it is
a rather special case of the general position I wish
to

consider.

In particular, Kuhn is committed to the

view that scientific (and other) theories are incom-

mensurable.

The incommensurability thesis does not,

however, seem to be what Quine is attacking in his dis-

cussion of objectivity in science.

Rather, his objections

are raised in connection with the view, shared by Kuhn,

Hanson, and Polanyi, among others, that observation is

theory-laden.

This view does not by itself entail the

incommensurability thesis.

Thus, though Kuhn's remarks

serve as an introduction to the alternative view of

observation sentences that

I

wish to discuss,

I

now

.

,
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turn to works of other philosophers
in order to continue my description of the
more general view that I
take Quine to be attacking.
In the remainder of this
section, I make use of passages
from the work of Bruce
Aune and Wilfrid Sellars.
In his discussion of "Common-Sense
Colors and

Theoretical Science," Aune takes up the
issue whether
a word such as
red' has the same meaning in scientific
and in common sense languages.

This question is

relevant to the evaluation of Quine's absolute
standard.

Aune uses the example of the word 'red'.
From the fact that even philosophically
minded scientists those with considered views on the relation between
science and common sense commonly use
ordinary words one cannot infer that
these words as they use them continue
to possess their ordinary meanings
On the contrary it would be entirely
natural to suppose that anyone who
explicitly resolved a conflict between
his ordinary and his scientific notions (assuming that one existed) might
well continue to use many of the same
words, such as "red", in response to
the same sensory experiences as before.
What would be different about his use
of these words would be their radically changed liaisons with other
expressions of his total language.
Given this sort of change one
might say that while many of the
utterances he makes are still triggered by the same sensory experiences
they would no longer have the same

—

—

,

,

,
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meanings as before and hence would
not involve the same claim. 67
Like Kuhn's discussion, Aune's
is, in the begin
ning, about words and not
sentences
According to the
view Aune describes, the meaning
of the word 'red'
uttered by members of a scientific
community is different from the meaning of 'red'
uttered by other
.

members of the "larger community."

Though the sign

design is the same in both cases, the
meanings are different.
They do, in some, perhaps many, cases,
produce the same designs in similar circumstances;
to make
the point more Quinean, they agree on their
verdict when

someone queries them with the sign design 'Red?' in
the same situations of stimulation, for example.

Aune and Kuhn do not argue that the stimulus meanings of sentences differ for the scientific and the lay

communities

.

It does seem reasonable to suppose that

there will be some differences even here, however.

srences might involve ways of deciding what are
the lay community, borderline cases.

These
,

for

They might also

result from differences in the background knowledge that
a scientist brings to a situation.

He would perhaps be

more likely to make discriminations on the basis of back-

ground information about the states of observers (including himself) and the nature of the circumstances in

8
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which a sentence is queried.
not the primary ones.

But such disagreements are

The primary disagreement between

Qume

on the one hand and Aune and
Kuhn on the other is
over Quine's claim that the
stimulus meaning of an

observation sentence does full justice
to its meaning.
This disagreement involves
disagreement over the ways
which these sentences are learned
and over the role

m

of the sentences in the language.

The issues are complicated by the fact
that Aune

speaks of the meanings of words and Quine
speaks of the

"meanings" of sentences.

Quine might be inclined to

agree with Aune that the scientist's use of
the word
’red'

is different from the layman's.

Even if he did

so, he would maintain that the meaning of
the sentence
'Red'

is the same for both.

Any cases of differences

in verdict would probably not be important to him,
since

they are likely to involve borderline cases about which

there is no general agreement within the lay community
in any case.

For Quine, the observation sentence 'Red'

(in this context) does not contain its associated term

'red'.

meaning

The meaning of the sentence is its stimulus
.

6

Aune would,

I

think, say that 'Red', if it is a

sentence at all, is shorthand for something like 'This
is red'

and claim that the sentence does, contrary to

Quine's view, contain the predicate 'red'.
;

Quine's
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gloss of the sentence 'Rabbit'
as 'Lo, a rabbit' suggests
that 'Red' is a shorthand for
a sentence that is more
easily recognizable as a sentence
in English, and that
'This is red' might do.

But Quine does not think that

the sentence 'This is red', as
observation sentence, has
structure or semantical function.
For him, the sentence
is a whole unit that is independent
of any other linguisiiic items and is learned by
ostension.

Aune denies that sentences are learned as
units

independent of any other sentences. 69
that ostension does not play the

role

He also argues
in language-

learning that philosophers like Quine claim for it. 70
He would, however, agree that "observation
sentences"

are uttered as responses to stimulation, that they
are

causally related to the world.
tences are not just

responses to external stimuli, as

Quine's view suggests;
As linguistic items

But observation sen-

they are linguistic responses.

they must be capable of function-

,

ing in the language, for example, in inferences.

Quine's

non-s tructured observation sentences cannot function
in inferences

.

Wilfrid Sellars

'

discussion of observation sentences

in "Some Reflections on Language Games" brings out this

last point. 71

He draws an analogy between speaking a

language and playing a game of chess.

We can think of

.
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sentences as marking positions
in the game of language,
which we occupy when we utter
them.
We move from one
position to another in the game
when we do such things
as making inferences.
We might, for example, move
from the position 'This is red' to
a position such as
'This is colored'.
It is important to note that

position

m

the game.

'This is red' is a

Because it is a position, we must

be able to come to occupy that
position and to move from

that position to other positions.

If one has learned the

sentence, one is able to use it in making moves
in the

language game

as_

well as

to respond to the appropriate

stimuli by producing it. 7 2
The view under consideration rejects the atomistic

account of observation sentences offered in Quine's

primary account.

On this view, the sentence

red' does contain the predicate

'red'.

'This is

Since it is also

claimed that the predicate 'red' as used by the scientist
is different from the predicate

the observation sentence

'red' used by the layman,

'This is red'

(or its ab-

breviation 'Red') also differs in meaning for the two
communities
It is claimed, then, that the scientist and the lay-

man are responding to different sentences when they assent to or dissent from queries such as

'This is red?'

.
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Quine's absolute standard supposes
that there is only one
sentence.
Thus, the absolute standard is
rejected by
philosophers who hold the general
viewed described.
When Quine discusses a view of the
sort I have
described, he makes several rather
strong claims about
it.
First, he describes the view as
reflecting a mood
of epistemological nihilism".
After discussing an example, one used by Hanson, he suggests
that, according
to this view,
The notion of observation as the
impartial and objective source of
evidence for science is bankrupt. ^ 3
My descriptions of the views of Kuhn,
Aune

are by no means complete

,

and

I

,

and Sellars

have not defended these

philosophers against Quine's charges of subjectivity.
But there is nothing in the views as

I

have so far

described them that makes it obvious that they abandon

objectivity or that they reflect a mood of "epistemological nihilism".

It is

,

I

think, up to Quine to state clearly

his standards of objectivity and to argue that views of
the sort described fail to meet these standards.

The

comments he makes on the example from Hanson's writing

provide neither a statement of these standards nor any
argument to show that the philosophers have abandoned

objectivity

4
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It is also incumbent upon
Quine to show how, on

his

account, observation remains the
impartial and objective source of evidence for
science.
Note that the
account of observation sentences
that Quine must use

m

showing this is the primary account,
that account
discussed in Subsection A of Section I.
According to
the secondary account, observation
sentences are about

objects.

This is the account in which observation

sentences are understood from the point of
view of a
theory.
This secondary account is much like the view
I

have described in this subsection, a theory-laden

view that Quine rejects as reflecting a mood of
epist-

mological nihilism and abandoning objectivity.

Thus it

is important that Quine make clear what his
standards

of objectivity are and how his own second account of

observation sentences meets them.
Consider Quine's primary account of observation
sentences.

According to it, observation sentences are

indeed impartial and objective, in that they do not involve a theory of objects.

Indeed, as Quine claims,

all true observation sentences are consistent with al-

ternative, incompatible theories, and conversely
In Subsection C of Section of this chapter,

.

I

I

discussed the difficulties, for Quine, in showing how
a learner of the language comes to adopt a theory of
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objects.

noted then that this was an important
difficulty because it was closely
related to the problem
of the relation between observation
and scientific
theory.
And indeed the same problems arise
in showing
how observation sentences are the
repositories of evidence for scientific theories.
Observation sentences,
I

according to Quine, do not enable us to
choose among
different theories. These theories may be
radically
diffsi’ont in the objects they posit.
It is

true

,

on Quine's account, that we might be

inclined to reject a theory if it were not compatible
with some observation sentence or sentences that we

believe to be true.

Quine has argued, though, that one

could equally well reject the observation sentence and

accept the theory.
for doing this

.

There might be complicated reasons

One might decide that the observation

sentence is in fact false because it depends on an in-

strument the theory of which is false.
just be rejected ad hoc.

Or it might

It is only a psychological

fact that observation sentences are among those that we

will be most reluctant to reject.

Moreover, sentences other than observation sentences are also used in deciding whether to accept a
theory.

If the theory is incompatible with any state-

,

.
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ment that we believe to be true,
we will be inclined to
reject it.
So being the ground for
inclining us to
reject or accept a theory is not
a trait of observation
sentences, as such, that makes them
capable of being

repositories of evidence for theories.
Unfortunately, Quine has very little to say
about

how observation sentences function in
providing evidence.

He needs to justify his claims about their
ob-

jectivity and their ability to provide evidence.
looks as though observation sentences
are objective (theory-neutral)

among theories.

,

,

It

insofar as they

do not help us to choose

To the extent that they do help us to

make theoretical choices

,

they do so in part

,

not be-

cause of their objectivity and impartiality, but

because of our attitude toward them, i.e.
to abandon them.

our reluctance

Quine needs to show in addition that

these attitudes are, on the whole, justified if he is
to make his claim convincing.

Moreover, he must show

clearly how the primary and secondary accounts are related

.

This is because it is only on the secondary--theory-

laden--account that such sentences have structure and so
are able

to have inferential connections with one another

and with theoretical sentences

.
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C
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Summary
In Section I,

I

draw a distinction between two

views of observation sentences
that are implicit in
Quine's writings on that topic.
On the primary account, which I discuss in Subsection
A, observation
sentences are conceived as mere
learned responses to

stimulation.

On this account, observation
sentences

are independent (in various ways)
of

other observation

sentences and of theoretical sentences,
unstructured,

theory-neutral, and without the usual
semantical
functions
The secondary account is discussed in
Subsection

B.

On this account, observation sentences
are connected with

one another and with theoretical sentences,
have structure,
are theory-laden, and have the usual semantical
functions.
In Subsection B

two accounts.

I

I

suggest a means of reconciling the
do not, however, present the details

of such a reconciliation; nor am

I

convinced that Quine

can make good all of the claims he wishes to make about

his conception of the observation sentence.

Some of these

appear to be plausible only because he conflates what
I

claim to be two importantly
I

different accounts.

find the distinction between the two accounts

important in clarifying some of Quine’s claims in con-

nection with his epistemology, philosophy of language,
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and philosophy of science.

His discussions of language-

learning provide much of the support for my
attribution
to Quine of the seven claims that
characterize the

primary account.

In Subsection C,

I

critically examine

Quine's discussions of language-learning.

I

take these

discussions to be important for several reasons.

First,

his claims about the objectivity of observation
sentences
are based on his claims about the ways in which
such sen-

tences can be learned.

It is because

they can be learned

ostensively (i.e., because they are related in an approw&y

"to

sensory stimuli) that they are objective.

These claims are important in Quine's discussions of epi-

stemology and the philosophy of science.

Second, the

purported role of observation sentences in enabling the
child to learn a language has some consequences for more

general views about the relation between observation and
theory.

Finally, Quine assimilates the position of the

language-learning child with that of the field linguist
attempting to learn a new language.

So his claims about

the language-learner should shed light on his discussions
of the indeterminacy of translation.
In Section II, Subsection A, I examine in detail

the definition of 'observation sentence' given in Word
and Ob j ect and elaborated upon in "Epistemology Naturalized."
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After considering the criteria for
the definition and how
the definition is to fit them,
I discuss two
issues.

Quine

First

definition fails to exclude sentences that
he
characterizes as analytic.
Second, the two formulations
of the definition he provides
are not equivalent.
These
issues are related, since .it is a failure
of Quine's attempt to provide a behavioral
explication of a dispositional term that causes the difficulty.
s

Quine discusses some objections to his definition

that might be raised by certain contemporary
philosophers
of science.

He

answers these by introducing an "absolute

standard" for observationality

.

At the same time, he

criticizes these philosophers for abandoning objectivity
in their discussions of observation.

take up these

I

criticisms at the end of the subsection.
In Subsection B,

I

describe an alternative view

of observation sentences.

The view as

I

describe it

includes those of the philosophers criticized by Quine.
This view is an important one to consider in the ex-

amination of Quine's views because it is quite similar
to Quine's secondary account.

how it is that his

Thus, Quine must explain

theory-laden view of observation

sentences avoides the criticisms he levels at Kuhn,
Hanson, and others.

Such an explanation wo._ld provide

the details of the reconciliation of the primary and
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secondary accounts of observation
sentences.
The discussion of observation
sentences

have
provided is used in Chapter II in
my explications of
the underdetermination and
indeterminacy theses.
Specific discussions of the bearing
of these on Quine's
claims about observation sentences
are given at the end
of Sections

I

and II of that chapter.

I
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I

CHAPTER
I.

II

UNDERDETERMINATION OF THEORIES
/

i

Introduction
At the end of Chapter II of Word and
Object

lation and Meaning,"

,

"Trans-

Quine says that all our theories

and beliefs are underdetermined by all the
possible

sensory evidence. 1 This is a claim that
the name

I

'underdetermination of theories'.

consider under

A more

detailed statement of this thesis is given by Quine
in the ar tide "On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of

Translation

.

"2

'

My discussion of underdetermination

regies heavily on the explication given there.

Quine first introduces two weak forms of an

underdetermination thesis.

According to the first

form, a theory is underdetermined by past evidence.

Quine

says that this form

it

of the thesis is clearly true:

seems obvious that there are alternative

,

incompatible

theories all compatible with all past evidence.

That

claim leaves open the question whether such theories

.

.

:
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also compatible with evidence
that will become available in the future
The second form of the
thesis is somewhat stronger.
Naturally, [physical theory]
is underdetermined by
past and future evidence
combined ." 3 This is because the past and future
evidence is comprised only
of those actually observed
(and to-be-observed) events.

Alternative, incompatible theories
could be compatible
with all these, it is claimed.
That claim leaves open
the question whether such theories
are also compatible

with other, observable but unobserved
events.
The thesis

accepted.

m

either of these forms is commonly

It is assumed, for example, in
discussions

of pragmatic criteria for choosing
theories, that al-

ternative hypotheses or theories are available.

Good-

man, in his discussion of induction, argues
that alter-

native hypotheses about a set of data can always
be

constructed
The thesis of underdetermination in the form held

by Quine is stronger than either of these formulations.
He holds that physical theory is underdetermined, not

just by actual

(past and future) observations, but

by all possible observations
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theo ies can be at odds with
earh^h
each
other and^ compatible with
all
possible data even in the
broadest
sense.
In a word, they can be
logiCa ^
incompatible and empirically
y
equivalent .6
.

The empirical equivalence
of theories would seem

to involve their consequences
about observational

data.

Two theories would then be
empirically equi-

valent if and only if they implied
exactly the same
observation sentences. This reading
is suggested by
Quine's talk, in "Epistemology Naturalized,"
for example, of the empirical consequences
of the more theoretical sentences of a theory. 7 What is
suggested
in the passage just quoted, however,
is not implica-

tion

but compatibility with such data.

would then be empirically equivalent

Two theories

if and only if

they were compatible with exactly the same
observation

sentences.

This seems rather weak.

If one theory

implied an observation sentence and the other implied

neither that sentence nor its negation, both would be
compatible with that sentence and so could be empirically

equivalent

.

If this is what is meant by empirical

equivalence, the alternative, incompatible theories in
the other formulations of the underdetermination thesis

need not have the same "empirical consequences."

Though

^

.

.

this passage suggests that
empirically equivalent theories are compatible with all
possible data this is
probably not intended. It seems
unlikely, since then
two theories that were
compatible with all the same
,

observation .-sentences

,

some of which were false, would

not be empirically equivalent.
be empirically equivalent

Surely, theories could

even though false.

Compa-

tibility with all possible data is,
however, a sufficient
condition for empirical equivalence
Quine elaborates the statement according
to which

Physical theory is underdetermined
even by all possible observations
.

In the elaboration, he explains his
use of

observations

'

'possible

in terms of place-timed sentences

Not to make a mystery of this mode
of possibility what I mean is the
following.
Consider all the observation sentences of the language
all
the occasion sentences that are suited
for use in reporting observable events
in the external world.
Apply dates
and positions to them in all combinations without regard to whether
observers were at the place and time.
Some of these place-timed sentences
will be true and the others false by
virtue simply of the observable
though unobserved past and future
events in the world.
Now my point
is that physical theory is underdetermined even by all these truths.
Theory can still vary though all
possible observations be fixed. Phys,

:

,

,

.
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ical theories can be at odds with
each
other and yet compatible with all
possible data even in the broadest
sense a

Quine expects there to be wide
agreement with his
thesis of underdetermination of
theories. He admits
that there might be disagreements about
which parts
of a theory are underdetermined.

He himself be-

lieves that the thesis applies even to
"common-sense

traits of macroscopic bodies. "10

He supposes, how-

ever, that there may be those who take the thesis
to
be applicable only to the more speculative
portions

of physical theory.

This expected difference between Quine and

other philosophers of science about the application
of the thesis is readily explained.

Quine treats

science and common sense as continuous with one another.
For him, science is not set against common sense with,

for example, its own standards of evidence and truth.
For him, our ordinary talk of physical bodies

— of

tables and trees, chairs and f lowers--itself involves
a theory of the world that is to be treated like any

other scientific theory.

There is no reason to sup-

pose that one physical theory (that of ordinary,

middle-sized objects)

is in any better position with

respect to underdetermination than any other theory.

H
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The physical object theory is
only a different theory
from, say, the molecular theory.
It has no special
status, except as being more
ancient and more widely

held than others

.

Since he accepts the underdetermination
thesis,
his view that the theory of
ordinary bodies is a scientific theory compels him to apply
that thesis to

common-sense traits of macroscopic bodies."

He

has good reason to suppose that other
philosophers
of science disagree about this matter.

For example,

though Feyerabend treats the "theory" of
ordinary physical objects as a scientific theory, Sellars
does not 12
.

And both differ from Quine in their treatment
of the

relation between such "theory" and other theories.
In Subsection (A)

I

discuss whether the thesis

is applicable to all physical theories.

distinguishing two kinds of theories
theories and explanatory theories

.

I

I

,

follow Harre

reticular

argue that

,

al-

though it appears that reticular theories are not

underdetermined, Quine would say that they are.

This

discussion allows me to elaborate the thesis somewhat
and to consider one possible motivation for it.

Subsection (B)

I

In

consider some objections to Quine's

s
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formulation of the thesis
...
mesis +•>>=+that are based on criticisms
of his views on observation
sentences.
,

A.

,

Two Kinds of Theories

In Ma tter

and.

Method, Harre distinguishes between
two

kinds of theories, reticular theories
and explanatory
theories.
Reticular theories are those that " connect
u£ facts of the same kind.
.”13
Explanatory
.

.

theories "explain one set of facts by adducing
in ex-

planation another and different set of facts." 14
distinction between

Harre’

reticular theories and explanatory

theories is, as we shall see, much like Feyerabend's

distinction between empirical generalizations and
universal theories.

Harre

’

s

distinction can be maintained

aL different theoretical levels, however.

In my dis-

cussion, reticular theories are assumed to reticulate
or connec

l

up facts at the level of observation 13
.

The essential point in the difference between
uhe two kinds of theories Harre discusses is that only

explanatory theories

,

and not reticular theories

,

in-

troduce theoretical concepts that are not reducible
to the concepts involved in what is to be "explained".
In the sorts of cases

I

be observation concepts.

consider, these concepts will
So, in this case, reticular
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theories do not introduce concepts
that are not reducible
to observational concepts
and clusters of observational
concepts.
Explanatory theories,
in this case, are

theories that introduce irreducible
theoretical concepts— such as the concept of an atom.

Theoretical terms
theories as well.

observational terms.

of a sort--do occur in reticular

But these terms are reducible to

They do not introduce any new set

of facts (about nonobservable
objects, for example).

The "theoretical " concepts of a
reticular theory serve

systema tize observational data by correlating
or connecting them.

Harre gives as an example of a reticular theory

Newtonian dynamics.

He says of this theory:

Newton knew of a number of regularities
in the phenomena of motion, some from
the investigations of Kepler and Galileo,
and some from discoveries made in his
own time. His problem was essentially
to find a way of connecting up all
the x acts of motion, both terrestrial
and celestial partially and fragmentarily connected up by his predecessors.-^
.

,

Harre

'

s

statement of Newton's task presupposes that

the theory that will accomplish that task is to be a

reticular one, for the task is the connecting up
a set of facts

(those about motion)

of the same kind.

of

that are essentially
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Newton introduced in the theory
of dynamics the
concept of force.
It is by means of this
concept that
he was able to connect up
the facts about motion.
The
concept of fo rce Harre claims,
is eliminable.
The
concept "never appears in the
answer to a genuine
mechanical problem. It is only part
of the working.
Concepts which are only part of the
working are not
used to express facts. "18 This is
part of his support
for the claim that the theory is
not an explanatory
,

theory— there are no facts expressed by
principles involving theoretical terms other than those
about
observables.

Forces are never observed in nature.

Newtonian dynamism is thus, according to him,
a reticular theory.
It does not attempt to explain

facts of

one kind (those about motion) by alluding to
facts of

another kind.

ihere are no additional facts about

forces as such.

Given Harre

'

s

distinction between reticular

and explanatory theories

,

one might suggest that at best

onl y explanatory theories and not reticular theories
are underdetermined by all the possible data. This

suggestion seems reasonable, because these theories
simply involve something like universal generalizations
about observables

.

It seems reasonable to suppose that

one could infer that all As are Bs

,

given that every

.
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instance of an A is also an
instance of a B and that all
possible instances are included
in our data.
So,
it seems reasonable to suppose
that all the possible data
do determine theories of a
certain sort, namely, those
that involve merely the connecting
up of these
data.

Before discussing this suggestion
in more detail,
I want to point out the
importance of the question whether
reticular theories are underdetermined.
First, if it

were decided that such theories are not
underdetermined,
tnis
limitation on the underdetermination would make
clearer what the thesis claimed.
But there is even
more reason to think this question important.

philosophers ciaim that no

Some

theory introduces theoretical

concepts that could not be eliminated in favor of

observational concepts.

In Harre’s terms, they claim

that all theories are reticular theories.

So, if re-

ticular theories are not underdetermined, then we could
say that, if this view about the elimination of theore-

tical concepts were sound, the underdetermination thesis
wou~ d be false

Consider the view discussed by Hempel in "The

Theoretician’s Dilemma."

Hempel examines a case in

which a "nonobservable entity," specific gravity, functions
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m

the theory much as Harre
claims force to function in
Newtonian dynamics
Hempel says , in a passage reminiscent of Harre on reticular
theories,
.

the assumption of nonobservable
entiries serves the purpose of
systematization:
it provides
connections among observables in
the form or laws containing theoretical terms.
^

.

He then suggests that the advantages
obtained by in-

troducing nonobservable entities could
just as well
be served without introducing them.

They are said to

be eliminable in terms of observables.

Discussion of this case leads Hempel to the

question whether, in general, terms for theoretical
entities can be eliminated from theories
ti.e

.

Since

general principles containing theoretical terms

are used merely for purposes of systematization, it
is supposed tnat these principles can always be
re-

placed by general statements in which only observational terms occur.

if so, then the systematization

can be achieved without the use of theoretical concepts

or theoretical entities.
This question leads to the theoretician’s dilemma,

the conclusion of which is that

"...

the theoretical

terms and principles of any theory are unnecessary "20
.

I*

this conclusion were true, then all theories would

be reticular theories.

.
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don’t plan to discuss the issue
of reductionism
detail here.
I pointed it out as
a possibility
I

m

to show

the importance for Quine's thesis
of under-

de termination of the distinction
Harre draws and for
the suggestion that reticular
theories are not under-

determined.

It is to the question whether
reticular

theories are underdetermined, in Quine's
sense, that
I now turn.
II beems prima facie

implausible to suppose that

reticular theories are underdetermined, in the
strong
sense used by Quine.
I gave the intuitive reasons

why

tnis is so above.

Reticular theories do not "go beyond"

the data, and all possible data can be supposed
to be

included.

Such theories merely provide ways of connec-

ting or systematizing, or classifying the data.

Clearly

,

there will be a very large number of dif-

ferent ways of connecting the data, particularly since
we are dealing with all possible data. But it is not

clear that such ways of connecting the data are logically

incompatible with one another and yet compatible with
all possible data.

There is a sense in which different

classifications are "incompatible" with one another; they
are

incompatible, simply by being different classifications

But this is not a logical

incompatibility.

The state-
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ment that an item is classified
as P by classification
system
c
and the statement that it is classified
as P by classification system
C' do not contradict
one another even though P and P'
are different kinds.
But though the suggestion that
the underdetermination thesis holds for such theories
seems implausible,
we should not be too quick to reject
it.
Quine does
not himself use Harre s terminology,
and he does not
’

discuss reticular theories in connection with
the under-

determination thesis.

Moreover, as

I

suggested above 21
,

there is reason to believe that Quine would
not even

make the distinction that Harre makes.

Some of his

work suggests that all theories are, for him, what
Harre calls explanatory theories:

Nevertheless

,

They posit entities 22
.

it is possible that Quine holds views

that would commit him to the view that even reticular

theories are underdetermined in his sense, or would so
commit one who held both those views and made the dis-

tinction in question.
this is so.

I

consider two arguments that

The first argument has to do with the

cardinality of the set of data; the second with the
nature of the observation terms to which theoretical terms
of reticular theories are to be reducible.
(

i

The first argument

)

This first argument depends on the fact that, for

Quine, there are only denumerably

I

i

*

»

many sentences.

Quine

l
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explains his use of the phrase
'all possible observations’
in terms of observation
sentences
He says that we take
all the observation sentences
of the language and apply
dates and positions to them in
all combinations irrespective of what observations have
or will be made. All
of the
truths that result still do not
determine
.

physical theory.
many sentences

,

Since there are only denumerably
there are only denumerably many place-

timed sentences.
I

can be argued that since there are only
denumerably

many place-timed observation sentences
even simple

hypotheses about the connections of the data
are underdetermined.

Considerations about curve-fitting prob-

lems in discussions of simplicity form the
basis of this

argument. 23

Suppose all the possible data about some

relation, as provided by Quine's procedure, are plotted
on the real plane.

sentences

,

There are only infinitely many

and so only infinitely many points are plotted

on the plane. Many different curves can be drawn that

pass through all these points--inf initely many between
any two points.

Each such curve would represent a

hypothesis about the values of the relation at those
places where no values were given by the original set
of data.

The hypotheses do not introduce any new theore-
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tical terms that cannot
be reducpd
auced to -m.
the observational
terms with which we
began nor do they introduce facts
of a new kind (e.g.,
about unobservable objects
or
entities). They serve
merely to connect the
previously
available data; they are,
in short, simply reticular
theories.
Yet they are incompatible
with one another,
since they make different
claims about the values of
the relation at infinitely
many points on the plane.
They are compatible with
all possible data, as Quine
explains this.
The problem is that there
are non-denumerably points
ln the plane
^d we assume that the relation is to be
defined at each of these. But
the value of the relation
’

m

question is determined for only
denumerably many
points.
For any two pairs of values
for the relation
whose values are being plotted,
there are non-denumerably
many other pairs of values between
them.
Choice of
a curve between any two pairs of
values will determine
values for the relation at the points
between
these.

These curves represent alternative,
incompatible hypotheses
about the values of the relation at those
points.
Thus,
even reticular theories are underdetermined
by all

possible data.
One might ask why this argument supposes
that there

are only denumerably place-timed sentences.

That is,

one might wish to reject that assumption, and
thus the

.
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argument would fail to
u go
20 thrv-m<T>.
trough

.

t
I

•

consider this ob,

section in order to explain
Quine's position more clearly.
The place-timed sentences
were said by Quine to provide
all the possible data.
Yet when we apply dates and

positions to the observation
sentences in all combinations
in accordance with Quine's
directions for getting all
the possible data, the result,
he claims, is only denumerably place-timed observation
sentences.
An objector might point out that
many topologies

for spatial-temporal structures
(for example, Carnap's) 24
have the cardinality of the real
numbers
There are
:

non-denumerably many "points" in the structure.
One
might suggest that a structure like that
one should be
used in the construction of the place-timed
sentences.
The dates and positions that Quine says
to apply to ob-

servation sentences would be "names for"
the space-time structure.

the points in

Applying dates and positions

to the observation sentences in all combinations
would

then result in non-denumerably many place-timed sentences
The values for any relation would then be given at all

points

,

since for each point the place-timed observa-

tion sentences have been constructed.

The curve,

representing a hypothesis about the values of the relation,
would be uniquely determined by all possible observations.

.
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But

think that Quine would reject
this suggestion.
First, it is not clear that
Quine makes use of a
Carnapian structure of space-time
in his characterization
of 'all possible observations'.
When he speaks of applying dates and positions to observation
sentences

m

I

all combinations" he may not have
in mind all dates

and positions in a structure of ideal
space.

Quine makes use of the device of applying
dates and

positions to sentences in various parts of
Word and
Object

.

He says, for example, that the meanings
of

observation sentences are their stimulus meanings 25
.

According to his definition, "a stimulus meaning is
the stimulus meaning of a sentence for a speaker
at a

date.

Observation sentences are thus place-timed

sentences relativized to persons 27
.

In developing the canonical notation, Quine avoids

the use of tenses by adopting temporally neutral verb

forms and applying dates and positions to sentences
One such use is to simplify logical deductions by

avoiding ambiguity in tensed verb forms. 2 ®
In these discussions, however, Quine does not

explain what is involved in the application of dates
and times to sentences

.

He does not indicate what

sort of space-time structure provides those dates and

.
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times.

It does, however, seem
reasonable to suppose
that he is not making use
of an ideal space-time

structure.

This is clearest in the
case of the place-

timed observation sentences
where the linguist may have
to be able to discriminate
the spatial or temporal
areas.
His handling of the other
case also suggests
that these areas are to be
discriminable

Moreover, this suggestion is supported
by the
fact that Quine would certainly
hold that there are at
most denumerably many sentences,
and so at most denumerably many observation sentences.
finally, Quine
does argue that there aren't enough
names for non-

denumerably many objects.

If he were to make use of

a Carnapian space-time structure in
the manner sug-

gested, his procedure

for

explaining all the

possible data would require non-denumerably names-names for the points of the structure 29
.

It is, then,

reasonable to suppose that Quine would agree with the
argument given above to show that even reticular theories
are underdetermined by all the possible data.

This

agreement involves a rejection of the objector's claims
about the Carnapian structure of space and time.
The objector's argument does

raise a puzzle about

Quine's characterization of the mode of possibility
used in his statement of the thesis of underdetermination
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of physical theory.

According to the argument,

there are alternative,
incompatible hypotheses, each
compatible with all possible
observations about the
values of a relation at
non-denumerably many points.
This, at least, is one
application of the thesis. Accepting one of these hypotheses
gives the value of the
relation at these points. The value
of the relation
assigned by a hypothesis at any point
is going to be
,

given by a place-timed observation
sentence not included among the original sentences. This
fact raises
the question to what extent Quine's
explanation of
'all possible observations' was adequate.

In what

sense are the new

place-timed sentences not part of

the possible data?

Clearly, Quine has to say some-

thing more about the structure of space-time that
is

involved in his explication of the mode of possibility
if he is to provide an adequate account of what
is in-

volved in his version of the thesis of underdetermination
of physical theory.

Perhaps the story he would tell

would rule out cases such as that discussed here.
One might still maintain that

Quine

is

wrong about' the matter of space-timed sentences

.

One

might claim that a Carnapian structure should be used
in the construction of the place-timed observation

.

.
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sentences.

Or one might claim that
my suggestion about
Quine’s response to the
objector is wrong!
Such a person might hold that the
objection supposes too much, and
that because of the proper
account of 'all possible
observations' the values of the
relation are given
at all points on the real
plane.
This person would
not be convinced by the first
argument that reticular
theories are underdetermined because
he would still
refuse to accept the premise about
the number of
sentences and names.
Such a person might, of course,
still hold that explanatory theories
are underdetermined.
The second argument I discuss speaks
to such a position,
for it does not depend on any limitation
on the number
of place-timed sentences
(

ii )

The second argument

Reticular theories have two important, related

characteristics

:

they don't introduce a new set of

facts (of a different kind) in explaining data and,
in
the sort of case

I

have been considering, any theoreti-

ca l terms introduced by them are reducible to observa-

tional terms or complexes of these.

The second argu-

ment that reticular theories are underdetermined in-

volves the reductions of theoretical terms to observa-

tional terms or complexes of these terms
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Quine’s account of underdetermination
makes use
of the notion of observation
sentences
His explanation
of what constitutes all
possible data explicitly uses
these sentences.
In my earlier discussion of
observation sentences I pointed out that
there appear to be
two different accounts of these
sentences in Quine's
work. 0 On one of these accounts,
observation sentences
are given as wholes which do not
have structure.
They
do not contain terms as parts.
This is the account that
.

is prominent in Quine's discussions
or language-learn-

ing and radical translation. 31

It appears also to

be the one required for his explanation
of the under-

determination thesis.
Given this account of observation sentences

,

the

between observation sentences and observation terms is essential. Ascription of the use of an

observation sentence to a speaker does not require
ascription to that speaker of a theory of any sort.

33

Ascription of the use of an observation term

does re-

quire ascription of a theory to the speaker.

Quine

claims in "On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Trans-

lation" that even the theory of physical objects is

underdetermined by all possible data.

The underdetermina-

.

.

100

tion thesis applies even to
macroscopic bodies.
it is the

"theory-neutral" account

So

of observation sen-

tences that is needed in the
explanation of underdetermination.
Observation sentences do not contain
terms,
on that account
It is, however, essential
to Harre

'

s

characteri-

zation of reticular theories that
there be observational te rms available. The "wholly
conceptual" theoretical terms introduced by such theories
cannot be

reduced simply to observation sentences.

There are no

simple reductions from theoretical principles
to ob-

servation sentences.

Theoretical terms and principles

of reticular theories serve to connect
data by showing

relationships among various observational terms

.

Re-

ductions of theoretical terms will not, on the whole,
be

term-to-term reductions.

They will be reductions

of a term to a complex of terms

.

Thus

,

one-word

observation sentences, such as ’Red', ’Yellow’,
and 'Square', will not be adequate, even if one could

make good sense of reducing terms to sentences.

In

order to get the observational terms needed for complex
reductions one needs not just observation sentences
that have no terms as parts

structure

,

but sentences that have

.
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Quine argues 3 5

that the introduction of terms,

even observation terms,
involves the introduction of
a theory of ordinary
middle-sized objects.
For him,
any such theory of objects,
even a theory of ordinary,

middle-sized objects, is underdetermined

.

36

Since re-

ticular theories require such a
theory (because they
require terms), they are underdetermined.
They are
underdetermined in the sense that they
cannot be explicated except given the context of
some theory.
Reticular theories can thus be said to be
underdetermined
insofar as the do in fact provide
systematization of
some presupposed theory.
They can be said to be underdetermined by virtue of the fact that they
require
not just observation sentences taken as
wholes but

sentences

that have structure, that contain terms

as parts, and thus involve an (underdetermined)
theory.
^-hink that much of what is said in this
argu-

ment is correct.

Reticular theories make sense only

in the context of a body of information that they

systematize.

The reduction of the theoretical terms of

a reticular theory will, in many cases, require

the use of observation terms

.

Because the reductions

will be complex, observation sentences will

not be

adequate
Of course, it does not follow from just this

that reticular theories are underdetermined

,

even in

-

.
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the extended sense suggested.

The argument requires

the premise that the observation
language involves a
eor y an<^ "that that theory is
underdetermined. We

—

-

can assume, with Quine, that the
observation language
involves a "theory" of ordinary physical
objects. As

Quine notes, however, not every
philosopher of science
would agree that this "theory" is a theory
in the

fudged sense or that

it is underdetermined.

Thus, for the argument to be fully convincing,
it would

have to give some reasons for accepting the
view that
this "theory" really is a theory and that it
is underdetermined.

What the argument does show, however,

is that Quine would be very likely to hold
that reti-

cular theories are underdetermined in this extended
sense
The argument of this subsection has thus far

been directed to the intuitively plausible suggestion
that reticular theories are not

underdetermined.

Two

arguments about this suggestion support the view that
Quine would reject that suggestion.

The arguments

depend, however, on a number of assumptions that would
be rejected by various philosphers

.

Independent ar-

gument for these assumptions is needed to make the

objections more generally convincing.

The objections

do point out some of what is involved in the under-
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determination thesis.

m

They also show a lack of clarity

Quine's characterization of
the mode of possibility
used in his statement of the
thesis.
I

do not discuss the application
of the thesis of

underdetermination to explanatory
theories in this
subsection. My more general discussion
of the thesis
in Subsection B will apply to
these theories.
i

B.

Observation Sentences Again
The observation sentences referred
to in Quine's

explication of the underdetermination
thesis are characterized by the first account discussed in
Chapter I.
These are sentences whose meaning is their
stimulus
meaning.

They do not refer to objects or contain
any

referring items.

They are independent of theory.

It

is not clear whether critics of this account
of observa-

tion sentences would hold the underdetermination thesis
in the form in which Quine holds it.

Critics of Quine's account of observation sentences

deny that observation reports can be couched in theory-

neutral language.
denial.

There seem to be two reasons for this

The first reason is that the introduction of

a theory introduces new sentences as observation sen-

tences

.

An example of such an observation sentence from

Quine's discussion of Hanson 37

is

.

,

9

,
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This is an x-ray tube.
Smart uses as an example of an
observation sentence
introduced by a theory the sentence
The current through the milliammeter
is 35 milliamperes 35
.

The point that Smart is making is
that the introduction

of a theory makes possible new
observation reports

observation reports that cannot be made by
those who
are not acquainted with the theory.

3

This first reason does not affect Quine’s
claim. 40
He maintains that, since the sentences
are observation

sentence, their "meanings" are their stimulus
meanings.
He appears, in his discussion of Hanson,
to agree that

oniy persons acquainted with the appropriate theory

could use the observation sentence
This is an x-ray tube
But he suggests that there is another sentence with the
sajne

stimulus meaning

the theory could use.

that someone unacquainted with
He suggests something like

This is a glass and metal instrument
replete with wires reflectors screws
lamps, and pushbuttons. 41
,

,

,

So far as Quine is concerned, then, since the

meaning of an observation sentence is just its stimulus meaning, there will always be non-theoretical

sentences that have the same meaning as the newly

.

.

105

introduced observation sentences.

"Theoretical"

ob-

servation sentences can always
be translated into the
observation language. The theoretical
sentence
is

no more about x-ray tubes than
is its common-place
counterpart
It takes the second reason to
raise a serious ob-

jection to Quine’s form of the
underdetermination
thesis, if one accepts Quine’s claim
about translation.
The second reason denies that
observation sentences
are units

whose

stimulus meaning is their full meaning.

According to this denial, the observation
sentence
This is an x-ray tube

contains the predicate 'is an x-ray tube'.

The meaning

of this predicate is not given just by the

stimulus

meanings of sentences in which it occurs but also
by
its connections with other sentences of the
theory as

well as with other observation sentences.

The stimulus-

synonymous sentence in the "observation language" contains
no similar predicate.

It does not contain any predicates

that must be related to those other theoretical sentences
It would seem that someone who held this sort of

view would say that the observation sentences of the
language do determine at least what sort of objects
there are.

Because of their theory-laden nature, certain
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observation sentences would
determine, for example, a
theory of physical objects
rather than a theory of atomic particles. Different
philosphers might make different judgments about whether
all of the lawlike statements are also determined.
Some might hold that all of
the connections among the
predicates of the theory are
determined; others might hold that only
some of these
are determined.
Any such views differ from Quine's

m

that, for Quine, not even the objects
of the theory

are determined by the observation
sentences.

The difference between Quine and those
who hold the

sort of view

I

have described is due in part to the

belief of Quine's critics that observation
sentences
are theory-laden.

It is also due to their belief

that the observation

referring items.

sentences of the language contain

The sentences can be quantified into.

On Quine's views of quantification, this means that
the

sentences involve a theory of the world.

This is

true for sentences that contain only observation terms
as well as for sentences that contain predicates such
as

'is an x-ray tube'.

For Quine, the language of

physical objects is a scientific language.
Not every philosopher shares Quine's views on

quantification and reference.

Someone might hold the

general view of observation sentences

I

have described

.

:
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and still agree with Quine
about underdetermination on
other grounds. Most
philosphers would, I assume, agree
that physical theory is
underdetermined in both of the
weaker senses discussed in the
Introduction to this
section

-

Apart from these weaker senses
of underdetermination
there is also a form of the
underdetermination thesis
stated in Quinean terms with which
some of Quine’s
critics might agree. Quine's form
of the underdetermination thesis really involves the
stimulus-meanings of
a certain category of sentence.

The sentences

in

question, observation sentences, are
said by Quine to
have stimulus meanings as their meanings.
We might
then consider a formulation of the thesis
that replaces

discourse about observation sentences with
discourse
about stimulus meanings.

when we consider that

,

This suggestion seems plausible

for Quine

,

the stimulus meanings

of sentences constitute their "empirical content."

Such

a formulation might be something like

Physical theories can be logically incompatible and yet compatible with
the stimulus meanings of all the
place-timed sentences of the language.
One might also formulate a thesis of underdetermi-

nation of physical theory in terms of explanatory
theories.

Explanatory theories can be adduced at dif-

.

,
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ferent "levels".

An example of an explanatory
theory

for the

theory" of physical objects is a
Newtonian
atomic theory (or, as Harre calls
it, a corpuscular
theory). An example of an explanatory
theory for this
atomic theory is the theory of
subatomic particles.

Explanatory theories, as Harre explains
them, adduce
a new set of facts about a different
kind of object
(say, atoms) to explain an already
accepted, but perhaps

now puzzling, set of facts about familiar
objects (say,
physical objects).
This terminology suggests a form of
underdetermination

thesis that might be acceptable to some of those
who

criticize Quine's account of observation sentences.

I

shall only suggest the general lines of such a thesis:

Prior to the acceptance of a new
theory there are alternative
incompatible theories (explanatory
theories)
that are compatible with
all the observation sentences of
the language
,

n

Suppose, for example, that we have a physical object language.

According to the view under discussion,

the observation sentences of the language determine
(at least) some sort of theory of physical objects.

There

is no "higher-level" theory that explains the behavior

of these objects.

There are, then, no connections between

the physical-object predicates and any other theoretical
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predicates.

At this point, alternative,
incompatible

theories are compatible with
all the sentences of the
language-even though those sentences
refer to physical
objects.
Theories that introduce -facts"
about demons
are just as good in this
respect at least— as theories
that introduce "facts" about
atomic particles.

—

The criticism of Quine's account
of observation

sentences

I

have discussed here and in Chapter

I

is

compatible with many forms of the
underdetermination
thesis, some of which can be stated
in Quinean terms.
It is important, however, for
Quine to hold the under-

determination thesis in the form he holds it.

The char-

acter of observation sentences is important
in his exposition of the thesis of indeterminacy of
translation.
As we shall see in the next section,
these two theses

are intimately related.

Not to keep the reader in

suspense about this intimate relationship,

I

end

this section with a quotation from "On the Reasons

for Indeterminacy of Translation" about the connection

between the two theses.

Then

I

turn to Section II, and

a discussion of the thesis of indeterminacy of translation.

My argument
has been
directed to you who already agree
that there can be logically incompatible and empirically equivalent
theories A and EL What degree of
indeterminacy of translation you must
then recognize, granted the force of
my argument , will depend on the amount
of empirical slack that you are
.

.

.

.

.

.

^
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lling to acknowledge in
physics.
If you were one of those
who saw
physics as empirically underdetermined only in its highest
theoretical reaches, then by the
argument at hand I can claim your
concurrence in the indeterminacy of
translation only of highly theoretical physics.
For my own part,
1 think the empirical
slack in
physics extends to ordinary traits
of ordinary bodies and hence
that
—j-ndeterminacy of transla tion
likewise affects that le vel oT

discourse
II.

.

INDETERMINACY OF TRANSLATION

Introduction
do not see Chapter II of Word and Object
as pro-

I

viding an argument for the indeterminacy thesis.
Rather,
it is a working out of some consequences
of Quine's

earlier views and an explanation of one part of
the
thesis

.

The thesis itself can conveniently be viewed

as having two parts.

the first part.

Early in the chapter, Quine states

This is that

manuals for translating one language into another can be set up
in divergent ways
all compatible
with the totality of speech dispositions, yet incompatible with
one another.
,

The second part is given later, only after most
of the attempt to make the first part plausible has been

Ill

completed.

According to this second part,
some of the
hypotheses the linguist makes
about the translation

he

undertakes are of a special sort.

These hypotheses,

which Quine calls analytical
hypotheses , are not genuine hypotheses.
They differ from certain other
hypotheses about translation and they
differ from the hypotheses of physical science. The
difference is stated
by Quine in the second part of
the thesis of indeterminacy of translation:
The point is not that we cannot be
sure whether the analytical hypothesis
is right
but that there is not even
an objective matter to be right
or wrong about 45
,

•

•

.

.

It is important

indeterminacy

,

,

if we are to understand the thesis of

to explain both of these parts and to

show why Quine holds each.
The first subsection of this section is devoted
to issues concerning that part of the indeterminacy

thesis according to which incompatible alternative

manuals of translation are said to be compatible with
the totality of dispositions to verbal behavior.

The

second subsection deals with the second part of the
thesis

,

that part according to which certain hypo-

theses about translation of a language are not about
any objective matter.

"

"
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A.

Alternative, Incompatible
Manuals of Translation
The linguist’s method

Quine's discussion of the
first part of the thesis
proceeds by an examination of
a case of what he calls
radical translation. Quine
considers to what extent,
given certain constraints on the
problem of translation,
there is a unique translation
of a radically foreign
language. He supposes there to be
a linguist doing
field work, attempting a translation
of "the language
of a hitherto untouched people. 4 6
The case of radical
translation is chosen to avoid the reader's
natural biases about the correctness of certain
translations and
so to make his claims more plausible,
as well as to

make them more dramatic.

Quine is concerned with lan-

guage as "the complex of present dispositions
to verbal

behavior

4^

.

The reason for this concern is his belief

that
v

language is first and last a system
of dispositions to verbal behavior. 4 ^
Quine considers this sort of "behaviorizing of meaning"
to be "simply a proposal to approach semantical matters
in the empirical spirit

of natural science." 49

And

radical translation is "an aid to taking this proposal
seriously

.

.

"50
.

,

I
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He is specifically not
concerned here with the ways
in which .language is learned 51
Because he is not
.

concerned with language-learning,
he can introduce the
concept of a modulus of stimulation,
which is important in his definition of other
essential terms.
In

deciding upon a modulus of stimulation,
one decides
upon a boundary for what is to
count as "current",
and this decision will determine
what is to count as
the speaker's current language and
what is to count
as the period of acquisition.

Quine describes the task of the linguist
as "the

recovery of a man's current language from
his currently observed responses

." 52

cerned with verbal responses.

He is particularly con-

This characterization of

the task points out the primary restraint
on the en-

terprise of translation:
All the objective data [the linguist] has
to go on are the forces that he sees
impinging on the native's surfaces
and the observable behavior, vocal
and otherwise, of the native 53
.

What Quine finds to be of interest is that these
data, limited as they

are, appear at least to provide

translations of the native speaker's language as a whole,
with all of the sentences that the speaker might produce.
His task in this chapter is to discover to what extent
the native speaker's language is actually

translatable,

given the restriction on what data are available.

;

114

He concludes that the methods he
allows the lin-

guist yield the following:
1.

translation of observation sentences;

2

translation of truth functions

.

;

3.

recognition of stimulus-analytic
sentences and stimulus-contradictory
sentences

4.

settling of some questions about intrasub jective stimulus synonymy of native

speakers non-observational occasion
sentences
*

.

Quine finds, then, that the methods allowed the
linguist

actually account for translation of a very small
part
of the language, appearances to the contrary.

rest of this subsection
items

,

I

In the

will explain these four

discussing the methods of the linguist

,

and

finally explain how this result yields the claim that
I

have called part (1) of the indeterminacy thesis.
Quine describes the linguist's methods this way:
We have had our linguist observing native
utterances and their circumstances
passively, to begin with, and then selectively querying native sentences for assent
and dissent under varying circumstances. ^

The first thing the linguist does is to make a

provisional determination of what utterances are to count
as significant units of speech.

Quine does not discuss

this aspect of the translation problem in detail in

Word and Object 56
.

The

linguist's initial hypotheses
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about these units will guide
him in his further attempts
at translation.
These hypothe ses it is
assumed, are
subject to revision during
the course of the translation,
Next the linguist develop s
preliminary hypotheses
about translations of the
commonly uttered linguistic
items and develops hypotheses
about what among the
native speakers' utterances are
to be construed as
assent and dissent. Difficulties
in later attempts at
using these hypotheses could lead
the linguist to abandon
them and "guess again. "57
,

Even these relatively simple matters
require the
use of strong methodological
principles.
In developing
early hypotheses about native speakers’
utterances, the
linguist supposes that, on the whole, a
speaker is

likely to have some short expression for
an item that
occurs commonly and (to the linguist)
conspicuously in
the speaker’s environment.

A particular hypothesis that

is adopted on the basis of this principle
may, of course

be rejected at a later time, and the linguist
might

well decide that the speaker does not, after all,
have
3~ny

expression (short or otherwise) for the item.
The hypotheses about what to translate as assent

and dissent suppose that the speakers will have some

sentences or words that correspond roughly to our
Yes" and "No", and that there are no other important

.
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related responses.

The speakers are assumed not
to

be using a three-valued
system of logic, for example.
And they are assumed to be
using some system of logic,
that is, they are not a
"pre-logical" people.
These

assumptions allow a translation of
the logical connective
negation 58
Quine states some of these
methodological principles
in "Philosophical Progress in
Language Theory":

When the field linguist begins his
project of breaking into a strange
language h e is methodologically
bound to trust in the homeliness of
the native mind.
The linguist has to
assume that the native will see the main
distinctions that we do and that he
tell the truth.
The linguist is
bound to assume that the sentence which
the natives persist in affirming or
assenting to, when rabbits appear, is
a sentence which in all sincerity
announces rabbits rather than wolves.
The alternative indeed that natives
almost always lyingly or deludedly announce rabbits as wolves reduces to
nonsense when we reflect that there is
nothing in meaning that is not in
behavior. 59
,

,

,

,

,

.

It is not clear what the status of these presup-

positions is.

They seem to be classifiable with what

calls "natural expectations" of the linguist.
They, like other "implicit/ supplementary canons" to

which the linguist might appeal in making translations
are not to be mistaken for "substantive law[s] of
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of speech behavior. "60

Quine's stricture here is di-

rected against such supplementary
canons as might be
appealed to in translation of
items other than observation sentences and truth
functions.
If these presuppositions are indeed like those
canons, then the
whole enterprise of translation
depends on assumptions
that are not substantive laws
of speech behavior.
One of the most important
methods available to
the linguist is that of querying
native speakers with apitems of their language.
parent
Eliciting native

speakers

'

.assent to and dissent from such
queries

allows the linguist to make important
decisions about
the translation.
Quine has the following to say about
the importance of this method:
When he can
the linguist
supply native sentences
for his informants approval. 61
,

^ as £
3

.

.

.

.

and
0nl y by taking the initiative and
querying combinations of native
sentences and stimulations so
as to narrow down his guesses to
his eventual satisfaction

can the linguist perceive that the native would have

been willing to assent to one sentence in all the situations in which he happened to volunteer another, and
so on.

CO

%

This method is needed to distinguish "overlapping"

sentences such as ’Animal’, ’White’, and ’Rabbit’.
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Translation of other parts of the
language relies
on the assumption that the
language contains items that
can be construed as assent and
dissent.
There are two
issues about translations of such
items.
The first
involves the methodological assumption
that there are
such items; this has been touched
upon already.
The
second concerns what appears to be an
assumption made
by Quine:
that translation of these items can be
made
on the basis of the native speakers’
dispositions
to

verbal behavior.
Obj_ect,

There appears to be, in Word and

an implicit assumption that such
translation

is not inderdeterminate but is subject
to only normal

inductive uncertainty.

That is, a particular trans-

lation of these items might be wrong; but there is

something for it to be wrong about.

Quine does not

state such an assumption; he does not argue for it;
nor
does he provide the reader with any reasons to
suppose

that the assumption would be a reasonable one.
The concepts of assenting to and dissenting from
(or, as Quine also says, expressing approval and dis-

approval) involve complex human behavior.

This behavior

appears to involve such things as the intentions and

norms of the speaker, particularly in its guise as

approval or disapproval.

Hintikka suggests, on what

I

6

.
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take to be similar grounds

,

that
I

If we assume that a
jungle linguist
can come to recognize
assentive beV
[there
is
no]
reason
to suggest
i°r’
+ ? at
he could not in principle
learn to
recognize

other modes of activity which
are closely related to our
use of

language

b d

Of the translation of native
speakers' utterances
as assent and dissent, Quine
says,

However inconclusive these methods,
they
generate a working hypothesis.
If extraordinary difficulties attend all his subsequent steps the linguist may decide
to
discard that hypothesis and guess
again. 64
,

And once the linguist has "settled
on what to treat as
native signs of assent and dissent, "65
he is in a

position to translate simple native sentences,
namely
observation sentences.

Quine quotes this same passage

in his Reply to Hintikka, and then goes
on to say
The linguist's decision as to what to
treat as. native signs of assent and
dissent is on a par with the analytical
hypotheses of translation that he adopts
at later stages of his enterprise
they
differ from those later ones only in coming
first needed as they are in defining
stimulus meaning.
This initial indeterminacy,
then, carries over into the identification
of the stimulus meanings. 6
;

1

,

Thus, contrary to the impression given in Word and Object,

the whole of the linguist's translation is indeterminate.

"Guessing again" is, it appears, merely accepting a

different hypothesis.

Even these- basic concepts, which
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are at "the very heart of the
conceptual apparatus of
the early parts of Word and
Object ," are subject to

indeterminacy

.

6 7

As already noted, translations
of what correspond
in the native speaker's language
to assent and dissent

allow the linguist to make progress
in translating
other parts of the language. To
account for such translation, Quine introduces the notion
of stimulus meaning.
This notion is supposed to be neutral
in the sense that
it does not rely on ideas, meanings
(in the ordinary sense),
or propositions.
It is a basic notion in the "behaviorizing of meaning," and is said by Quine
to be a crude

concept

of empirical meaning.^®

Stimulus meaning is defined for sentences.

This

is important because, Quine later claims,
terms raise

special problems of translation.

Thus he claims that

although we can determine the stimulus meanings of some

one-word sentences (given the acceptance of hypotheses
about native speakers' terms for assent and dissent)
and thus translate them by stimulus-synonymous sentences

these translation do not ensure translations of the

related terms

.

Basically

,

the consideration is that

the stimulus meaning does not determine

of the related term.

the extension

We will see why this is so later.

.
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In the definition of

'stimulus meaning', reference

is made to stimulations
that prompt assent or dissent.

Quine identifies these stimulations
with ocular irradiation patterns, and analogous items
for other senses,
host or his discussion involves
visual stimulation. He

emphasizes that what is at issue is
stimulations, and
not oDjects. .The basic reason for
this is that stimulations produced by a rabbit,, for example,
need not vary
from tnose produced by a counterfeit of
a rabbit.
i.iis

use Ox stimulations here requires that

Quine make an interesting claim.

He has said that he

-s ^^Lerested in the native speaker's

"socially in-

culcated linguistic usage, hence his responses to conditions normally subject to social assessment "69
.

is

,

ox

course

,

because of the claimed social nature

of language-learning.

lations

,

This

So Quine must claim that stimu-

which are such things as patterns of chromatic

irradiation, are in some interesting sense subject
social assessment.

to

He claims that

Ocular irradiation ij3_ intersub j ectively
checked to some degree by society and
linguist alike by making allowances
for the speakers orientation and the
relative disposition of objects. 70
,

'

He makes similar claims in his discussions of what is

required in language-learning
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l.-^h

nition of

this background
'

,

stimulus meaning

we can now consider the defi1

:

The stimulus meaning of
a sentence
order,ed P^r of the affirmative
stimulus meaning of that sentence
and
Lii£ negative stimulus
meaning of that
semence. The affirmative stimulus
meaning of a sentence is the
class
o^ a^x tne stimulations
that would
prompt the speaker’s assent. The
negae StlmUlU
meart ing is the class of
?
"tT those
+
all
stimulations that would prompt
uhe speaker’s dissent. 72
-

Note that stimulus meaning is
defined for a sentence,
^ 0r a

s P ec- xe r>

a lime.

”A stimulus meaning is the

stimulus meaning modulo n seconds of
a sentence

speaker a at time t

.

”

S

for

Affirmative and negative stimu-

lus meanings of a sentence for a
speaker are mutually

exclusive.

Also, there may be stimulations that

ere members ox neither the affirmative
nor the negative

stimulus meaning ox a sentence for a speaker.

Finally,

the use of the subjunctive in the definition
shows that

dispositions

of a speaker are at issue, and not

just his actual utterances.

dispositions ox a

Quine suggests that these

speaker are to be explicated, in the

long run, in terms of the structural conditions of the
speaker.

This makes clear that determination of the

stimulus meaning of a sentence is subject to inductive

uncertainty.

The translations of sentences via their

.
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stimulus meanings involve hypotheses
about the dispositions of the speakers that
might be discontinued at
a.
later date.
Cii)

"po ssible yield" of the linguist's method

Determining stimulus meanings in the
manner described
al-ows the linguist to translate
observation sentences
As we have already seen in Chapter I,
those sentences are
such that
their stimulus meanings may without fear
of contradiction be said to do full
justice to their meanings. 73
1

It is then the observation sentences as
characterized in

tne primary account that are at issue in this
part of

Quine

s

discussion.

Tnough stimulus meaning is defined

only for individual speakers
inters ub j eciive

.

,

observationality becomes

This is because response to observation

sentences is claimed not to vary under differences in

collateral information.

m

behavioral terms, an occasion
sentence may be said to be the more
observational the more nearly’ its
stimulus meanings for different speakers
tend to coincide 74
.

.

.

.

Thus there is

an,

intersub j ective criterion of observationality,

though this criterion does not require going beyond
dispositions to verbal behavior.

Observation sentences

can be translated within the constraints put on the

translation problem-given translation of assent and dissent.
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Negation can also be translated
T he sa ™ ai? tic criterion of negation
S taa
Il: turvpiS a-^y short
sentence
tL °
\
which
one will assent into
a sentence from which one
i

sent

,

,

and vace versa.

will dis-

7^

Dif rerenm sorts of sentences
can be used for trans-Lu. Ling
negation.
Quine distinguishes occasion sentences and standing sentences.
Occasion sentences are
those to which a speaker will assent
or dissent only
wnen ue query is accompanied by or
preceded by an ap-

propriate stimulation.

Standing sentences are those

to which a speaker will respond with
current stimula-

Some such sentences

uio...

may require an initial

stimulation on the first occasion of query.

But there-

after the speaker would assent without current
stimulation

.

76

The translation of negation can make use of either

standing or occasion sentences.

observation sentences
accompanied

.

)

But occasion sentences must be

oy appropriate stimulation in order that

assent or dissent be eli
I

(The latter include

ted.

noted earlier that, at the time of writing Word

an ^ Object

,

Quine believed conjunction and disjunction

to be translatable in this way as well.

decided that this is incorrect.

He has since

In an example he discusses,

.
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he supposes that though
a speaker would dissent
from
Quine was born in Pittsburgh
and
Quine was born in Detroit

the speaker may not be
prepared to dissent either from
Quine was born in Detroit
or from

Quine was born in Pittsburgh.
This example shows that his
semantic criterion for conjunction was inadequate. That
criterion was
[The semantic criterion] of
conjunction

is that it produces compounds
to
w ilc h
one is prepared to assent
always and only when one is prepared
'

*

•

•

to assent to each component.

7

No criterion was given in terms
of dissent.

The obvious

one, that one be prepared to dissent
from a conjunction
always and only when one is prepared
to dissent from one
of its conjuncts, will not work.
Quine’s example shows

that// 8

The considerations for alternation are
similar,

except that the criterion was given in terms
of dissent
und the counterexample involves assent.
The third item on the list of the "possible
yield"

of the linguist's method was

recognition of stimulus-analytic and
stimulus-contradictory sentences
The defintion of stimulus analyticity is short:
I call a sentence stimulus -analytic
for a subject if he would assent to
it, or nothing, after every stimulus
(within the modulus). 79

,

.
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The first qualification, "or
nothing”, is to discount

inhibited responses.
to a modu

,

of stimula-cio

The second qualification, reference

is always made.

The notion of a modulus

one of the basic notions used by

Quine in his discussion of translation.

It is needed

to distinguish changes in a speaker’s
"attitude" towoxxi a

sentence from differences in the stimulations.

This distinction is needed because
language may change
so that, for example, what is an
observation sentence

now will be one no longer at some future time

and what

is stimulus-analytic now will no longer
be so at some

future time.

Stimulus -contradictory sentences are

just those sentences from which a speaker would
dissent,
or fail to respond, after -every stimulus within

the

modulus
These terms are defined here only for individual

speakers and not for the community.

Like other concepts

,

these can be "socialized" by taking as socially stimulus-

analytic those sentences that are stimulus— analytic for

most speakers of the language; and similarly for
’

stimulus-contradictory

.
'

^0

Stimulus-analyticity

even of the social variety, is not a reconstruction
of the intuitive notion of analyticity.

It does not

distinguish among various kinds of sentences to which

.
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most speakers of the language
would assent under all
stimulations.
Quine uses as an example of
stimulusanalytic sentences the following:
There have been black doss
6
2

+

2

=

4

.

No bachelor is married.

This is not to be considered a
shortcoming of the definition.
Quine does not think that the distinction
between analytic and synthetic can be
drawn any finer
than as a distinction between sentences
to which the

community of speakers are (psychologically)
disposed to
assent to "come what may" and other sentences 81
.

The last item of the short list of the
"possible

yield" of the linguist's methods was
settling some questions about intrasub jective. stimulus synonymy of native speakers non-observation
occasion sentences
'

Quine notes that even though questions about stimulus

synonymy of these sentences can be settled the sentences
cannot be translated.
Stimulus synonymy, or sameness of stimulus meaning,
is defined for single speakers

.

Stimulus meaning is

defined, as we have noted before, for a sentence, for
a speaker, at a time.

We have seen that, for observa-

tion sentences, meaning is stimulus meaning.

So, for

observation sentences, synonymy is stimulus synonymy.
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And there is no difficulty
in defining synonymy for
these sentences
Observation sentences were also
those
that did not vary under the
influence of collateral
information.
Quine noted that
terms an occasion sentence
to be the more observational
the more nearly its stimulus
meanings
different speakers tend to coincide. 82 for
3

^

° a id

Since observationality for
occasion sentences is defined
as degree of constancy of
stimulus meaning from speaker
to speaker, 83
intrasub j ective stimulus synonymy
for
observation sentences presents no
difficulties.

There are some mild difficulties
with establishing
intrasubj ective synonymy of non-observational
occasion
sentences.
For these sentences, collateral
information
may affect the responses of speakers
to queried sentences
The natural suggestion about
synonymy for these
sentences is to suppose that sentences are
stimulus.

synonymous for the community, "in the sense of
being
thus for each member. "84

But

,

in cases in which col-

lateral information has intruded and in which
different
speakers have different amounts of information, sentences that

yie

would intuitively say are synonymous

turn out not to be even stimulus synonymous

.

This due

to false beliefs on the part of some members of the

community, for example.
is that

Quine's reply to this criticism

7
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we can hold out for
virtual
stance over the community 85 con.

Some sentences would then
"still rate as stimulussynonymous even socially, as
being intrasub jectively
stimulus-synonymous for nearly
everybody ”86
.

Before turning to the more
interesting questions
aoout what the linguist’s
method does not yield, I
want to recall a few remarks
made earlier about the yield
of the method.
Quine's talk about the yield of
the
linguist's method suggests that the
four items discussed
this subsection involve only
the native
speakers' dispositions to verbal
behavior.
The further
suggestion is that translations of
observation sentences
and negation and the rest of the
"yield” are determinate.
Ir this were so, they would
be subject only to "or-

m

dinary inductive uncertainty" but not to the indeterminacy of translation.
But such a suggestion would be wrong.

Translation

even of observation sentences requires
translations of
the terms for assent and dissent from queried
sentences,
as does recognition of stimulus-analytic sentences
and

so on.

Even, the paltry yield of the linguist's method

has what Quine calls "residual” indeterminacy

.

8
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Ciii)

Empirical slack

We saw in subsections (i)
and (ii) that the linguist’s method provides
translation of only a very

small part of the language.

Even that translation is

subject to what Quine calls
inductive uncertainty --even
given the acceptance of hypotheses
about native terms
for assent and dissent.
Translation requires that
the linguist develop hypotheses
about the native

speaker's future behavior and about how
the native
speaker would respond in certain
circumstances that do
not,
fact, obtain.
Different hypotheses about the

m

native speaker’s verbal behavior
the linguist's data.

are compatible with

Even the translation that can

be given by this method is subject to
some degree of

"empirical slack".
The empirical slack with which Quine is
concerned
is, however, much more pervasive.

Consider some of the

linguistic items that are not translatable by the method
alone

,

items about which the linguist must advance

analytical hypotheses."

Outstanding among these are

the quantif icational apparatus of the language, its

general terms, plural endings, and an identity element

88
.

These comprise the "referential apparatus" of the language.
It is only when items such as these are translated

that we can say what the native speakers

’

sentences are
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about

Translations of these are
needed for specifying the extension of
the terms of the language.
As
Quine noieo, "stimulus
meanings never suffice to determine even what words are
terms
terms, it
if any, much nless
what terms are coextensive 89
.

Once hypotheses about what
items are terms are ac
cepted, translation of the
terms can begin.
Quine
uses as an example the term
'gavagai'.
The stimulus
meaning of the sentence 'Gavagai'
was the same as the
stimulus meaning of the English
sentence 'Rabbit'.
Thus the first part of the
translation translates
'Gavagai' as 'Rabbit'.
This translation of the senfence does not, however, give us a
translation of the
term.

Even given the translations allowed
by the linguist’s
methods --translation of observation
sentences and negation— and the recognition of stimulus-analytic
and stimu-

lus-contradictory sentences, we are free to choose
among
radically different hypotheses about how to
translate
the terms of the language.

Any one of the resulting

translations will be compatible with the native speakers’
dispositions to verbal behavior.

The stimulus meaning

of a sentence does not distinguish among the alternative

0
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translations of the associated
term.
gavagai

In the case of

ror example, our choice of
hypotheses might
result in translating the term,
as 'rabbit', 'rabbithood
'rabbit stage', or 'rabbit time
slice'.
Each of these
Qirrerent translations would require
acceptance of
a set of analytical hypotheses
about what is to count
as identity and about the
quantif icational apparatus
of the language.
Translations of items of the "referential
apparatus" are interdependent 9
’

r

,

'

.

When we reflect on what the linguist is able
to

translate, this result does not seem surprising.

Trans-

lation of the referential items of the language
attributes a theory ox objects to its speakers.

native speakers

'

The

dispositions to verbal behavior are

not sufficient to determine what theory of objects to

attribute to them.
The stimulus situations in which rabbits are present
are those in which rabbithood is exemplified, and so
on.

Nothing in the stimulus situation determines whe-

ther we are to attribute a materialist theory of enduring
bodies or a theory of recurring universals to the native
speakers.

Appeal to their use of identity statements

,

,

’
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does not help, since
translation of the identity
element
"goes along with" translation
of the rest of the referen
tial apparatus. As we
change theories, we change
the
translation of the identity
element. As Quine says,
c° u id equate a native
expression
wi cn any of. the disparate
English
terms rabbit
’rabbit stage’
iindetached rabbit parti,
etc.’,
still, by compensatorily jueglin^ and
the
translation of numerical idfnti?y
associated particles, preserve con-lid
xormity to stimulus meanings of
occasion sentences. 31
'

1

,

Quine considers the suggestion
that by considering
some non-verbal behavior, such
as pointing, one might
be able to translate the terms.
This procedure, he
says, would be fruitless.

His reasons involve stan-

dard objections to ostensive definitions:
Does it seem. that the imagined
indecision
between rabbits stages of rabbits
and rabbithood must be due merely to
some
special fault in our formulation of stimulus meaning, and that it should be resoluble
by a little supplementary pointing and
questioning? Consider, then, how.
Point
to a rabbi t and you have pointed to a stage
of a rabbit
and to where rabbithood, is manifested.
Nothing not
distinguished in stimulus meaning itself
is to be distinguished by pointing, unless
the. pointing is accompanied by questions
of .identity and diversity:
’Is this the
same gavagai as that?’
’Do we have here
one gavagai or two?
Such questioning
,

,

,

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

,

.

.

134

of the

linguist a command of
!•
i-h? ncit:L
n
e lan
ua
ge far beyond anything
§
1 h ^ i.
6 ^
haVe
aS ySt SSen h ° W to aca ount

forM

Not only will stimulus meaning
be insufficient for determining these translations, but
the supplementary
devices or pointing and questioning
are of no help.

Pointing is

,

distinctions.

by itself

,

inadequate to make the needed

Questioning requires that the linguist
'

have already achieved translations of
some of the linguistic items whose translation is to be
accounted

for
Thus native speakers

'

dispositions to verbal

behavior are not sufficient for translating the referential apparatus of the language.

They are, however,

sufficient for a concept of stimulus meaning.
lus meanings, according to Quine,

"do full justice"

to the meanings of observation sentences

have seen, in Subsection (ii)

Stimu-

As we

observation sentences

can be translated.^
It might be supposed that the translation of the

observation sentences would enable one to translate the
rest of the language, much as translation of assent and

dissent enabled Quine to formulate a definition of stimulus meaning and then to translate observation sentences

This is not so, however.

Translation of the general

,
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terms (and the rest of the
referential apparatus) determines an attribution of a physical
theory to the speakers of the language 95 As we
saw in Section I, for
Quine physical theory is underdetermined
by all possible
.

,

observation sentences.

There are alternative, in-

compatible theories that are compatible with
all the
(true) observation sentences of the language.

Attribu-

tion of any of these theories would be
compatible with
the speakers

production of observation sentences

’

so with his dispositions to verbal behavior.

,

and

Transla-

tions that attribute these theories to the speakers
of
the language will be equally good translations, in
that

®^ch such translation is compatible with the speakers

*

dispositions to verbal behavior.
In short

manuals for translating one language
into another can be set up in divergent ways all compatible with the
totality of speech dispositions, yet
incompatible with one another.
,

Thus, we have seen Quine’s reasons for holding what

I

have called the first part of the thesis of indeterminacy
of translation and how it depends on Quine’s form of the

underdetermination thesis.

This part of the thesis of

indeterminacy is simply underdetermination in second
•

?

‘

.

•

<

.

|

i

4

f

intension, and so far Quine's claim in the passage quoted
v

v.

Mil

at the end of Section

I

I

'

'III

I

makes sense.

I

I

II

<

I

|

I

I

I
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B.

Analytical Hypotheses
In this subsection, I
consider different interpreta-

tions of the thesis of
indeterminacy of translation. My
primary concern is with the
second part of the thesis,
according to which the linguist's
analytical hypotheses
are not

about any objective matter.
The three interpretations I consider are one that
explicates indeterminacy
as simply a case of
underdetermination, one according to

which the claim about indeterminacy
is a form of a
verif icationist theory, and one
according to which the
indeterminacy thesis involves other claims
about synonymy
and meaning.
I reject the first two
interpretations and

offer the third as a plausible and interesting
interpretation
.

^

i

)

Indeterminacy as underdetermination
One suggestion about the indeterminacy thesis

that has been put forward is that it is simply
a case

of the underdetermination thesis discussed in Section
I.

From what we have learned about the thesis so far,

this suggestion seems plausible enough.

The justifica-

tion of the thesis so far rests on the restrictions

placed on the linguist's method and on the thesis of

underdetermination of physical theory.

The linguist's

method was restricted as a result of an attempt at

,

.

:
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"a behavior! zing of meaning."

This, in turn, was said

simply a proposal to approach
semantical matters
in the empirical spirit of
natural science."” since
linguistics is being treated in
what Quine takes to be
the spirit of natural science,
it is not surprising
e

that it should be subject to the
same epistemological
thesis as are the rest of the natural
sciences.
The main lines of reasoning thus
far have been

these
(1)

All the objective data the linguist
has to go on are the forces he sees

impinging on the native speakers

’

sur-

faces and the observable behavior, vocal
and otherwise, of the native
speakers.
(2)

In terms of the available data we can

develop a crude concept of empirical

meaning

,

which we call stimulus meaning

for sentences

.

This concept is defined in

terms of a speaker’s dispositions to

assent to or dissent from queried

sentences of his language.
(3)

The concept of stimulus meaning allows
us to provide criteria

for observation

sentences that are both behavioral and

social

Observation sentences can be translated (given the acceptance of hypotheses about native speakers

for assent and dissent).

'

terms

This is be-

cause, for them, the notion of sameness

of meaning has behavioral criteria.
The referential apparatus of the lan-

guage is not translatable by the use
of only the native speakers

'

dispositions

to verbal behavior.

Translation of the referential apparatus would determine what the native

speakers' theory of objects is.

Alternative

,

incompatible theories

of objects are compatible with all the

observation sentences of the language.
Translation of the observation sentences
of the language will not, therefore, aid
the linguist in his translation of the

referential apparatus of the language.
In order to translate the referential ap-

paratus of the language, the linguist

must accept some set of analytical hy-

potheses (a manual of translation)

.

These

hypotheses "exceed anything explicit in

9

:
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any native's dispositions
to speech

behavior.
(10)

There are alternative, incompatible

manuals of translation, each of
which
is compatible with all the
native

speakers' dispositions to verbal

behavior.

9 8

This line of reasoning suggests
that analytical

hypotheses are hypotheses of linguistic
theory that attribute to the native speakers one of those
theories that
are compatible with the translation
of the observation

sentences.

Different hypotheses would attribute to the

native speakers different theories.

The linguitic hypo-

theses would be about which theory the native
speakers

actually held.
Some such interpretation is supported by some of

Quins

s

remarks in Word and Object.

When he first

introduces the thesis in Chapter II of Word and Object

,

he explains what he is going to do in the chapter this

way
In this chapter we shall consider how
much of language can be made sense of in
terms of its stimulus conditions and what
scope this leaves for empirically unconditioned variation in one's conceptual scheme. 9
,

.
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This passages suggests that
analytical hypotheses are
hypotheses about that part of the
native speaker’s conceptual scheme that is not determined
by the stimulus
conditions.
The unconditioned part of the
conceptual
scheme would include that theory
of objects held by
the native speakers

Quine's discussion of objectivity in
language-lear-

ning ends with a paragraph in which
he says,

Different persons growing up in the same
anguage are like different bushes trimmed
and trained to take the shape of identical
elephants
The anatomical details of twig
and branches will fulfill the elephentine
form differently from bush to bush, but the
overall outward results are alike. 100
.

Here, Quine is giving an analogy to show that
different

speakers of a language may come to develop essentially
the same dispositions to verbal behavior as a result
oT different sorts of training and so of different

connections between words and experience "101
.

One might consider analytical hypotheses in these

terms as well.

The native speakers’ dispostions to ver-

bal behavior are analogous to "the [outward] elephantine

form."

Analytical hypotheses are about whatever structures

are analogous

to'

the "anatomical details of twigs and

branches" that make up the outward form.

This analogy,

too, would support the interpretation of the

thesis

141
as merely a special case
of the underdetermination thesis.

Analytical hypotheses, like the
hypotheses of physical
theory, are underdetermined by
the available data— the
native speakers' dispositions to
verbal behavior.
Chomsky interprets the indeterminacy
thesis in
much this way.

He says, in his article on "Quine’s

empirical assumptions,"
There can surely be no doubt that
Quine s statement about analytical
hypotheses [that they exceed anything implicit in any native speaker’s
dispositions to speech behavior] is
true, though the question arises why
it is important
It is, to be sure,
undeniable that if a system of "analytical hypotheses" goes beyond evidence then it is possible to conceive
alternatives compatible with the evidence, just as in the case of Quine's
"genuine hypotheses" about stimulus
meaning and truth-functional connectives
Thus the situation in the case
of language, or "common sense knowledge", is, in this respect, no different from the case of physics. 102
.

.

.

Chomsky, then, supposes that the thesis of indeter-

minacy of translation is just a special case of underde-

termination of physical theory.

Linguistic theory, like

any other theory, is underdetermined by the evidence.
He finds the thesis not only true but obvious

uninteresting as well.
paper he says,

— and

Near the conclusion of his

®

5

,
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^ Ulte certain that serious hypotheses concerning a native
speaker s knowledge of English,
or concerning the essential properties
of
human language.
will "go beyond
th6 v den e "
If they did not, they
?
J
n
would
be without interest.
Since they
go beyond mere summary of data,
it
will be the case that there are
competing assumptions consistent with
the data. 103
.

.

.

•

Quine rejects Chomsky’s interpretation
of his views on
indeterminacy of translation in his Reply,
and reaffirms
this denial in "On the Reasons for
Indeterminacy of
Translation," where he says,

v

The indeterminacy of translation is
not just an instance of the empirically
underdetermined character of physics.
The point is not just that linguistics
being a part of behavioral science and
hence ultimately of physics, shares the

empirically underdetermined character
of physics. 104
In the introduction to this section

two parts of the indeterminacy thesis.

,

I

distinguished

The first part

was a claim that

manuals for translating one language
into another can be set up in divergent
ways all compatible with the totality of
speech dispositions yet incompatible with
one another. 10
,

,

This part of the thesis does indeed seem to be supported
by the general line of reasoning

I

have outlined above.

If this were the only aspect of the thesis, then it would

be possible to characterize it as an epistemological thesis
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perhaps a special case of
the underdetermination of
phys
teal theory.
The second part of the
thesis is not,
however, an epistemological
thesis and is not supported by this reasoning.
The second part of the
thesis requires, at the very
least, some additional
explanations of and justifications
for the steps (1)
through (10).

According to the second part of
the thesis,
The point is not that we cannot
be
sure whether the analytical hypothesis is right, but that there is
not even ... an objective matter
to be right or wrong about.
6

Chomsky supposes that "what distinguishes
the case
of physics from the case of language
is that we are,
for some reason, not permitted to have
a 'tentative
theory* in the case of language.

.

he finds that difficult to accept.

."107

.

Naturally,

The second part of

the thesis, however, shows that that is not
what dis-

tinguishes the two sorts of theories.

Rather, it is

something about the status of the hypotheses of a
'tentaive theory' in the case of language.
On the interpretation I've been considering, analy-

tical hypothese are supposed to be about what the

native

conceptual scheme (including his theory of objects) is
in fact like.

Or, alternatively, they are about what

.

:
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the structures are that in
fact underlie
speakers dispositions to verbal behavior.
But Quine s remarks in
his Reply to Chomsky and in "On
the Reasons for Inde'

'

terminacy of Translation" show that
this is wrong:
Analytical hypotheses are not about any
matter of fact,
"objective or sub j ective "10 8 It is
this pec uliar
status of analytical hypotheses that
distinguishes
linguistic theory from physical theory.
.

Thus, though many of Quine's remarks might
suggest

that indeterminacy of translation is merely
a special
case of the underdetermination thesis, the
thesis clearly involves a claim other than the claim
that linguis-

tic theory (i.e., translation) is underdetermined
by
all possible observations.

Indeterminacy is not merely

a special case of the underdetermination thesis
(ii)

Indeterminacy and verification
One question that presents itself immediately is

What is the relation between the two parts of the thesis?

And another is:

justified?

,

How is the second part of the thesis

Quine gives little attention to these

questions in Word and Ob j ect
part of the thesis

.

He introduces this

in Section 15

in his discussion

of the "possible yield" of the linguist's method.

yield, it will be recalled, was quite small.

The
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Quine tells that the linguist
can go beyond this limited
yield by developing hypotheses
about what are to count
as the terms of the language
and by hypothetically

equating these words with words of
English.

The only

constraint on these hypotheses is that
they are to conform to the yield of the initial
method in obvious ways.
Quine emphasizes that these analytical
hypotheses
"are not determinate functions of
linguistic behavior." 109
He goes on to make some qualifications
of his original

statement.

^P 16

>

The analytical hypotheses are not, for ex-

generally equational in form.

Then he states,

more emphatically that the analtyical hypotheses
go

beyond dispositions to verbal behavior:
From the point of view of a theory
of translational meaning the most
notable thing about the analytical hypotheses is that they exceed anything
implicit in any native's dispositions
to speech behavior.
They extend
the working limits of translation beyond where independent evidence can
exist HO
.

.

.

.

Near the end of Section 15, the case is restated:
Sentences translatable outright,
translatable by independent evidence of stimulatory occasions are
sparse and must woefully under-determine the analytical hypotheses
on which the translation of all
further sentences depends. HI
,
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Nothing Quine says so far explicitly
shows why
analytical hypotheses are different from
the hypotheses
of natural science.
Since Quine is doing something like
the

natural science of language, we still have
some
reason to suppose--wrongly as we have seen
that the

—

indeterminacy of translation is a special case of
under-

determination of theory applied to the hypotheses
of linguistic science.

Even the statement that these hypo-

theses go beyond where independent evidence can exist
does not distinguish the two kinds of hypotheses.

Phys-

ical theory, as we have seen, is also underdetermined
by all the possible evidence.

Section 16 of Word and Object is entitled "On
Failure'- to Perceive the Indeterminacy."

There, Quine

clarifies the thesis considerably by discussing a variety of reasons for which people have not seen the inde-

terminacy.

The second part of the thesis is stated in

that section.

In the first paragraph, Quine says,

Thus the analytical hypotheses and the
grand synthetic one that they add up to,
are only in an incomplete sense hypotheses.
Contrast the case of translation of the occasion sentence ’Gavagai
by similarity of stimulus meaning.
This
is a genuine hypothesis from sample observations, though possibly wrong. 'Gavagai' and 'There's a rabbit have stimulus
meanings for the two speakers, and these
are roughly the same or significantly different, whether we guess right or not.
On
,

1

1

e
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analytical

hypothesis
ia ?ieht
there is not even, as there
was in ^hP case of
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hVJj

atter to be right or wrong
about.

H2

This claim that analytical
hypotheses are not
genuine hypotheses, in the sense
Quine elucidates,
is not given a justification
here.
Nor is its relation
to the first part of the thesis
explained.
The immediate
move from the claim that

Analytical hypotheses extend the limits of translation beyond where
independent evidence can exist
to the claim that

Analytical hypotheses are not about
any (objective or subjective) matter
of fact
might lead a reader to assume that Quine is
making use
of a verificationist principle 113
.

That such a principle

is involved in the inference is suggested
by several re-

marks

,

in Word and Ob j ect and elsewhere, that involved

the notion of meaninglessness

in connection with ana-

lytical hypotheses.
In Word and Object

,

Quine notes that

Where cultural contrasts begin to
be threatened with meaninglessness
is rather where they depend on analytical hypotheses.! 14
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On the Reasons for Indeterminacy
of Translation,"

he

relates the indeterminacy thesis
with the issue of the
significance of a sentence more explicitly.
He says

that what he is "getting at in arguing
the indeterminacay of translation" is that questions
about whether the
native speaker really believes a theory
attributed to
him by one translation or believes a theory
attributed
to him by another, incompatible translation
are questions
"whose very significance" he would put in
doubt. 115
In "Ontological Relativity," Quine claims
that cer-

tain questions about the reference of linguistic
items
are

gi ean i n gless
.

guage

.

except relative to a background lan-

His earlier emphasis on the unavailability

of evidence for analytical hypotheses suggests
that this

meaninglessness is due to

unverif iability

speaks of verification in Word and Object
passing.

,

Quine

.

but only in

The most straightforward statement

I

one that appears in "Epistemology Naturalized":

find is
Quine

concludes a discussion of observation and their role in

verification and in providing evidence by saying that
epistemology remains centered as always
on evidence, and meaning remains centered
.117
on verification.
.

.

The suggestion that Quine is making use of a veri-

fication principle does answer both of the questions with

:
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Which

began this subsection.

I

The principle this sug-

gestion attributes to Quine is
something like the following
A statement has empirical
content if
and only if there is (in
principal)
objective evidence for that statement
.

The first part of the thesis
says (in part) that analy-

tical hypotheses go beyond where
independent evidence
can exist.
There is, in principle, no objective
evidence
for analytical hypotheses.
It would follow from this
claim and the verif icationist principle
suggested above
that analytical hypotheses have no
empirical content.
This result seems to accord with what
Quine says in
his discussion of the linguist's task.

For, when he

introduced the concept of stimulus meaning, he
suggested
that it would provide "a crude concept of
empirical
meaning.

"HQ

It does not seem implausible to suggest

that a statement is about a matter of fact if and
only
if it has

empirical content.

And, if this suggestion

is also accepted, it would follow that analytical

hypotheses are not about any matter of fact.
Thus the suggestion answers the first and the sec-

ond questions by showing that the second part of the

thesis is justified by the first part of the thesis

along with the verificationist principle introduced above.

.
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Moreover, there is considerable, though
certainly not
conclusive, textual evidence that the
suggestion is
correct

Nevertheless,

I

think that the suggestion is mis-

taken.

Quine argues against verif icationism, most
particularly in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism." Though
there
are,

I

think, traces of positivism to be found Quine’s

work— reflected

in his talk, here and there, of verifi-

cation and meaninglessness--I do not think that
verification is the principal foundation of the second
part
of the thesis of indeterminacy of translation.

next subsection

I

In the

argue that Quine’s justification for

the second part of the thesis is to be found in his
vari
ous attackes on synonymy and meaning, distinctions be-

tween analytic and synthetic statements, and the existence of propositions.
(iii)

Meanings and synonymy
In this section

I

advocate an interpretation of in-

determinacy of translation that involves Quine’s rejection of the notions of meaning and synonymy

.

begin

I

by discussing an early statement of the thesis that ap-

pears in "The Problem of Meaning in Linguistics "H9
.

In that article, Quine discusses a case of radi-

cal translation, translation of "Kalaba" into English.

"
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Quine points out that the
linguist will, i„ the course
creating his lexicon, come
to appeal to his methodological principles as justifications
for his translations
He concludes that
The finished lexicon is a
case, evidently,
of ex ped e Herculem.
But thprp c
difference
acting Hercules from
the foot we risk error, but
we may derive
comfort that there is something
to be
wrong about.
In the case of the lexicon,
pending some definition of synonymy
we
of the problem we have
nothing for the lexicographer to be
right
&
or wrong about. 120
-i

=>

.

j

This conclusion is essentially
the second part of

the indeterminacy thesis as it
appears in Word and Object
The indeterminacy is here attributed
to the lack of a

definition of synonymy.

The first part of the thesis

does not appear in this article.

The reasons for this,

and the reasons for the emphasis in Word and
Object will

become clear,

I

hope, by the end of this subsection.

This passage suggests a justification for the
sec-

ond part of the thesis, or at least a partial
justification.

It suggests that determinateness of translation

requires a workable definition of synonymy.

Quine has

a number of reasons for supposing that no such defini-

tion can be found.

One of these is given in "The

Problem of Meaning in Linguistics

.

I

want to discuss

152
it briefly because it
suggests a view of the thesis of

indeterminacy that, though Quine
rejects it later, has
vestigial remnants in some of his
later works
And this
.

can be a source of confusion.
The problem is that of determining
what sequences
of utterance in Kalaba are
significant sequences and of

determining which significant sequences
in Kalaba are
synonymous with utterances in English.
Quine gives an
account of how the lexicographer would
go about determining how Kalaba utterances are to be
correlated with
English utterances. He points out the following
difficulty

:

The relevant features of the situation
issuing in a given Kalaba utterance are
large part concealed in the person of
the speaker where they were implanted
in the speaker by his earlier environment 121

m

,

.

Because of this, the linguist faces difficulties in
his attempt to determine synonymy of utterance by at-

tending to the situations of utterance.

This fact poses

serious difficulties for the development of the needed

definition of synonymy.

Quine points out the seriousness

of the problem:
The difficulty here is not just that
those subjective components of the
situation are hard to ferret out.
Theoretically the more important difficulty is that, as Cassierer and Whorf
have stressed, there is in principle
no separating language from the rest of
.

.

.

..

*

153

the world, at least as
conceived by
the speaker.
Basic differences in
language are bound up, as likely
as
dlff erences in the way in
which the speakers articulate
world itself into things and the
properties time and space, elements,
forces, spirits, and so on.
not clear even in principle It is
that it
makes sense to think of words
and
syntax as varying from language to
language while the content stays
fixed; yet precisely this fiction
is involved in speaking of
synonymy at least as between expressions of radically different languages
,

,

.

This passage suggests what seems to
a reader of

the late Quine a very un-Quinean view.

It suggests

that the problem of indeterminacy is that
there is

something "in" the speaker, his conceptualization
of
the world, that one can't even in principle
"ferret

out".

The speaker conceptualizes the world in all

the privacy of his own mind, but his utterances
do not

adequately reflect his mode of conceptualization.

One

reason that this view seems un-Quinean is that it appears to conflict with the second part of the indeter-

minacy thesis.

According to the second part of the thesis, there
is nothing for analytical hypotheses to be right or

wrong about.

The passage suggests that analytical hypo-
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theses are about the speaker's
actual mode of conceiving
the world, and so about some
matter of fact. I do not
think that there is such a
conflict, though, given the
way Quine has set up his claims.
In the passage quoted
above, Quine suggests that what
analytical hypotheses
would be about is some supposed
"content" that stays
fixed while words and syntax vary.
He denies, on the
grounds of the Whorf hypothesis that
there need be any
such fixed content.
Different modes of conceiving the
world may not share any content. Thus
we cannot assume that hypotheses of translation
are about any matter of fact— any content shared by two
languages.
So
,

the view of the passage and the second
part of the in-

determinacy thesis need not conflict. 123
As we saw in subsection (i), this way of talking

about the indeterminacy thesis is partially preserved

m

Word and Object

.

Thus, there is the talk of "empiri-

cally unconditioned variation in one's conceptual scheme"
at the beginning of Chapter II.

It is also reflected

in Quine's statements in Word and Object that to project

linguistic (i.e., analytical) hypotheses "beyond the

independently translatable sentences

...

is in effect

to impute our sense of linguistic analogy unverifiably

to the native mind." 12

14

.
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While there are vestigial remains
of this talk of
unreachable conceptual schemes that are
not reflected
one’s speech behavior, Quine explicitly
rejects the
Whorf hypothesis in Word and Object and
in "Philosophical Progress in Language Theory.'.’ 125
He also rejects
the notion of privacy that is suggested
by such an

m

account.

This rejection is most pronounaed in "On-

tological Relativity"
in Language Theory ." 126

and in "Philosophical Progress

This rejection of privacy is

of a piece with Quine's behaviorism and with his
re-

jection of what he calls "mentalism".

Though Quine rejects the particular argument against

synonymy that depends on Whorf

'

s

conjecture he has plenty

of arguments against a notion of synonymy left; and his

rejection of synonymy remains at the

heart of the thesis

of indeterminacy of translation.
I

shall not review Quine's arguments about synonymy.

My interest is rather in the importance of his rejection

of this notion for the indeterminacy thesis

.

If we

ask what sorts of conditions might make it possible for

there to be determinate translations, two answers are

obvious
Suppose that the meaning of a sentence were the

proposition that it expressed.

Propositions can be
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expressed, presumably, in different
ways, and indeed
in different languages.
So we might suppose that a
sentence in one language
Gavagos snurat bel canto
and a sentences in another language
The rabbit ran into the forest

express the same proposition.
Such a supposition would provide us with
a defi-

nition of sameness of meaning for sentences:
Two sentences have the same meaning
if and only if there is a proposition
P such that both sentences express P.

^

:*-

s

definition were adequate, translation would be

determinate.

sentence

!32

both Sq and
one.

To translate a sentence Sq in Lq
in L2
S2

by a

is to put forth the hypothesis that

express a certain proposition, the same

We can certainly make mistakes about what proposi-

tion a sentence expresses;

might be wrong.

our analytical hypotheses

But there is something for them to be

right or wrong about, namely, which proposition is being

expressed by the sentence.

There is, on this view, no

difficulty in principle about translation.

We could

speak in a similar way about terms expressing concepts.
Quine rejects this suggestion about the determinateness of translation.

He denies that there are propo-

sitions because, he says, there is no adequate theory
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that posits propositions.

This is so because there are

no means of distinguishing
propositions
There are no
criteria for their identity.
A problem related to that
of translation arises at the
level of propositions.
The
definition of sameness of meaning
for sentences suggested
above is misleading.
It hides the fact that the
notion
of "the same proposition" is
being made use of. A more
perspicuous statement would read
something like:
.

Two sentences have the same
meaning
if and only if there is a
proposition
r such that Si expresses P
and a
proposition P' such that
expresses
P
and p is the same proposition as P*.

This statement is more perspicuous
because it shows the
need for some way of determining when
P is the same

proposition as P

?

.

Until this is done, the theory that

posits propositions must be rejected.

This theory of

meaning cannot be used to explain how it is
that translation can be determinate 127
The theory of concepts
.

must be rejected for the same reason.
goes one way

Qf

And with them

making translation determinate.

Propositions, meanings, and concepts all have their
own difficulties.

Quine suggests in "Two Dogmas of

Empiricism'* that it may not be necessary to appeal
to meanings

;

what we are interested in, at least in

discussions of translation, is the notion of sameness
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of meaning.

If we could say when two
linguistic forms

are synonymous that would be
sufficient for determining
a translation, whether we
could explain in what the

"meaning" consisted or not.
The task of explaining synonymy
sounds like an easier
one than that of saying what meaning
is or what meanings are.
But Quine argues, primarily in
"Two Dogmas
of Empiricism" that synonymy can be
explicated only
in terms of analyticity
y

, nr1
and

also

vice- versa.

The

task of explicating synonymy (non-circularly
is, he
)
argues, a hopeless one. We cannot say, on
the basis of
a notion of synonymy, that translation is
determinate.

This

,

briefly

,

is the background for the discussion

of translation in Word and Obj ect

the discussion

}.n

.

The main part of

Word and Obj ect is an attempt to

see to what degree determinate translation of a language
can be given simply by reference to the dispositions
to verbal and other behavior of the speaker.

It is an

examination of the possibility that one’s dispositions
to verbal behavior determine translation.

But, as we

saw in Subsection A, only a very small part of the total

language is determined by the speaker’s dispositions to

verbal behavior.

And even that part is subject to the

residual indeterminacy arising from the translation of
items of assent and dissent.
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The only sentences that are
translatable, even

given acceptance of hypotheses
about assent and dissent,
are observation sentences.
They are translatable because there are behavioral criteria
of synonymy for
them.
For observation sentences, synonymy
is stimulus
synonymy.
Stimulus-synonymy is inadequate for translating the remainder of the sentences
of the language,
though.
The naturalistic approach to translation
cannot be appealed to in claiming translation
to be determinate.
This result was the first part of the
thesis
of indeterminacy of translation.
We can now see why the argument in Word and
Ob-

ject

makes the indeterminacy thesis plausible.

The

first part of the thesis is a result of the failure
of
the notion of stimulus -synonymy as a complete
account
of synonymy.

Dispositions to verbal behavior do not

determine translation.

Quine’s earlier work showed

the shortcomings of the general notion of synonymy. Ap-

peal to synonymy could not account for determinateness
translation.

Finally, theories that posit propo-

sitions and concepts are inadequate because they lack

criteria for identity.

So theories of meaning that

appeal to propositions do not support determinateness
of translation.

Analytical hypotheses are not

about
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facts concerning what
propositions a sentence or pair
of sentences express or the
concepts expressed by the
terms they are not about facts
concerning sameness of
meaning of pairs of sentences.
For Quine, at least, it
seems plausible to maintain on
the basis of the arguments for these claims that
,

analytical hypotheses are not genuine hypotheses.
They are not about
any objective or subjective matter
of fact.
C.

Observation Sentences Again
In Chapter I(IC),

I

argued that there are serious

difficulties for Quine’s claims about the role of
observation sentences in language-learning.
of that chapter,

I

In Section 11(B)

suggested that the same is true

of his claim that these sentences are repositories
of

evidence for science.

In both places,

I

attributed the

difficulties to Quine's theses of underdetermination
of physical theory and indeterminacy of translation.
It should by now be clear why observation sentences can-

not perform the functions claimed for them by Quine.

Consider the language-learning case.
of Belief and

’’The

Roots of Reference,"

In The Web

Quine is con-

cerned with what he calls the psychogenesis of reference.
He wants to provide some account of how it is that the

,
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Child comes to master the
language

,

and in particular

ho„ he comes to be able to
refer.
It is clear from what
he says there (as elsewhere)
that referring involves a
theory of objects. 12 8 He
introduces the topic at the
beginning of Lecture I by saying
propose in these lectures to speculate on how we master one of the
conspicuous uses of language:
its use
in speaking of objects.
Somehow we
do learn to speak effortlessly
of
objects, and not only of physical objects but of attributes, numbers,
sets,
all sorts of abstract objects. 1^9
I

.

In considering when the child can be
said to

have learned to refer to the color red he
makes the

point more clearly.

He insists that it is not suf-

ficient for having learned to refer that one
"has
learned to respond, on demand, in distinctive verbal
ways according as red is conspicuously present
or not. "130
Such responding is not enough for the child to be
said
to have learned to refer to red:

"To say that [the

child] refers to the color would be to impute our

ontology to him." 13 l
These quotations are intended to show that, on

Quine's view, for the child to have become a full-

fledged speaker of our language it is not sufficient
that he have "learned" to respond verbally in appropriate

ways in the appropriate circumstances.

The child must
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have, in addition, adopted our ontology.

He must refer

to the same things we refer to.
One of the claims about observation
sentences

cussed in Chapter

I

I

dis-

was

Learning some observation sentences

(1)

is a necessary condition of learning
to speak a language.

This claim is made in The Web of Belief and in
"Grades

of Theoreticity

.

"

The actual claim made by Quine is a

bit stronger, for learning observation sentences is
sup-

posed to be not only a necessary condition of learning
a language but an "entering wedge" into a language.

"They

afford the only entry to a language."
I

argued that the two theses discussed in this chap-

ter--the thesis of underdetermination of physical theory
and the thesis of indeterminacy of translation--raised

very serious doubts about whether Quine could explain

how the learner is to be able to "catch on" to a theory
of objects even once the child has learned the observa-

tion sentences, or some set of these.

Now that we have seen in detail what these theses
say, the difficulties for Quine’s discussions of the

psychogenesis

of'

reference should be obvious.

I

merely

list them here.
(1)

The observation sentences the child

has learned do not determine a theory
of objects.

Radically different

.

"theories are consistent with

the observation sentences he has

learned
(2)

What the terms of a language are
is not determinate.

The child can-

not learn what linguistic items are

terms on the basis of the observa-

tion sentences he has learned.
(3)

Indeterminacy applies to general
terms (and the rest of the ref-

erential apparatus of the language).
The child cannot determine a theory
of objects from his teacher on the

basis of the observation sentences
he has learned.
(4)

Indeterminacy applies to general
terms.

Even if we assume the child

to be using general terms

,

the teacher

cannot determine what theory of objects
the child is using from his verbal

behavior.

The child’s referential

application of these terms is not

determinately reflected in his dispositions to speech behavior.
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No facts about the child's
acquisition of dispositions in learning observation
sentences can explain how
the child comes to have one
theory (say, the theory of

middle-sized objects) rather than
any other theory (say,
a theory of events).
We attribute a theory to the child
only by accepting some set of
analytical hypotheses,
hypotheses that are woefully underdetermined
by his

dispositions to verbal behavior and that
are only one
set out of many equally acceptable
alternatives.

Learn-

ing some observation sentences may
be a necessary condition of learning a language. But it is
difficult to
see how such sentences can serve as an
"entering wedge"

into a language.

In any case, talk of the child's

theory of objects (or ours) is misleading.

It suggests

that analtyical hypotheses are about some
fact--what
the child's theory is.

As we have seen, Quine thinks

that questions about the accuracy of the attribution
of
a theory of objects are meaningless.

I

discuss this

matter in more detail in Chapter III.
The problems for Quine's claims about the epistemo-

logical role of observation sentences are much the same.
He says that "Observation sentences are the repository

of evidence for scientific theories "134
.

i s no

-t-

at all clear how they can have this function in any

ordinary sense, given the two theses.

.
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According to the underdetermination
thesis there
alternative, incompatible theories
compatible with all
possible true observation sentences
of a language.
The
discussion of first part of the thesis
of indetermina,

cy of translation shows that
these theories may posit

radically different kinds of objects.
Quine uses

The examples

are theories that posit physical objects

and theories that posit events.

Physical theories, as

we normally understand them, molecular and
atomic theories,

for example, are also compatible with all
these observa-

tion sentences.

Observation sentences do not, on Quine’s

view, provide evidence

for theories in the sense that

they enable one to choose among such radically
different

theories

Observation sentences as characterized in Section
1(A) of Chapter

I

fail even to provide evidence in the

sense of justifying empirical generalizations.

Accord-

ing to this characterization,
(3)

Observation sentences do not refer
or contain referring items

and
(4)

Observation sentences are learned
they do not have

as single units
terms as parts.

Thus

,

;

there are two reasons why these sentences cannot

justify empirical generalizations.

.

.

.
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CD

Such generalizations involve
quanti-

fication and so a theory of objects.

Observation sentences

,

according to

(3), are independent of any theory

of objects
(2)

To justify an empirical generaliza-

tion of the form 'All A's are B's',

observation sentences would have
to have some structure.

They would

have to contain the terms
'B'.

'A'

and

But, according to (4), they

do not contain terms or other parts

Quine's presentation of his views on observation sen
tences

their roles in language-learning and evi-

dence are, at the least, incomplete.

A satisfactory pre-

sentation of his views must take into account the consequences of his theses of underdetermination and indeterminacy.

This is particularly important, since, as

we shall see in Chapter III, the thesis of indeterminacy
of translation applies not only in radical translation

but to one's own use of one's language
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CHAPTER

HI

THE INSCRUTABILITY OF REFERENCE

AND ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY

INTRODUCTION
In the John Dewey lectures for
1968, entitled "On-

tological Relativity," Quine takes up
some problems raised
by the thesis of the indeterminacy
of translation.
The

main problem arises because this thesis
is general, applying to all languages and all speakers.
Quine argues
that, ’'ecause of this, reference appears to
be "nonsense":
Questions about the reference of terms are evidently
"meaningless".

In trying to avoid this result, Quine

says that semantical claims and questions of ontology
\

are meaningful only relative to a background language.

This view is what he calls ontological relativity.

Ac-

cording to it, one can "make sense of reference" in a

theory or language only when that theory or language is

translated into a background language:

"Reference is

nonsense except relative to some background language."
There are a number of difficulties in understanding

Quine’s argument for ontological relativity.

His initial

.
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argument depends on two assumptions
that are not widely
understood.
The first of these is that
reference is
itself indeterminate, or as Quine
says "inscrutable."
As we have seen in Chapter II,
Quine argues in Word and
Object and elsewhere that the
translation of the referential items of a language is
indeterminate. This does not
by itself explain why reference
should be indeterminate.
I take up this question in
Section I
*

As already noted, the argument Quine
gives requires

the assumption that the indeterminacy
thesis (as it applied
to reference) is completely general.
It must then apply
to what Quine calls the "home" case.

The indeterminacy

of reference must be acceptable "when applied
to oneself. "2

Some philosophers find the suggestion that
indeterminacy
be applied in the home case either puzzling or highly

implausible.

In the first part of Section II I defend

the conditional statement that

,

if the indeterminacy

thesis is applicabble to the interlinguistic case (radio-

translation)

,

then it is applicable to one's own case.

Quine proposes the view about
ontological relativity

because of an argument whose conclusion is that "there
is no difference between the rabbit and each of its parts

or stages." 3

The argument as Quine sketches it is very

difficult to understand.

In Section II

I

try to re-

construct his argument, or a near relation of it.

In

169

my discussion of this
reconstruction

I

show how ontologi-

relativity is designed to avoid
Quine's unwanted
conclusion.
In the course of my
explication, I reconstruct
two similar arguments, each
of which has a conclusion similar to that of my reconstruction
of Quine's argument.
n each of these arguments
the semantic statements are
relativized to a manual of translation
and a background
language.
Quine's solution, ontological relativity,
does not circumvent these arguments.
,

One difficulty that Quine finds with
ontological

relativity as a solution of the problem
about reference
is that it appears to involve
a regress into background
languages. At the end of Section II I discuss
the way
in which this regress gets started and
the nature

of the

regress.

Quine says that the regress is to be stopped

by accepting the home language, as a background
language,
at face value.

Though

I

agree with Quine that there is

such a regress and that it must be stopped

give any account of reference,

ceptable.

I

if he is to

find his solution unac-

In find no satisfactory way for Quine to

state what it is to accept the home language at face
value.

This failure seems to me to throw doubt on

Quine's attempt to behaviorize meaning.
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THE INSCRUTABILITY OF REFERENCE

A.

Reference and General Terms

Throughout this chapter

referring expressions.

I

treat general terms as

In discussing the inscrutability

of reference,, for example,

I

speak of the application of

the thesis of indeterminacy of translation
to the general

terms of a language.

The reference of general terms is,

according to Quine, "divided reference."

1

*

A general

term "divides" its reference among those objects to

which it applies, or of which it is true.

Such a term

is true of each, severally, of any number of
objects. "5

The term ’dog’

,

for example, is true of (and thus refers

to) each object that is a dog.

This "division" of reference is one of the reasons

why

,

of a

for Quine

,

the translation of the referential items

language is indeterminate.

A general term might

divide its reference in any one of a number of ways

,

and

there would be no behavioral criteria for determining in

which way its reference is divided. 6

Translation of these

items presupposes some principle or principles of individu-

ation

that show how reference is divided, of what objects

the general terms are true.

Such principles are not

adequately reflected in a speaker's dispositions to

8

7
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verbal behavior, a set of
analytical hypotheses must be
accepted in order to translate
general terms
My treatment of general
terms is consistent with
Quine's usage in "Ontological
Relativity" and with his
discussion of principles of
individuation and of divided
reference in Word and Object
Nevertheless, this treatment could be confusing to someone
not familiar with
Quine’s other writing on reference.
Although Quine includes general terms in his list of
items that comprise
.

.

the referential apparatus of a
natural language .in "The

Roots of Reference," he takes bound
variables and quantifiers and their natural language counterparts
to be the

ultimate bearers of reference.
In "The Roots of Reference," he asks,
is this referential apparatus?"

"Just what

and he answers:

I mentioned pronouns, copulas, suffixes.
The contrast between general and singular terms is part of the mechanism; also
the copula of predication, which joins
general to singular.
The plural ending
is part of the mechanism, and counting,
and the copula of identity and above
all the pronouns
The pronouns become
exalted as bound variables once we
regiment our language along quantificational lines of symbolic logic, and
all references can be funnelled through
this channel.
Quantification is reference
,

.

,

distilled

.

In the regimentation given in Word and Object

,

names are

H
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to be eliminated, assimilated
to general terms or replaced by definite descriptions.
The name ’Socrates',

for example, becomes, in the
regimentation, the predicate
Socratizes
Other singular' terms are also
eliminated by
assimilation to general terms. Mass
terms may be treated
either as predicates or as abstract
singular terms. 9
Thus, in one example, Quine treats
'red' as a general
term. 10
In an earlier discussion (section
19), he treats
it as a mass term.
The distinctions among singualar,
mass and general terms seem not to be
made in the syn.

,

tax.

One can't, for example, determine from
the struc-

ture of a formula whether a predicate is
a mass term. The

distinction, if it is to be made, is to be made in
the
semantics

.

The importance to Quine of the role of quantifica-

tion in reference comes out clearly in Word and Object

where he says

,

To decline. to explain oneself in terms
of quantification, or in terms of those
special idioms of ordinary language
by which quantification is directly
explained, is simply to decline to disclose one's referential intent. 12

An example of what becomes of general terms and

certain mass terms in the regimentation, where one
explains oneself in terms of quantification, shows one

way in which the distinction collapses in the regimenta-

.

.
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tion.

The sentences

Rabbits are brown

becomes
(x) (Rx then Bx)

The English sentence, on
Quine's analysis, contains both
the general term 'rabbits'
and the mass term 'brown'.
Thus,
according to Section 19 of Word and
Object two modes of
,

referring— dividedly and cumulatively
„are made use of

m

the sentence.

In the regimentation, both terms
appear

as predicates; no syntactical
distinction is made between
them. 13 The

two modes of referring are not distinguished

syntactically in the regimentation. 1 ^
Once the regimentation is completed, the
referring role

role is performed by the whole structure of
predicates,

quantification, and identity.

Though Quine says that

quantification is reference distilled, it is not clear
in just what sense this is true.

It seems, for example,

that predicates continue to be true of objects on Quine's
account.

The predicate

'dog'

would— on standard interpre-

tations in any case— be true of all and only dogs

refer to all and only dogs

.

,

and

The purported connection be-

tween quantification and reference appears to involve
Quine's views on quantification and ontological commit-

ment 15

so

^

,

Quine's views on ontological
commitment are a matter
of some controversy.
Whatever interpretation one puts
on his remarks, however, it
is clear that the use of the
existential quantifier involves
one in ontological commitments. 16 The idea seems to
be that the range of the
quantifiers determines what objects
can be referred to
in the language in question.
The assignment of those
objects to predicates determines
which of the available
objects a given predicate refers to.
Thus, though (for
Quine) 'Quantification is reference
distilled," terms
or predicates continue to play an
important role in

referring

Indeterminacy (Inscrutability) of Reference

B.
(

i

.

)

Translation and reference
We saw in Chapter II that the thesis of
indeterminacy

of translation applied to the referential items
of the

radically foreign language.

In "Ontological Relativity",

Quine introduces the phrases "indeterminacy of reference"
and

inscrutability of reference."

determinacy of reference

He suggests that in-

is either a case of or a conse-

quence of the indeterminacy of translation

of the re-

ferential apparatus (and, in particular, of the general
terms of the language).
One might ask why reference should be indeterminate

just because the translation of the referential items
of the language is indeterminate.

It does not seem in-

.
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itially implausible to suppose
that a term should be
capable of referring to a given
thing, even though
a linguist is incapable --even
in principle--of translating the term correctly.
It might be supposed that
even though there were conflicting,
equally correct

manuals of translation, terms do
refer--and refer in
some determinate way.
Such suggestions seem to me to miss
one of the

main points of Quine’s discussion of
indeterminacy.

As

pointed out in Chapter II, Quine is concerned
to develop an empirical science of language.
According to
I

him, such a science will be a behavioristic
one--thus

Quine’s behavioristic account of the field linguist's
activities.

Because of Quine's views about the con-

ditions for an empirical science of language, the results about translation do show something about ref-

erence:
3.

If reference were determinate, there would be

determinate translation of the referential items of

the language.

There are several ways in which one might clarify
this claim.

One might put the point in terms of trans-

lations of native speakers

tical words.

'

sentences that contain seman-

We might consider a semantical sentence

of the native language:
'gavagai' srefer ot gavagoi
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If the translation of this
sentence is indeterminate, we
might have (among others) the
following

translations,

each of which translates
'srefer

of

as

'refers to': 18

gavagai refers to rabbits;
gavagai' refers to rabbit partsgavagai* refers to rabbithood.
?

|

^

*

The manuals of translation
that yield these dif _
ferent translations of our native
sentence are equally
good manuals of translation in that
each is compatible
with all the native speakers'
dispositions to verbal

behavior.

We might also suppose that they are
equally

simple, preserve informal principles of
translation

equally well, and so on.

The suggestion is that, since

the translations of these semantical
sentences, sentences

which give the reference of the term 'gavagai*
is in-

determinate, the reference of the term is itself in-

determinate

.

So far as I know, Quine does not explicitly
discuss

the translations of such semantical sentences.

It seems

likely, however, that he would claim that the translation

such sentences is indeterminate.

A second suggestion

concerns issues on which Quine has more clearly taken
a position, and I turn now to discussion of that suggestion..

According to the second suggestion, the indeterminacy
of reference is a fairly direct result of the indetermi-

nacy of translation of general terms, along with that

f

.

'

Of the rest of the referential
apparatus.
the term 'gavagai' is indeterminate.

Translation of

Some of the trans-

lations given by different manuals
of translation are
'rabbit
'rabbit part'
'rabbithood
'

The intuition on which this suggestion
is based is
that the manual of translation makes
use of a .background
language the semantic statements (about
reference) of

which are assumed to have already been
established.
this has been done is a question that

next section.

For the time,

I

I

How

discuss in the

shall suppose that there

is no difficulty about establishing
the reference of terms

in the background, or translating, language.

gavagai

is translated in a given manual by

hood', and 'rabbithood' refers to rabbithood.
vagai

refers to rabbithood.

Thus,
'rabbitSo

'ga-

Since there are different,

and equally acceptable, manuals of translation, there are
di-f

er>e nt

,

and equally acceptable

reference of the term.

,

statements about the

Choice of a manual of translation

not only determines the translation of the native speakers
term; it also fixes its reference.
of the term is indeterminate

,

Since the translation

the reference

of the term

is indeterminate as well.

In a recent, as yet unpublished, paper, B. Aune re-

constructs in more detail this Quinean argument for the

.

indeterminacy of reference.

His reconstruction captures

the intuition on which the
second suggestion is based.
quotes Quine as saying,

He

The terms ’'rabbit,"
"undetached rabbit
part,
and "rabbit stage" differ not only
in
meaning; they are true of different
things.
Reference itself proves behaviorally inscrutable. 19

Aune then suggests the following
reconstruction of Quine's
argument for the inscrutability of
reference.
(1)

Absolutely speaking, the following
translations for 'gavagai' are
equally defensible:

'rabbit',

'rabbit stage', and 'undetached

rabbit part.'
(2)

If 'gavagai' were translated as
'rabbit'

,

it would refer to (or

be true of) rabbits.
(3)

If

'gavagai' were translated as

'rabbit stage', it would refer
to rabbit stages
(4)

If

'gavagai' were translated as

'undetached rabbit part', it

would refer to undetached rabit parts.

.

:

.
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(5)

Since, absolutely speaking, the
ante-

cedents of (2), (3), and (4) are
equally

defensible
(a)

'gavagai' refers to rabbits.

(b)

'gavagai* refers to rabbit stages.

(c)

'gavagai' refers to undetached

rabbit parts
But if (5a), (5b), and (5c) are,
abso-

(6)

lutely speaking, equally defensible,
the

reference of 'gavagai' is, absolutely
speaking
(7)

,

indeterminate

Therefore, the reference of 'gavagai' is,

absolutely speaking, indeterminate.^
This reconstruction of Quine's argument is,

I

think,

an accurate rendering of the argument implicit
in Quine's

discussions of the indeterminacy of reference.

As Aune

points out, however, some account of the justification
of

premises (2)-(4) is needed to clarify the relation between reference and translation.

These premises are them-

selves instances of a general claim about a relation be-

tween translation and reference.

As Aune says, until

we can answer certain questions about the justification

for these premises and about the logical form of statements such as

'0

refers to K's', "we shall not really

.

2
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understand Quine's view of
reference or its precise relation to the notion of
translation ”21
.

It is difficult to
provide such a justification.

One

suggestion made by Aune requires
a particular account of
the logical form of '0 refers
to Ks
Aune believes that
some remarks made by Quine
in "Ontological Relativity"
imply that
'

for Quine, statements of the
kind
0 refers to (denotes, is
true of)
K s
actually relate words to other
words rather than (at least
directly)
relating words to the world. 2
If this suggestion is correct,
Quine is committed

to denying that statements of the
form

?

0

refers to

K's’ specify a direct relation of
words to the world.

On such an account, semantic
statements provide classifi-

cations for terms.

'0

refers to K's’, on this view, is

a statement that classfies the term
0 as a term of the

same sort as the term

^ ff^rent

'

K

f

.

There may be, of course, many

such systems of classification.

One connection between translation and reference
is

that manuals for translation are also classificatory

systems. For Quine, such manuals correlate--among other

things--the referential items of one language with the

referential items of the same or another language

.

Manuals

of translation, in the interlinguistic case, classify what
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are taken to be the
referential items of the
translated
language, using the referential
items of the translating

language for the classification
system.
Typically, however, sentences such
as
K

'0

refers to

are metalinguistic sentences
in which the variable
’0’
and
are associated with items in
the same object
2
language. 3 The classification
provided by such sentences
s

is typically intralinguistic

.

Manuals of translation,

however, typically provide interlinguistic
translations.
The similarity of function of
manuals of translation and
semantic statements about reference can
be used to provide
a justification of premises (2)-(4)
of Aune’s reconstruction of Quine’s argument.

A natural suggestion

to be used in such a justification

is that semantical statements about the
reference

of terms

relate words to other words rather than relating
words to
the world, and this was in fact part of Aune’s
suggested

justification.

Aune notes that such a suggestion would

not provide a complete justification for the premises.

Two

terms may be co-referential and yet the one not be a good

translation of the other.

Thus, the relation between

ref erence and translation may not be a direct one.

Aune

suggests "an appropriate word-word relation between co-

referential terms" that bringd

translation and reference:

out this relation between
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Re l at ve ly speaking, we
may assent to
i
0 refers to K's
just in case we are prepared to
assent

There is a general term 0 belonging to the language of 0
such that 9 is coextensive
with 0 and 0 is the translation,
relatively speaking, of 'K' 2l+
This last statement does appear
to provide a justi-

fication for premises (2)-(4).

In order to complete the

clarification of the logical form of

'0

-

?

refers to K's',

however, an explication of 'is coextensive
with' is needed.
As Aune notes, such an explication
must be given

1

"in such a way that it does not simply
mean

V

ential with

"
'

.

'is

corefer-

Ad

25

A definition of 'co-extensiveness' that preserves
the notion that reference is a word-word
relation might

make use of substitutional quantification. 26

To do so

would avoid possible difficulties due to the role of
objectual quantification in reference. 2 ^

Moreover, objec-

tual quantification gives us a relation between words and
the world, between words and objects.

On the line that

we are now pursuing, the analysis of referential state-

ments is to provide a relation, not between words and
(non-linguistic) objects, but between words and words. Sub-

stitutional quantification seems to be ideally suited for
such an analysis.

Cadi

s

.

r

)
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One might, then, give the
following explication of
’is coextensive with':
is coextensive with

iff
,

then

r0C\)

^

in L

is a singular term of L
-

is true iff

f

C\)'is true).

28

In this explication,
co-extensiveness of predi-

cates of a language is explained
in terms of the results
of substituting singular terms
for the variables in open
sentences. More natural characterizations
such as

I

A and

B

A and

B are

are co-extensive in L iff
v£jeai

true of the same things

are not, of course, available.

Given the purpose of the

definition, co-extensiveness cannot be
explicated in
terms of co-ref erentiality
The suggestion seems quite promising as an
attempt
to complete the justification for premises

(

2

)

—

(

4

of

the reconstructed argument in such a way that
reference
is construed as a word-word relation.

ever, serve as an explication of Quine

erence.

It will not, how*

views on ref-

In the next subsection, I argue that Quine's

views on quantification will not allow him to accept the

proposed justification.

This is because he rejects the

substitution interpretation of quantifiers.
subsection

I

try in that

to make plausible a claim that, for Quine,

Ad

1

.

2
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Following their suggestion,

I

characterize the

substitution interpretation for
the existential quanthe following way:

For the uaer of substitutional
quantification
'(Ex)Fx is false if
every substitution instance in
every
extension of the theory is false.
Otherwise, it is true. 3
,

'

The universal quantifier is
characterized in an analogous

way
It is quite clear that Quine does
not make use of this

interpretation of the quantifiers.

In an early paper,

A Logiais tical Approach to the Ontological
Problem,"
and in his logic text, Mathematical Logic

,

his account of

quantification is what he calls the objectual or classical
interpretation of quantification theory.
Object, he continues to use this account.

In Word and
In a dis-

cussion of ontic commitment in Word and Object

,

for ex\

ample, he says,

Insofar as we adhere to this [canonical]
notation, the objects we are to be understood to admit are precisely the objects
which we reckon to the universe of values
over which the bound variables of quantification are to be considered to range.
Such is simply the intended sense of the
quantifiers '(x)' and '(Ex)':
'every
object x is such that', 'there is an
object x such that'. The quantifiers
are encapsulations of these specially
selected, unequivocally referential idioms of ordinary language. 3
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Quine has, then, explicitly
committed himself to
the use of objectual
quantification. The case I want
to make is stronger than
this, however:
Quine explicitly
- jeCtS the substi tution interpretation of quantifiers.
He has a variety of arguments
against the use of this
interpretation.
I will discuss only
those that occur
several more recent papers, including
"Existence
and Quantification" (1966) and the
Carus Lectures,
"The Roots of Reference" (December
1971).
There are

m

several reasons, other than limitations
of space, for
considering only these later works. One
reason is that
Quine’s views about the substitution
interpretation have
changed considerably since his earlier papers
;

much more tolerant of it now.

he is

Another reason is that

the argument with which we are concerned

appears in "On-

tological Relativity," which was published in 1968.
I

So

want to include arguments that were roughly contempora-

neous with that essay or else appeared later.

I

will not

discuss the merits of Quine’s arguments about this in-

terpretation in any detail.

My point is that he rejects

the substitution interpretation.
In "Existence and Quantification," Quine finds a

certain virtue in substitutional quantification.

This

is that, he finds, substitutional quantification is less

subject to indeterminacy of translation than is objectual

.

,

.
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quantification.

He says that substitutional
quantifica-

tion "doas admit behavioral criteria
of tranalation as substantial as those for the truth
"33
functions
.

.

.

.

Quine then argues that "substitutional
quantification
gives no acceptable version of existence
properly soailed.
He seems to take this to be an objection
to substitutional quantification 36
For him,
.

.

.

existence is what existential quan^ific&tion expresses. There are things
of kind F if and only if (Ex)Fx.
This
is as unhelpful as it is undebatable
since it is how one explains the
symbolic notation of quantification to
begin with. 36
He points out, moreover, that Lesniewski

,

one who "favored"

substitutional quantification, "did not himself relate
his kind of quantification to ontological commitments." 3 ^

Quine raises another objection to this form of quantifi-

cation in

Existence and Quantification

.

"

He claims
\

that any theory that has "an indenumerable or indefinite

universe is irreducibly committed to something like
ob jectual quantification.

Indenumerable and indefinite

universes are what, in the end, give point to ob jectual

quantification and ontology." 38

Quine thinks that such

universes are needed for higher mathematics and physical
theory
In "The Roots of Reference," Quine introduces other

objections to the substitution interpretation.

Substitu-
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tional quantification is, he says,
important in explicating the "psychogenesis" of
reference.
Quine claims that

variables, as they would be initially
learned, are
substitutional 39 but, he claims, once
categoricals
such as An r,\ is a i
are introduced, the variable
f
goes objectual." He argues this way:
;

*

*

Since the categorical construction 'An
ls a
’is learned through such ex\
amples as 'An apple is a fruit,
'A rabbit
is an animal
it would be inappro priate
to read '(x)(if Fx then Gx ) 1 in the substitutional way as meaning merely that
every substituted name that verifies 'Fx'
verifies 'Gx'.
It is unnatural if not
absurd to imagine names or singular
descriptions either, for all apples and
rabbits 40
’

(

'

,

,

.

There is in this argument an implicit objection to the
use of the substitution interpretation on the ground that

the substitution interpretation would require that each

object have a name.

It is not clear whether the objec-

tion is that we not in fact have names for all objects or
that there cannot be names for all objects.

Quine says

only that "the namelessness of apples and rabbits was

what showed us that our variables had gone objectual ." 41
An objection based on a law of class theory involves
a similar consideration.

The law is what Quine calls

the law of unit subclasses.

He describes it this way:

"any class that has members has some unit subclass

." 42

He claims that this law comes out false when substitution-

ally interpreted.

According to him,

.

.
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t

requires that whenever we can write

a class abstract or relative
clause that
is true of a lot of
individuals, we can
write another that is true of exactly

one of those individuals

I say it is false.
Well, it is implausible.
It says that whenever we
can somehow demarcate a multiplicity
of
physical objects we can also specify a
unique sample.
This is about as implausible as supposing a distinctive designation for every physical object. 43
.

There are other, related objections based
on similar

considerations about the numerousness of names.

Thus,

Quine believes that the substitution
interpretation is
not adequate for class theory as a whole.

And, of course,

he believes that class theory is required for
mathematics.
So he finds that he must reject the substitution
interpre-

tation of quantifiers in favor of what he calls objectual

quantification
Quine has other objections, but these should suffice
show that he rejects the substitution interpretation.
He would not, then, accept the suggested justification of

premises (2)- (4) of the argument for indeterminacy of

reference, since this justification makes use of the sub-

stitution interpretation.
My discussion thus far does not show that Quine would
be unwilling to accept substitutional quantification as
a logical device that can be explicitly defined by using

.

°
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.

actual quantification.

thing like the following.

One might suggest, then,

sou-

Q uine could make use Qf sufa _

etitutional quantification
in the context under
discussion,
though in other contexts
he makes use of objectual
quantification.
The substitutional
quantifiers can be ’•translated" into ob j actual
quantifiers.
So far as X know, Quine
has not discussed this
sort of suggestion 44 It
.

does,
however, seem correct to
suppose that if Quine were
to make
use of some form of mixed
quantification, the substitutional
quantifiers would be defined
by translation into objectual
quantification. 45 If this were
the case, the translated
variables would be taken to
range over names.
Given the sort of objections
Quine makes to substitu^
tional quantification, however,
such a move seems somewhat
implausible. His objections are
based primarily on claims
about the availability of names.
Similar objections would
naturally be raised about the
availability of names for
the (objectually interpreted)
quantifiers to range over.
On the face of it, this proposal
seems unlikely
to be one

that Quine would find acceptable.
In any case, there seems to be a
problem with the def-

inition.

On this definition, the coextensiveness
of gen-

eral terms depends on which of the items
falling under the
terms in question are named.
Consider an example. Ac-

cording to the definition, the following bi-conditional
is

true:

.

:
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'Apple'

is coextensive with

'fruit' in L

iff (a) (a is a singular term
of L

then

'

apple(a) is true iff

'

fruit(a)

1

is true)

But one can easily find cases in
which the first part of
the biconditional is false and the
second true.
Suppose

that in L the only items of fruit that
are named are
apples.

(Whether all apples are named is irrelevant;

Quine finds this supposition absurd.)

Speakers of L do,

however, use the term 'fruit' when speaking of
items other
than apples (when speaking of oranges, for example).
On

these suppositions

,

the following is true

(a) (a is a singular term of L

is true iff

r fruit(a)

7

.

in

L'

,

'

apple(a)

1

is true).

According to the characterization of
.

then

'is

coextensive with.

the following should also be true:
'apple' is coextensive with

'fruit' in L.

But, according to our story, this is false.

not wildly implausible.

The story is

The speakers of L may have some

reason for paying special attention to apples and so
naming (at least some of) them.

What does seem implausible

is that the coextensiveness of terms should be tied to

the

use of singular terms in the language as suggested.

One would get similar unfortunate results, of course, when

considering general terms the referents of which are not

)

.’
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named.

Examples that seem most likely
to be convincing
are ’electron’, ’photon’,
-blade of grass'.
Exactly what part of the analysis
Quine must reject
for these reasons is not clear.
Use of substitutional
quantification is made in the definition
of coextensiveness.
This definition is used in giving
the logical form of
statements of the form ’0 refers to
K’s’.
A different
definition of coextensiveness might be
developed that would
not make use of the term 'refers'
(and thus not be circular) and that would not conflict with
the suggestion that
"statements of the kind ’0 refers to (denotes,
is true
of) K s
actually relate words to other words, rather
than
(at least directly) relating words to
the world." 46
’

It is

very difficult to see how such a view can be
made out,

however
I

do not believe that Quine holds a view of state-

ments about reference of the sort
described by Aune in the

passage just quoted.
I

In the remainder of this subsection

want to do two things:

(1)

make plausible that Quine

takes reference to be a relation between words and the

world and (2) provide an alternative to Aune’s justification of premises

(

minacy of reference.

2

)

—(4

of the argument about indeter-

' .
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As we saw in subsection
A,

"Reference and General

Terms," for Quine, quantification
is an essential part of
the referential apparatus.
He says in Word and Object
Such is simply the intended sense
of the
quantifiers:
'(x)' and '(Ex)':
'every
object x is such that', 'there is an
object x such that'.
The quantifiers are
encapsulations of these specially selected, unequivocally referential idioms
of ordinary language
^
,

.

Quine

reiterates this idea when he says, "Quantification

is a welcome encapsulation of the
referential apparatus ." 48

This view is reflected later in "The Roots
of Reference,"

where he says, "referring in the fullest sense
to objects
of some sort" is a result of "handling something
tanta-

mount to quantification." 48
Much of my attempt to make my interpretation of
Quine's views on reference plausible will, because of the

importance of quantification for reference, concern
Quine

s

views on quantification.

I

will also consider

some of his less technical remarks
As we have seen, Quine rejects the substitution

interpretation of quantification in favor of what he
calls the objectual interpretation. We also saw that, for

Quine, quantification, in particular existential quantifi-

cation, expresses existence.

In "Existence and Quantifi-

cation," Quine gives various reasons why one looks to

quantified variables to determine the existential force
of a theory.

.
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In arguing that quantifiers,
rather than names, have

existential import, Quine says this:
An expression "a" may occur in
a theory,
we saw, with or without
purporting to
name an object.
What clinches matters
is rather the quantification
(Ex) (x = a)
1!
existential quantifier, not —
"
th
the a itself, that carries
existential
import.
This is just what existential
quantification is for, of course.
It is
a logically regimented rendering
of the
there is" idiom.
The bound variable
ranges over the universe, and the
2£.
existential quantification says that at
least one of the objects in the universe
satisfies the appended condition in
this case the condition of being the
object a. 50

—

Quine's talk here of objects and the universe in

connection with quantification is difficult to explicate
except as involving a relation between words (or
logical
symbols) and the world, at least in the light of Quine's

rejection of substitutional quantification. Moreover,
many of Quine's remarks in rejecting the substitution

interpretation support the view that the interpretation
of quantifiers, and so of reference, involve a relation

between words and the world.
As we saw before, one of Quine's objections was that

there are insufficient names for objects

.

As Quine says,

"It is unnatural if not absurd to imagine names

,

or

singular descriptions either, for all apples and rabbits."
Reviewing this point in connection with another objection
based on the law of unit subclasses, he says,
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Sure ly for individual physical
the case for objectual quantification was conclusive. Quantification
over physical objects was
objectual
because of its categorical root,
in
sentences like Rabbits are animals'
that*
treat of individually nameless
objects. 5
•

*

‘

ob] ects

,

.

.

'

In a lighter mood, he describes
what happens when the

variables

go objectual":

cation now

...

,

Our rake is engaging in quantifi-

and it is objectual quantification. He

is referring flagrantly and
unequivocally to objects ." 53

These statements by Quine do not, of
course, constitute
a proof that, for him, reference is
a relation between words
and the world.
They are, however, very difficult to understand in any other way.
There is no clear and detailed

statement of Quine's position on this question in
works

appearing after Words and Ob j ects

.

make about quantification, of which

The remarks he does
I

have given examples,

do, however, suggest a view very like that which
appears

in his earlier works.

The obvious alternative to this

earlier view, one that makes use of substitutional quantification as the basis of reference, has been explicitly

rejected by Quine.

Surely, anyone who wishes to attribute

to Quine the view that reference

is a relation between

words and words must provide some appropriate explication
of these and similar passages from Quine's later works.
I

have made no claims about the details of Quine's

view about the logical form of statements with the term

5^

)

.

^

,

)
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'

refers

have tried to show that it is
plausible to

I

'

suppose that the sort of view he
holds is one in which
reference is a relation between
words and objects, not
words and words.
Further support for my interpretation
of Quine’s views on reference is
given by the fact that
can provide a justification of
premises C 2 ) - ( 4 that is
consistent with the above remarks.

I

Aune's reconstruction of Quine's argument
for indeterminacy of reference seems to me to be
correct.
Now I want
to describe an alternative to Aune's
justification for

premises

(

2

)

-

(

of that argument.

4

Consider the second

premise, as an example.
(2)

There is,

If 'gavagai' were translated as
'rabbit'
it would refer to rabbits.
I

think, a very natural justification for

premises of this sort.

The translation of 'gavagai' is

given by accepting a manual of translation that is comprised
of analytical hypotheses about various items of the language

to be translated.

There are, of course, different manuals

of translation that one might decide to accept.

Each manual

of translation makes use of a language into which the

translation is made.

It is supposed that the reference of

the terms of this language is established.

Thus accepting

a manual of translation that includes an analytical hypo-

thesis equating the term 'gavagai' with the term 'rabbit'
is a decision that

'gavagai' refers to, or is true of,

.

.
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rabbits 56
This suggestion about the
justification of premises
like (2)- (4) is supported by
a passage from "The Roots
of Reference":

assessment of the foreigner's word
awaits only our systematic English
manual of translation of his elaborate
language.
Such a manual would enable
us to fall back upon our familiar
English referential apparatus and so
decide whether to regard his word as
designating the color red or as denoting
patches or as denoting bodies or
whatever.
Different manuals may lead
to different answers, but one will do. 57
This passage makes clear the connection
between accepting
a manual of translation and establishing
the reference

of a term.
The argument that shows a particular term of a

foreign language to refer to certain objects would presuppose that some manual of translation has been
accepted.

It would also presuppose that the reference

of terms in the language (e. g.

,

English) into which

the translation is made is established.

An argument

that 'gavagai' refers to rabbits would look like this:
(a)

'gavagai' is translated, in manual
as 'rabbit

R

,

'

(b) We have decided to accept manual R.
(c)

'gavagai' refers to (is true of)
what 'rabbit' is true of, since
accepting the analytical hypothesis
that equates 'gavagai' and 'rabbit'
is the decision to accept 'gavagai'
as co-referential with 'rabbit'.

.
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Cd)

So

(

e

)

'rabbit' refers to (is true
of)
rabbits.

'gavagai' refers to (is true of)
rabbits.

On my account of the
justification of Quine's argument, part of the import of
accepting analytical hypo-

theses is that doing so allows
one to establish the
reference of terms to be translated.
So part of the
import of translation is given in
terms of 'refers'.

Translation does not explain what reference
is.
This
result is, it seems to me, what one
should expect of
manuals of translation that include
analytical hypotheses about the referential apparatus of a
language.

To see more clearly what is involved in
Quine's

argument, we must consider Quine's notion of a
background

language and the role this notion plays in the justifi-

cation of premises (2)- (4) of the reconstructed argument.
Quine introduces the notion of a background language when
he proposes ontological relativity as a solution to a

^^iculTy

arising as a consequence of a special appli-

cation of the indeterminacy of reference
,In

Section II

I

discuss this consequence.

The claim

that indeterminacy of reference applies in the home case—
to one's own use of one's language
in Quine's argument.

Thus,

I

— is

an important premise

begin Section II with a

discussion of this application of indeterminacy.

Then

I

,
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reconstruct the remainder of Quine’s
argument and discuss
his solution.
II.

A.
(i)

ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY
Reference as "Nonsense"

Indeterminacy in the home case
As we saw

m

the preceding section, translations of

the referential apparatus of a language
are subject to

indeterminacy; and this indeterminacy implies,
for Quine,
an indeterminacy of reference.

Though Quine initially

presents the argument for indeterminacy in the context
of radical translation, indeterminacy is claimed
to hold

for all languages, including the linguist's own.

Thus,

Quine says
If if is to make sense to say even
of oneself that one is referring to
rabbits and formulas and not to rabbit stages and Godel numbers then
it should make sense equally to say
it of someone else. ®
,

And, in the same place:
if there is really no fact of
the matter, then the inscrutability
of reference can be brought even
closer to home than the neighbor's
case:
we can apply it to ourselves.
.

.

.

This extension of the thesis of indeterminacy to one's

own case is bound to be objectionable to many phil-

osophers

who could agree with the principle as it is

,
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first presented, for the
interlinguistic case. 59
Though I think that Quine is
quite right to extend his
thesis this way, I think it
instructive to consider the
objections that two sorts of
philosophers would make to
Quine's extension.
In showing how these objections fail,
I shall be bringing out
some common misunderstandings of
the thesis and defending Quine's
claims that I have quoted
above.
Thus I am here defending the conditional
statement
that
If the principle of indeterminacy is

accepted for the interlinguistic case
then it should be accepted for one's
own case.
In their criticisms of Quine the critics I
am con-

cerned with accept the claim that when the linguist
sets
out to translate the native speaker's language,

All the objective data he has to go on
are the forces that he sees impinging
on the native's surfaces and the observable behavior, vocal and otherwise,
of the native. 60

They also accept the linguist's method of assessing these
data. The method, it will be remembered, consists of

picking out what appear to be sentences of the language
and querying the native speaker with these sentences

under varying circumstances.

In this way the linguist,

it is supposed, decides what are the stimulatory con-

ditions under which he is disposed to dissent from the

queried sentences.

51
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The critics find the thesis
unexceptionable in the

mterlinguistic case and at least
comprehensible in the
case of other users of his
language.

Each is, however,

unable to accept the thesis for
his own case.
Such
critics might have any number of
reasons for accepting
the thesis for the interlinguistic
case.
I discuss two
sorts of reasons and sketch the
positions briefly.
One critic might claim that referring
is an activity

that can be understood only in terms of
the intentions of
a speaker.
These intentions, while they manifest themselves in a speaker's dispositions to verbal
behavior are
not determined by such behavior:

A variety of different

intentions might result in the same set of dispositions
to behave, verbally or otherwise.

cannot determine,

i.

On this view, one

e., discover what the (intended)

reference of a term is, on the basis of the native's
dispositions to verbal behavior 62
.

Another critic might claim that using terms to refer
is an activity governed by rules or conventions.

Under-

standing the reference of a term, on such a view, requires the ability to apply those rules or conventions.
But though the applications of the rules or conventions

according to which reference is to be understood may
produce a set of dispositions to verbal behavior, the
rules or conventions are not determined by that behavior:
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The same dispositions might
be produced in connection
with
different sets of rules. The
linguist cannot determine,
i. e., discover or be
sure he's right about, the
rules of
the native speaker, and thus
the speaker's reference, from
the speaker's dispositions
to verbal behavior. 63
In cases of these sorts it
may be supposed that the

linguist develops hypotheses about
the intentions or rules
and conventions governing the
terms of the native language.
These hypotheses about the native
speaker's language are
developed to account for or to organize
the objective data
garnered by the linguist from his study
of the native
speaker's use of the language, namely what
he has learned
of the native speaker's dispositions
to verbal behavior.
The acceptance of some group of
hypotheses is to provide
an account or translation of the language.
This picture
of the activity of translating is thus
similar to the

picture of the physicist in action commonly drawn
by
Quine, and by other philosophers of science as
well.
The scientist is often supposed to be in a
situation
in which his data do not determine any one theory
of the

world but are rather consistent with alternative incompatible theories

.

The theories are said to be under-

determined by the data (or, as Quine would have it, by all
possible data).

According to the views

I

have sketched,

the two pictures--that of the linguist laboring in the

field and that of the physicist hard at work in the
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laboratory-are very similar.

It would not be surprising,

on these views, to find that the
linguist's theory of the

native is underde termined

.

In the way 'determine'

is

used in these accounts, the reference
of the native speaker'
terms is indeterminate.
I believe that some such mis understanding of Quine's views on translation
is at the

core of the critics' positions,
irrespective of the particular view of what reference involves
may be.
It is
a misunderstanding because it supposes
determining the

reference of a term to be a matter of discovering
some
fact, what the actual reference of a term is.
We

saw in

Chapter II, Section II that this is not the case.

Application of the thesis to the case of the fellow
speakers of one's own language engenders some uneasiness
for such critics.

The uneasiness is engendered by the

not very interesting fact that both we and our fellow

speakers tend to produce similar strings of symbols in

similar situations, strings of symbols with which we all
are more or less familiar.

Unless given some reason to

suppose that their linguistic use of these symbols differs

from ours

,

we tend to suppose their use of these symbols

in referring to be roughly the same as ours.

We do not

suppose ourselves to be developing hypotheses about their

language and thus do not see so clearly how the problem
of indeterminacy of translation arises in such cases.

.
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Nevertheless, these reflections do
not affect the
philosophical point being made by Quine.
Given the linguist’s methods as described and
given that the only objective data available are the
neighbor’s dispositions
to verbal behavior, the reference
of the neighbor's
terms is indeterminate.
Notice that neither of the critics'
positions as
have described them precludes such
application

I

of the

principle in the neighbor's case.

So long as the critic

has no reason to reject the constraints
placed on the

translation problem, he can naturally suppose that
the
theory about, or translation of, his neighbor's

use of

these strings of symbols is underdetermined by the
available data--namely

,

the neighbor's dispositions to verbal

behavior
happens

,

though

,

when we come "even closer to

home than the neighbor's case ?" 65

Each of our critics re-

fuses to accept the thesis when he (as linguist) is to

apply it to himself (as native).

In each case the refusal

reflects a rejection, for one's own case, of the first

constraint on the translation problem:

namely, the con-

straint that the only objective data available to the
linguist (now oneself) are the native's (now one's own)

dispositions to verbal behavior.

In each of the two

positions we can find plausible and natural grounds for
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rejecting the principle in our own
case.
On the first critic's view, we
cannot "determine" the
intentions of another speaker on the
basis of his dispo-

sitions to verbal behavior.

Thus we cannot "determine"

his reference given the objective
data available.

But

surely, it is exclaimed, we have
insight into our own
intentions.
In our own case, the objective data
are not

limited to dispositions to verbal behavior.

now include those intentions.

them are needed.

The data

No hypotheses concerning

Thus, there being no theory to be under-

determined, the reference of our own terms is
determinate.
The thesis of indeterminacy of translation
does not hold
for oneself.
The second critic would make a similar claim
about

the rules or conventions governing reference.

Though we

cannot determine the applications of these for another
speaker, even of "our own" language, surely we know the

applications of the rules that we are following.
in our own case

,

Again,

our data are not limited to dispositions

to verbal behavior.

We need no hypotheses about the rules

we ourselves are following.

Our own referring is clear

enough to us because we know the applications of the rules
that produce our dispositions to verbal behavior.
In both of these cases the first constraint on trans-

lation has been rejected.

The supposition that, in one's
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own case, all one has to go
on in "determining" the
reference of terms are the speaker's
(i. e. , one's own)
dispositions to verbal behavior is
denied.
It is supposed
that reflection on one's own use
of one's language, and
specifically on one's own use of its
referential apparatus
provides objective data that are not
available
in the

other cases

the case of the foreigner and that
of the

neighbor.
The picture of the linguist laboring
in the field has

been redrawn by the critics.

In the home case, the

linguist's activity does not resemble that
of the physicist.
The linguist does not advance hypotheses
about
the reference of the native speaker's (i.
e., his
own)

terms.

There is no theory to be underdetermined.

the requisite data about reference are at hand.

All

Reference

is not "indeterminate."

Quine might well have objections to the specific

views of reference appealed to in such rejections of
the

constraints on translation.
example

,

One would assume, for

that he would not find the view that relies on

the notion of speakers' intentions unproblematical

shall not deal with such objections, however.

.

I

The two

views sketched are intended merely as examples to give
an idea of the sort of views that might be held and the
line of reasoning that might be followed by one who
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accepted the indeterminacy theses
in all but the home case
Quine has a reply to all such
critics, irrespective of the
particular views that they hold.
I shall first discuss
the reply that Quine makes and
then offer a separate
defense of Quine on this point, based
on my interpretation of the thesis of indeterminacy of
translation.
Quine’s reply is given in "Ontological
Relativity"

where he discusses the application of the
thesis to oneself more explicitly than in Word and
Object.
In

"Ontological Relativity," Quine claims that to
suppose
that the thesis of indeterminacy of translation
holds
for others but not for oneself presupposes that

one has

a private language.

This, he says, is not so.

If it is to make sense to say even of
oneself that one is referring to rabbits and formulas and not to rabbit
stages and Godel numbers then it should
make sense equally to say it of someone
else.
After all, as Dewey stressed,
there is no private language.
,

No more is said here about private languages, nor is the

claim that there are none defended.
however, that the intersub j ective

,

We should remember,

objective nature of

language-learning and language use is an important
theme, not only in Chapter II of Word and Object
it is dominant, but in other works as well.

,

where

It is, for

example, the intersubj ective nature of language that

accounts for objectivity in science as well as in the
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common sense understanding of the
world.
Though

I

think there is much to be said for
the view

that language is essentially public
or intersub j ective
I
am not prepared to support this
somewhat dogmatic statement made in "Ontological Relativity."
Nor am I willing
to argue for his claim, made earlier
in the same article,
that "... there cannot be, in any
useful sense, a pri,

vate language

." 68

I

am content to leave Quine and his

critics, of whatever persuasions, to defend
their views
as best they can.
I suggest for Quine another point
of
defense.

This defense requires returning to the thesis

of indeterminacy itself

,

and to the claim--re j ected by

the critics under discussion--that the only objective

data available to the linguist are the native's dispositions to verbal behavior.
The first thing

I

want to point out is that the sen-

tence beginning "the only objective data available.
and the critics' understanding of 'determine'
ous.

— is

.

ambigu-

The critics' use of the phrase "the only objective

data available" suggests that the phrase belongs in a

methodological or epistemological claim.

This use

suggests that, though there might be more facts about the

native speaker's use of his language--or about the neighbor's use of his--the linguist is unable (in principle) to
"get at" these facts.

Such facts are inaccessible to the

:
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linguist, though presumably they
are accessible to the
native or the neighbor, just as,
in one's own case, the
facts about one's own use of
one's language are accessible
to oneself.
Unfortunately, Quine's choice of the
word
'inscrutability' to describe the
indeterminacy of reference encourages this reading of
the phrase.
Each of the critics accepts the idea
that, while the
nguist cannot determine the native's
reference, the native
could, simply by reflecting on what he
does when he refers,
"determine" his own reference. And each of
us could do

—

the same for his own use of his language.

It is no wonder

that the critic is surprised by the claim that
the thesis
of indeterminacy applies to one's use of one's
language.

There is, of course, another way of understanding
the sentence that contains the phrase "the only
objective

data available," a way that,

I

believe,

accurate account of Quine's views.

provides a more

On this understanding,

one could replace the original sentence by a sentence
some"t--di

n S like.

The only objective data there are are the

native's dispositions to verbal behavior."

Some of the

more illuminating statements about the principle of indet-

erminacy of translation would then be seen to include the

following
The point is not that we cannot be sure
whether the analytical hypothesis is
right, but that there is not even, as
there was in the case of 'Gavagai', an
objective matter to be right or wrong
about 69
.

,
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...The inscrutability of reference
is
not the inscrutability of a
fact; there
is no fact of the matter. 70

and
The question whether, in the
situation last
described, the foreigner really
believes A
or elieves rather B, is a
question whose
very significance I would put in
doubt.
This is what I am getting at in
arguing
the indeterminacy of translation 71
^

.

.

On this reading of the sentence,
Quine's claim in the
thesis is not about the status of

linguistic theory considered

as a science, nor is he making
a claim about the possibility,

or impossibility, on one's coming to
know certain facts
about other persons.
Rather, he is claiming something about
the nature of language and language-users.
He is claiming
that there are no meanings beyond what is
given in a speaker's
dispositions to verbal behavior.
If we must speak of meanings,
we are compelled to do so in terms of such
dispositions. 72

These dispositions themselves, he suggests, are
eventually
to be explained in terms of neurological structures.

also that

reference

meaning' is not here used in oppositon
.

Note

to

The application of the thesis to reference

i.e., the inscrutability of reference, appears to transcend
the distinction between the theory of meaning and the theory
of reference as Quine distinguished these in his early work. 72

Understood in this way, the thesis surely applies
to oneself if it applies to speakers of other languages

or to other speakers of one's own language.

For suppose

we were to accept the principle for the foreigner, and for
the neighbor, but to reject it in our own case.

What would

:
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this amount to?

It would seem to be a claim
that one

is a different kind of being
than the foreigner or the

neighbor, that for oneself— but not
for others— there is
something beyond the neurological
structures that account
for dispositions to verbal behavior.
Exactly what this
"something" might be is left open, though
the claim suggests that one belongs on a different
link of The Great
Cham of Being from that occupied by other "human
beings."
There is another problem: Everyone would
have equally
good grounds for making such a claim about
himself.
If

there is a fact of the matter in each
individual case,
there are facts in all cases.
This would seem to result

m

a denial of the original thesis as applied
to others.

In any case,

I

hope that we can agree that the claim that

one is a special sort of being set apart from other
human

beings is unacceptable.

If so, we should also agree to

the following conditional
If the principle is acceptable in the inter linguistic case and in the case of the
neighbor,, it is equally acceptable when
applied to oneself.

Whether the critics whom
the principle as

I

I

have described would find

explicate it plausible for the inter-

linguistic case or for the neighbor's case is, of course,
a separate question.

My defense of Quine in this section

is limited to a defense of the conditional given above.
I

do not defend either the antecedent or the consequent.

An assessment of the principle must take into account,

'

.
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among other things, its consequences.

The conditional

have defended is one of the
premises used by Quine in
his argument about the consequences
of indeterminacy.
I
discuss this argument in the next
subsection.
I

^

)

A consequence of indeterminacy
In subsection (i) I defended the
conditional statement

that
if there is really. no fact of the
matter,
then the inscrutability of reference can
be. brought even closer to home than the
neighbor's case: we can apply it to
ourselves 5
.

I

did not defend either the antecedent or the
consequent

of this conditional.

Quine affirms both.

Moreover, he

believes that the consequent--the applicability of
indeter-

minacy of reference to one's case--raises difficulties
about reference.

He presents the following argument:

We seem to be maneuvering ourselves into the
absurd position that there is no difference
on any terms, interlinguistic or intralinguistic, objective or subjective, between
referring to rabbits and referring to rabbit
parts or stages.
Surely this is absurd,
for it would imply that there is no difference
between the rabbit and each of its parts or
stages
Reference would seem now to
become nonsense not just in radical translation but at home
.

.

.

.

....

This argument is very puzzling, and very important.
It is puzzling because it is difficult to find a way to

justify the purported implication.

It is important because

it provides Quine with the motivation for introducing his

theory of ontological relativity.

Before discussing on-

.
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tological relativity, therefore,

I

want to discuss the

argument in some detail.
Consider, first, the claim that

there is no difference on any terms,
interlinguistic or intralinguistic objective
subjective between referring to rabbits or
and
referring to rabbit parts. 77
.

.

,

,

Note that it is not claimed merely
that there is no objective difference between referring to
rabbits and referring
to rabbit parts but that there is no
subjective difference
either.
In WO it was claimed that there were
no objective
data that would determine the reference of a
term.
To
,

fix reference one must translate the referential
apparatus,
and this requires accepting a set of analytical
hypotheses

that are not about any objective matter.

The addition

here of both "intralinguistic" and "subjective" needs
some

explanation
It should be fairly clear why Quine adds the phrase

"or intralinguistic."

and of reference

,

The indeterminacy of translation,

has been shown to extend beyond the in-

terlinguis tic case to apply to one's own language and
even to one's own use of one’s language.

The addition of

"or subjective" appears to be connected with the extension

of the indeterminacy of translation and indeterminacy of

reference to one’s own case as well.

Quine’s reasoning

seems to be that if there were subjective differences

between referring to rabbits and referring to rabbit
parts, one could, on the basis of these subjective dif-
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ferences, determine the actual reference
of the terms
rabbit* and 'rabbit stage* as used by
oneself.
One's
own use of the referential apparatus
of one's language
would be determinate.
But this is not so:
indeterminacy
applies even to one’s own case.
So Quine concludes that
there are no subjective differences between
referring to

rabbits and referring to rabbit parts.

Something like

this seems to be the import of Quine's denial
of the

possibility of a private language.
It seems clear that the premise of Quine's
argument

is supposed to be a statement of the indeterminacy
thesis

as it applies to reference.

The justification that

I

have given for this premise seems to me to be a fairly

natural one.

It is difficult to see, however, why this

premise "would imply that there is no difference between
the rabbit and each of its parts."

Part of the difficulty

may be that the statement of the premise is not so clear
as it seems to be.

Attempting to "regiment" the premise according to
the methods Quine suggests in Word and Object does not

clarify it or suggest any general principles to use in

arriving at the conclusion.

No natural reading of the

premise that makes use of identity, for example, provides
a formulation that supports such an implication.

Since the premise is a statement of the indeterminacy
of reference

,

I

try to work out the argument by making use

'

.
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of the earlier discussion of
indeterminacy of reference.
Something very close to Quine’s
conclusion can be reached
by considering the argument
for indeterminacy of reference,
especially premises (2)-(4) of that
argument.
Statements
about the difference or sameness
of rabbits and rabbit
stages can be couched in terms of
the coextensiveness of
terms and in terms of what two terms
are true of.
Thus,
the contrary of Quine’s conclusion
that there is no dif-

ference between rabbits and rabbit stages
might be given
by
(1)

'rabbit' is not coextensive with 'rabbit
stage

or, more accurately,
(2)

'rabbit' does not overlap with 'rabbit
stage 7 9
'

Since we have not given a definition of

'

overlaps (and
'

have seen that Quine would reject a substitutional
account
of such terms), it is more convenient to use a related

terminology

,

one that brings us closer to statements about

indeterminacy of reference:
(3)

'rabbit' is not true of anything 'rabbit
stage' is true of. 80

Now we are in a position to ask whether, given the

first premise, i.e., the indeterminacy of reference, sentence (3) can be justified.

According to the argument

for indeterminacy of reference, it cannot be justified.
The reference of 'rabbit' and of 'rabbit stage' is indet-

,

216
e muriate

.

We could devise manuals of
translation that

are compatible with speakers'
dispositions to verbal behavior
that translated both ’rabbit' and
'rabbit stage' by the

same term.

Thus, among the analytical hypotheses
of such
a manual we might have
(4)

'rabbit'

(5)

'rabbit stage' is translated as 'rabbit'.

is translated as

'rabbit'

and

According to the argument for indeterminacy of
reference
If

(6)

'

then

rabbit stage is translated as 'rabbit'
rabbit stage' is true of rabbits
.

'

and
If 'rabbit' is translated as 'rabbit',
then 'rabbit' is true of rabbits.

(7)

Statements

(

4

(8)

)

—

(

7

)

give us the conclusions

'rabbit' is true of rabbits

(10)

and
(9)

'rabbit stage' is true of rabbits.

These statements together give us a contrary of sentence (3),
i.e

.

,

'rabbit' is true of the same things as
'rabbit stage' is true of.

One might suggest the following objection to this argument.® 1

Even if both 'rabbit' and 'rabbit stage' are translated as
'rabbit' and thus true of rabbits, it does not follow that
'rabbit' and rabbit stage' are coextensive.

According to

this objection 'rabbit' might be true of something (other
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than rabbits ) that 'rabbit
stage' is not true of, and
vice versa.
In answering this objection,

of indeterminacy of translation.

I

return to the thesis

According to the the-

sis, a term cannot be said
to refer to any items apart
from a choice of a background
language and a manual of

translation.

The suggestion appears to
ignore the thesis,

for it supposes that the terms
being translated can be
said to be true of (refer to)
items other than those
to whcih its translation refers.
If this were so, it
would be because other analytical
hypotheses in the manual
question specify different items of
which the term is
true and so the purported translation
is not in fact a
translation.
The manual I am considering is not
of this
sort.
On my account of Quine’s views on
translation and

m

reference, "part of the

import of accepting a manual of

translation is that doing so allows one to
establish the
reference of the terms to be translated."^
On this ac-

count, the fact that in the manual of
translation chosen the
the term t ± is a translation of another
term t ensures
the coextensiveness of t and t
The decision to accept
±
2
the manual of translation is in part the decision
to treat
.

the terms as coextensive.

Given this account, the objec-

tion is clearly mistaken.

The argument offered does show

the terms to be coextensive.

Of course, one need not adopt the manual of translation

according to which the terms 'rabbit' and 'rabbit stage

»

.

217

are translated as the same
term.

Indeed, one might argue

that such a manual of translation
would be inconsistent,
because sentences (4) and (5)
would require different
principles of individuation.
I don't think that this
is
correct.
Translations of the relevent linguistic
items,
e.g., identity, could be made
that are consistent with
these translations of the terms.
They could be made disjunctive, for example.
In any case, one can get the same
result by taking
a more aesthetically pleasing
manual.

Consider the manual

according to which
(12)

'rabbit'

(13)

'rabbit stage' is translated as 'rabbit'.

is translated as

'rabbit stage'

and

By the argument of indeterminacy of reference
we get
(14)

'rabbit' refers to rabbit stages.

(15)

'rabbit stage' refers to rabbits.

and

These statements give us
(16)

'rabbit' and

(17)

'rabbit' is true of the same things that
'rabbit stage' is true of.

'rabbit stage' are coreferential

So

Unlike the other manual of translation, manuals of

translation that include hypotheses (12) and (13) seem
quite inoffensive.

Indeed, it seems natural, given that
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one translated 'rabbit' as

'rabbit stage', that 'rabbit

stage should be translated as
'rabbit'.

And certainly

Quine finds nothing wrong with this
first hypothesis.
It is important to realize that
Quine has argued that

there are no reasons to choose any
other manual of translationover the manuals described. Both manuals
discussed
can be supposed to conform to speakers'
dispositions
to

verbal behavior.

The second manual might be favored over

the first because it seems to be simpler.

Of course one

would have to see the rest of the manual to
decide that
question.
One might even argue that there is a

sense in

which it would be simpler to accept the more
complicated

principles of individuation than to accept a set of
hypotheses that has the air of paradox of the second manual.
What we have now is something very like Quine's

conclusion:

viz., there are manuals of translation according

to which (3) is false and (10) is true. 83

Thus, in a straight-

forward sense, there is given the hypothesis "no difference"

between rabbits and rabbit stages.

Of course, there are

other acceptable manuals of translation for these terms

which would not give these results.

But there are no

reasons to choose those manuals over manuals like the two
I

have discussed.

one.

Our choice is more or less an arbitrary

The difficulty about reference arises, then, because

our decision about which manual of translation to accept
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is not determined by
speakers'

behavior.

dispositions to verbal

It is not determined by
any matter of fact

"objective or subjective."

As we will see in the next

subsection, Quine's resolution of the
problem makes use
of the fact that a manual of
translation must be accepted.
He avoids this r esult by
relativizing reference to
a

manual of translation.
Reference

Thus he says,

nonsense except relative to
In this principle of
relativity lies the resolution of our
quandry 84
ijs

a coordinate system.
.

.

Ontological Relativity and the Background
Language
(i)
Making relative sense of reference

B.

In the last subsection we saw that an
argument can

be constructed from Quine’s principles
about translation

and reference to show that there is no difference
between

rabbits and rabbit stages.

^

It seems, then, that Quine

needs some supplement to his account of reference to
avoid
this conclusion.

Even one who did not accept the argument

in the previous subsection might find the premise of
that

argument sufficiently non-intuitive to require some qual-

ification of the account of reference.

That premise, as

we saw, is simply a version of the thesis of indeterminacy

of translation as it applies to reference.

Quine does accept the conclusion of the argument,

with an important qualification.

He says, in "ontological

Relativity"
Reference is_ nonsense except relative to a coordinate system.
In this principle of relativity lies the resolution of our quandry.

°

.

,
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It is meaningless to ask
whether, in
general our terms "rabbit," "rabbit
part,"
number,
etc.
really refer respectively
to rabbits, rabbit parts, numbers,
etc.
rather than to some ingeniously
permuted
denotations.
It is meaningless to ask
this absolutely; we can ask it only
relative to some background language
we need the background language
to regress
into.
The background language gives the
query sense, if only relative sense;
relative in turn to it, this backgroundsense
language b
,

.

.

.

Quine's solution requires that the use of
’refers*
be restricted to contexts in which a
background lan-

guage and a manual of translation are provided.

He

supposes that the problem to which ontological
relati-

vity is a solution depends on some "absolute" sense
of

reference
note at this point (and explain in greater detail

I

later) that my arguments of the previous subsection do
not

make use of this absolute sense of reference.
arguments, reference is relativized.
the argument that shows that

,

In those

In particular, in

if reference is indeterminate

there is "no difference" between rabbits and rabbit
stages

,

two kinds of manuals of translation are discussed.

According to each of these, rabbits turn out to be the same
as rabbit stages

,

given the acceptance of the sort of

manual of translation described.

Quine’s thesis of

ontological relativity does not then speak to any deficiency in these arguments.
The justification

I

offered for the premises of the

argument for indeterminacy of reference already included

..

.

:
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the sort of relativization
that Quine presents in on-

tological relativity.

The sort of argument he has in

mind involves a misunderstanding
of premises like
premises (2)- 4) of the argument
for indeterminacy of
reference.
It is easy to reconstruct an
argument of the
sort he has in mind.

Consider premises like Aune
(2)

'

s

premises (2)-(4):

If rabbit
is translated as 'rabbit*
then 'rabbit' refers to rabbits.
'

J

(3)

If 'rabbit' is translated as 'rabbit
part'
then 'rabbit' refers to rabbit parts.

(4)

If 'rabbit' is translated as 'rabbit
stage', then 'rabbit' refers to rabbit
stages

Given these premises

,

and the existence of manuals of

translation, R, P, and S, that translate 'rabbit' as
'rabbit',

'rabbit part', and 'rabbit stage', respectively,

one might think oneself justified in detaching the
con-

sequents of these conditionals.

Thus one might think that

the existence of the three manuals of translation would

give the following additional premises
(2')

'rabbit'

is translated as

'rabbit'

(

n

manual R).
(3')

(4')

'rabbit' is translated as
(in manual P)

'rabbit part'

'rabbit' is translated as
in manual S )

'rabbit stage'

(

These premises with (2), (3), and (4) seem to justify, by

modus ponens

,
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(2'')

'rabbit' refers to rabbits (by
y (2);
and (2'))

(3,,)
/o?

bbit

'

refers to rabbit parts (by

and
C4'')

'rabbit' refers to rabbit stages (by
y
and (4' ) )

(4)

.

In my justification of premises

(2)-(4),

I

assumed

that sentences like (2"), (3"), and (4")
establish
coref erentiality
If this is so, it follows from (2'')
.

and (4'') that 'rabbit' and 'rabbit stage'
are true of
the same things.
It is assumed that (2'') and (4'') are

proven unconditionally.

This gives us the conclusion

that there is "no difference" between rabbits and
rabbit
stages.

87

This argument, or something very like it, seems to
be what Quine avoids when he advocates ontological
rela-

tivity.
(2),

When we consider the justification for premises

(3), and (4), we can see clearly why such an argument

is not allowable.

The term 'rabbit' is translated only

upon the acceptance of some manual of translation, say

manual

R.

We have premise (2') then, only if manual R

_is

accepted

S.

We cannot accept manual R and manual P and manual

.

Manual R is incompatible with manuals

P and
S.

We

will not, then, ever be able to get all three of premises
(2'),

(3'), and (4').

So we will not be able to get all

three of statements (2''), (3''), and (4'') together to

construct the argument that shows reference to be nonsense.
An argument of tne sort Quine envisages clearly rests on

.
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a mistake in understanding
the premises

(2),

(3), and

(4).

The restriction of the use of
'refers* given in

"Ontological Relativity" makes it clear
that an argument
of th is sort one that does not
take into account the
relativization to background language
and manual of translation, will be invalid.
Ontological relativity makes
explicit the conditions on premises like
premises
,

(2)-

(

4)

that are implicit in the justification
for these

premises that

gave in the last subsection.

I

Note that the arguments

I

presented in the last sub-

section to show that there is "no difference"
between
rabbits and rabbit stages are not affected by
the introduction of ontological relativity.
In those arguments,
I

did not violate the restriction implicit in my
justifi-

cation of premises like (2) — (4)

The sentences in my

argument are relativized to a manual of translation in
eac ^

which one could get the result that there is

"no difference" between rabbits and rabbit stages.

The

arguments do not depend on the sort of mistake Quine
avoids by introducing ontological relativity.

There is,

on Quine's own grounds, no reason why these manuals

should not be accepted.

They cannot be ruled out except

by some ad hoc restriction ruling out manuals that have

this consequence

.

Thus

,

though Quine may free himself

..

sketched in this subsection—
arguments which appear to
infer correctly that there is "no
difference" between
rabbits and rabbit stages from truths
about the existence of manuals of translation.
(ll)

Ot her difficulties for ontological
relativity

The relativization of reference to
a coordinate

system, or background language,

is,

not by itself a com

pletely adequate supplement to Quine’s
account of reference.
To see why this is so, I want to review
some
,

(1) translation and
points about
reference.

These points

should make clear a difficulty that Quine raises
for
his relative account of reference, and prepare
for my

discussion of this difficulty in the next subsection.
Any language can serve as a background
language
(2)

For any background language, there will
be equally acceptable alternative
in,

compatible manuals of translation from
the foreign language into that background
.

(3)

Though we typically use examples in
which English serves as a background
language, English has no special properties that make it peculiarly appropriate for use as a background
language

(4)

Like any language, the background language we choose is subject to indeterminacy of translation.

(5)

Translation of a term into a background
language specifies the reference of that
term.
(Example:
If 'rabbit* is translated as 'rabbit stage', then 'rabbit'
refers to rabbit stages.)
I
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(6) The appeal to a

background language in
specifying the reference of a term presupposes that ,the reference of the
items
in the background language is
established.
Otherwise translation into the background
language would not specify the reference
of the terms being translated.

Statements (4), (5), and (6) may already
suggest to
the reader the difficulty that Quine
finds with ontological relativity: Simply translating into
a backgorund
.language is not adequate to establish the
reference of a

term unless reference is established in the
background
language.
But reference is established (in the
background
language) only relative to some (other) background
lan-

guage.
To see this point more clearly, consider an
English-

to-English translation, one of those ingenious "permutations" to which Quine alludes in stating the thesis of

ontological relativity.

Suppose we wish to discover the

answer to a question about the reference of the term ’rabbit*

as it occurs in L (i.

e., English).

Having read "Ontolo-

gical Relativity," we realize that we cannot ask, "in

general," whether ’rabbit’

(in L) refers to rabbit stages.

We can ask this only relative to a background language and

some manual of translation.

English is our background

language, and we may choose manual R, mentioned in the

previous section.

We can, according to what Quine has

told us thus far, ask
(Ql) Relative to manual R, what is the re-

.
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ference of 'rabbit'

(in L)?

From our earlier descitption
of manual R, we know
that
(2')

'rabbit'

is translated as

manual R).

'rabbit'

(in

The argument for the indeterminacy
of reference (in II A
(ii)) then justifies this
answer to our question:
(2")

'rabbit' refers to rabbits relative
to

manual R)

This answer is given, however,
only on the assumption that
the term 'rabbit' in the language
used in manual R (which
I will call LR) has some
determinate reference. We know
that every language is subject to the
indeterminacy of

translation.
terminacy.

So LR, in particular, is subject to
indeIt can be used, in conjunction with
the manual

of translation, to establish the reference
of 'rabbit' in
L only if we can answer the question

(Q2

)

What does 'rabbit'

(in LR) refer to?

Now, this question is meaningless absolutely
speaking.

We can ask a similar question, however, relative to
some

background language and some manual of translation.

One

question we can ask is
(Q3

)

What does 'rabbit' (in LR) refer to,
relative to P and LP?

where LP is a background language and P, a manual of transi

i

lation.

We can answer the question, given acceptance of

the manual of translation P.

According to manual P, de-

.
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scribed earlier,

O')

'rabbit*

(m

is translated as 'rabbit
part'
F
manual P).

We can then get the result that
(3")

'rabbit' (in LR) refers to rabbit
parts
relative to manual P).

Now that we have ensured that our
original background
language has a fixed reference, we see
that the answer to
our original question is
(2"')

'rabbit' (in L) refers to rabbit parts
(relative to manual R, relative to
manual P)

It should be obvious that we are
going to be involved

in a regress.

tical sort.

The regress is, moreover, of a problema-

The problem is not only that for every
back-

ground language we can raise the question what the
reference of the term is, in that language.

worse than this.

The problem is

We look to the background language LR

to establish the reference of the term in L.

The re-

ference of the term in L can be established only if the

reference of the term in LR is established.

This can,

in turn, be established only if a manual of translation

into some background language has been accepted.

So we

must ask the .question about LR in order to establish the

reference of the term of

L.

My point stands out clearly if we consider an aug-

mented form of the argument for premise (2) of the argument
from indeterminacy of translation to indeterminacy of re-

)

:

.

.
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ference. The argument
(a)

'

I

gave then is

gavagai is translated, in manual
R,
'rabbit
'

as

5

1

.

(b) We have decided to accept
manual R.
(C)

ga
a;
refers
K?? r refers to (is true of) what
rabbit
to (is true of), since
accepting the analytical hypothesis
that
equates 'gavagai* and 'rabbit' is
the
decision to accept 'gavagai' as coreferential with 'rabbit'.
!

—

(d)

'rabbit' refers to (is true of)
rabbits.

(e)

'gavagai' refers to (is true of) rabbits.

Written with the augmentation suggested
by the account of ontological relativity, the
argument form
of

which the above is an instance is
(a')
(

b
'

In M, 0 (in L) is translated as 0 (in
B).

We have decided to accept M which translates terms of L into the background lan-

guage

,

B.

(c') 0 ( in L) refers to (is true of) what 9
(in B) refers to (is true of), since

accepting the analytical hypothesis
that equates 0 (in L) and 0 (in B) is
the decision to accept 0 (in L) as coref erential with 0 (in B).

(d') 0 (in B) refers to (is true of) Ks

(e') 0 (in L) refers to (is true of) Ks

Note the sentence (d').

This is a sentence of exact-

ly the same logical form as the sentence (e*).

background language is not

,

Since the

qua background language,

privileged, (d') can be established only by an argument
of exactly the same sort as the one above. Moreover, it

:

8
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must be established if we are to
obtain (e') and thus
answer even relatively the question
>

,

Wh3-t

does 0 (in L) refer to?

The difficulty

I

have described is precisely the
one

that Quine raises in "Ontological
Relativity," though he
does not discuss the regress in any
detail.
He says,
We need a background language, I
said, to
regress into. Are we involved now in an
infinite regress? If questions of reference of the sort we are considering
make sense only relative to a background
language, then evidently questions of reference for the background language make
sense only relative to a further background language. y

The point about the regress that Quine
does not make

sufficiently clear is this
The initial question about reference cannot be answered unless the question about
reference for the background language has
been answered.

Though he doesn't make this point explicit, Quine
does make it explicit that the regress must be stopped
if he is to make even "relative sense" of questions

about reference.

Though, he says in describing the re-

gress, "in these terms the situation sounds disparate,
he thinks it is possible to end the regress.

His proposal

for doing so is this:
We end the regress of background languages, in discussions of reference, by
acquiescing in our mother tongue and taking
its words at face value.
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(iii)

Accepting the home lancni^

We saw in the last subsection
that Quine's supplement to his account of reference
involved him in a regress into background languages.
Because of the nature
of the regress, Quine must
find a way to stop the regress
if his account is to make
"relative sense" of the reference
of a term in the language for
which the question of re.

ference was originally raised.

Quine's proposal for end-

ing the regress is that one accept
our home language at
"face value." Quine does not show in
what accepting the
home language consists, or how accepting
the home language
at face value will stop the regress.
In this subsection
I

argue that Quine has not given us an adequate
account

of reference,

even relatively speaking, because his pro-

posal for ending the regress into background
languages

will not work.
First

I

want to state what must be accomplished in

stopping the regress.

To stop the regress one must

establish the reference of the terms of
some language
in a way that

either
(a)

does not introduce new analytical hypotheses and so another background language

(b)

introduces new analytical hypotheses

or

,
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and another background language
in
such a way that the reference in
that
new background language is established.

That these are the only alternatives
can be seen by considering my treatment, in the last subsection,
of the

argument with the sentences (a')-(e').

It is clear that

the disjunct (b) actually reduces to
(a).

accomplish (b)

If we could

then (a) would be true for the new back-

ground language introduced.
I

argue, first, that Quine's way of introducing
the

idea of accepting one's home language at face
value shows
his solution to be prima facie unacceptable.
Then
I

consider other suggestions about what it is to accept
the home language at face value.

Finally,

I

consider a

suggestion that is based on some remarks by Quine in
"The Roots of Reference."
To see why Quine's proposal for ending the regress
i-

s

prima facie unacceptable

,

I

look at the way in which

it was introduced in "Ontological Relativity." Quine's

introduction of this proposal suggests something about
the face value of the home language that is false.

The

idea of accepting the home language at face value is

introduced in

aa

analogy between the regress into back-

ground languages and a regress into coordinate systems
in physics.

Thus Quine says, after noting that there is

a regress that must be stopped:
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In these terms the situation
sounds desparate, but
fact it is little different from questions of position
and
velocity. When we are given
position
and velocity relative to a given
coordinate system, we can always ask in
turn about the placing of origin
and
orientation of axes of that system of
coordinates; and there is no end to the
succession of further coordinate systems that could be adduced in answering the successive questions thus
gene&
rated.
In practice of course, we end the
regress of coordinate systems by something like pointing.
And in practice,
we end the regress of background languages, in discussions of reference,
by acquiescing in our mother tongue and
taking its words at face value.

m

Examination of the analogy will show an obvious
difficulty.
The regress into coordinate systems arises
when one

attempts to specify position and velocity of a
particle.
This specification can be made

,

Quine says

,

tion to a spatio-temporal coordinate system.

only in rela-

What is to

be specified is the space-time point at which the
particle

occurs.

Such a point can be specified only in the context

of some coordinate system.

A coordinate system can be

established, or specified, only if one is able to specify
an origin for the system.

That is, one must be able to

specify some space-time point that is to serve as an
origin.

In order to specify that point, however, one must

first have a coordinate system.

And so on.

The regress

does look very like the regress into background languages.
The two regresses share the property that some further sys-

:
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tem is always required in order to
answer the initial
question raised.
Quine says that in the case of physics
the regress
is ended by specifying an origin
by "something like
pointing." What one does by pointing is,
he suggests, to
specify some space-time point as origin.
This space-

time point is specified without reference
to any other

coordinate system.

Because the specification is accom-

plished without reference to another coordinate
system, th
regress is ended.
It is crucial that what is given
by

pointing is an item of the sort whose specification
raised
the problem of the regress in the first place--a
space-

time point.

Ending the regress into background languages by

accepting the home language at face value is
to Quine

,

,

according

analogous to pointing to end the regress into

coordinate systems.

If this is so, the following should

be true
(i)

Accepting the home language at face
value does not require any further
background language.

and
(ii) Accepting the home language at face
value provides a way of specifying

an item of the sort whose specification
raised the problem of the regress into
background languages in the first
place:
it gives the reference of the
terms of the home language.

.

Note that if (i) and (ii) are
true, the conditions set
down earlier for ending the
regress would be
met.

these cannot be true.

But

The home language, like any other

language, has no reference except
relative to a background
language and a set of analytical
hypotheses.
In the list
of items at the beginning of the
previous subsection I
noted that the home language has
no properties that make
it peculiarly suited to serve
as a background language
or that make it privileged if it
is chosen to serve as a
background language. The point is that
the home language, like any other, is subject to
indeterminacy of
reference.
This solution, as explicated in terms of

Quine's analogy, is unacceptable:

It suggests that ques-

tions about reference are meaningful

guage

,

absolutely speaking.

,

in the home lan-

But Quine has argued that

this is false.

There is another, similar solution to which the
same objections can be raised.

It might be suggested

that when we have asked
What is the reference of 'rabbit* relative
to the home language and manual R?
we get a perfectly good answer:
'rabbit' is translated as 'rabbit'
(relative to the home language and
manual R)
So

'rabbit' refers to rabbits (relative
to the home language and manual R)

.

236

And if we ask further what
the reference of 'rabbit' is
in the home language— the answer
is that we are using
'rabbit', in the home language, in
just the sense mentioned.
Further questions about reference in
the home
language are superfluous

There are two difficulties with such
a response.

—

The

first is that, according to the indeterminacy
thesis, there
is no sense mentioned--except
of course relative to a

background language and a manual of translation.

For the

response to be a solution it would have to
presuppose
that reference is determinate in the home
language, which
Quine has shown to be false.
Thus far, this solution
is

subject to exactly the same problems as the solution

suggested by the analogy.
Second, this solution involves a false supposition.
It supposes that it is sometimes sufficient to
correlate

the linguistic items in one language with the linguistic

items in another language to establish the reference of
the items in the first language.

It ignores the general

character of the regress as Quine describes it:

Re-

ference in the translated language is not established unless referenge in the translating language is established.
We can never refuse to raise the question about the re-

ference of terms in the translating language if we are
to answer the question about the reference of terms in

the translated language.
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There is another very plausible
suggestion.

We

might suppose that to accept,
the home language is to
accept that set of analytical
hypotheses that one supposes would ordinarily be accepted
by speakers of the
home language.
In the home language, for example,
’rabbit’
’horse’

and so on.

is translated as
is translated as

’rabbit’

'horse’,

Accepting the home language would be
accepting

that set of analytical hypotheses
that give us homophonic
translations of all of our terms.
So far the suggestion is plausible.

The homophonic

translation does seem to be the natural choice
of analytical hypotheses for translation from English

to English.

As we have already noted, however, the
simple translation

does not establish reference.

Unless more is said, the

regress is not stopped.
We might suppose that there is no difficulty in

establishing the reference of the home language because
we always have available the homophonic translation.

It

is always possible to choose a homophonic manual of
trans-

lation, and we could make it a policy always to do so.
It is essential to realize, however, that reference
is not established unless a manual of translation is

actually accepted.

Neither the simple existence of a

manual of translation nor the possibility of choosing that
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manual is sufficient for establishing
reference.
That this is so is a direct result
of Quine's argument for ontological relativity.
If the mere existence
of, or possibility of choosing,
a manual of translation
were sufficient for establishing
reference, the invalid
argument discussed in the previous
subsection would be
acceptable.
What made that argument invalid is that
it
violated the restrictions to the effect that
the con-

sequent of a conditional such as
If 'rabbit' is translated as 'rabbit
stage', then 'rabbit' refers to rabbit
stages

can be detached only if a manual of translation
that

translated 'rabbit' as 'rabbit stage' is actually
accepted
If we no longer accept this restriction, the
argument

that attempts to show that there is no difference
between

rabbits and rabbit stages is acceptable.
course

,

This,

of

is what Quine argues against in "Ontological

Relativity."

So, if this suggestion for stopping the

regress is acceptable, so is the argument that shows

reference to be "nonsense."
It seems, then, that none of the obvious moves in-

volving analytical hypotheses will help in explaining
what accepting the home language at face value consists
in and how it can stop the regress.

The problem with all

these attempts is that they introduce languages to which
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indeterminacy of reference applies.

Indeterminacy of

reference applies to every language,
even our own, and
thus to every background language.
In "The Roots of Reference,"
Quine talks about

reference in a way, he claims, that
avoids indeterminacy
of reference.
Perhaps the remarks in those lectures
could
help to provide an account of accepting
the home language
at face value that avoids indeterminacy.
In this lecture Quine discusses two
kinds of cases

involving reference.

In both cases, he claims, it is

possible to "escape from problems of translation ." 92
These cases might serve us as models for
understanding
the notion of accepting the home language at
face value

while escaping from problems of translation.
The first case discussed is that in which the
child
as language-learner, comes to "bandy about" those
portions

of English that Quine calls its "referential apparatus."

The other case is that in which one is able to engage
in "fluent dialogue" with competent speakers of the

language.

In both these cases, Quine says, he is able

to avoid indeterminacy because he is not "going to make

capital of relations of sameness and difference of meaning ." 99

Common to both these cases is a treatment of
"reference" that involves only the classification of the

syntactical items of the language.

The "referential
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apparatus" consists merely of those
items of English
that are said to be involved in
reference. Among these
items are the identity sign,
the. copula, and the pronouns.
Later, quantifiers are included as
more sophisticated counterparts of pronouns.
The fluency with which
Quine is concerned in the second case
is the mere fluency
of utterance by two speakers of
linguistic
items.

He

is specifically not concerned
with conveying of "meanings"

or with a shared theory.
In both these cases, the notion of
reference used is
a truncated one.

As Quine points out early in these lec-

tures, the mere verbal response in an appropriate
situation, the m^^e production of linguistic items, is
not

adequate for referring in the full sense.

Reference in

the full sense involves designation of items in one's

ontology; it involves a theory of the world.
It is by avoiding this richer sense of reference
that

Quine avoids the problems of translation.

The sparse

sense of reference is what we have to look to in finding
a sense of accepting the language that does not involve

one in indeterminacy.
'

Suppose we do model an account on

»

these other two cases.

Accepting the home language would

then be recognizing that in our home language fluency is

achieved by the production of certain groups of syntactical items.

various ways

We might also classify these items in
,

as Quine does in the case of the referen-
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tial apparatus.

What the model does not allow
us to do

is to explain the function
of any of these items.

Such

an account of the home language
is not, as Quine says,
an adequate account of reference.

There does not seem to be any
explanation of what
it is to accept the home
language that will serve to stop
the regress into background
languages.

Until Quine pro-

vides such an explanation, he has
failed to stop the regress.
Moreover, I think that I have shown it to
be

highly implausible that such an
explanation can be given.
Unless Quine is able to stop the regress,
however-whether by providing an explanation of accepting
the home
language at face value or by some other proposal--he
has not given us an account, even a relative
account,

of reference.

One of the consequences of the indeter-

minacy of translation and the indeterminacy of
reference
thus seems to

be that no adequate account can be given

of the conditions under which statements in the
form
'0

refers to Ks

'

are accepted.

Clearly, such a conse-

quence would throw serious doubt upon the acceptability
of the thesis of indeterminacy of translation and of in-

determinacy of reference.

.

CONCLUDING REMARK

Schuldenf rei begins his "Quine in
Perspective" by
claiming that, in order to understand
Quine's views on
indeterminacy of translation, it is
necessary to consider Quine's "world view."l
Though I disagree with
Schuldenf rei elsewhere, I think he is
clearly right
that it is important to consider
Quine's views as a
whole if one is to understand the
indeterminacy thesis.
I

have tried to do that, showing
how his views

on translation and meaning are
related to his episte-

mological views and his philosophy of science.

There

is, of course, much more to be said
about these views

than
that

I

have been able to do here.

I

have shown there to be serious difficulties
with

Nevertheless,

I

think

these views that become clear when one considers
them
in the context of his theory of meaning.
on language -learning and evidence

,

Quine's views

for example

,

are

thrown into doubt when one takes into account the un-

derdetermination and indeterminacy theses
The consequences of indeterminacy, as Quine de-

scribes them, are radical and quite unappealing, even
to Quine.

His attempt at handling these consequences

involves the introduction of ontological relativity and
the acceptance of some background language.

Chapter III that this attempt fails

.

I

argued in

This failure leaves
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Quine with a radically skeptical
view, not only about
meaning, but about reference as
well.
In effect, he has
no (even relative) account of
semantical statements
about reference. Much of Quine's
recent work can be
seen as an attempt to answer the
question:
"How
is a

science of language possible?"

Quine's response is an

attempt to behaviorize meaning.
that this response is inadequate.

I

have

,

I

think, shown

.

.

.

.
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or this issue.
;

10.

Quine (1960

7

) ,

p.

42

8.
The reader who is unfamiliar with Quine's
work
on translation and reference may wish to
read Section II
of my Chapter II for clarification of this
discussion.
9

.

Quine (1971)

,

pp.

3-5.

Statements made elsewhere by Quine may seem to
cast doubt on my attribution to him of claims (3)
and (4).
He says in "Epistemology Naturalized," for example, that
observation sentences "will usually be about bodies"
[Quine (1969a), p. 87] and in Word and Object that his
account allows observation sentences "to Ee about ordinary things.
"[Quine (1960), p. 47].
.

.

It is important to remember, however, that I distinguish
tw 9 accounts of observation sentences.
The first account,
which I discuss in this subsection, is needed for the explanation Quine gives of language-learning and for his
discussions pf objectivity in science, underdetermination
of physical theory, and indeterminacy of translation.
Quine
does not, of course, himself distinguish the two accounts.
The failure to do so, I claim, raises serious difficulties
for various of his views.

i

.
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On the first account, observation
sentences don't
laCk ° f st ct ure is direcSy"
related to the ways
re^teftfthr
which observation sentences are
said to be related to stimulus
situations.
On the
second account, observation sentences
do
have
structure
Because of their structure and
their interconnections
theory ? the y involve reference, can
be quantified into, contain
terms, and so on.
According
to my
eSt ?' 0n, obser> vation sentences
are
??
typically
about
ho
bodies
because the speakers of the language
will typicaugh onto a theory of ordinary, middles
7 ed bodies
h
J
sized
rather
than to some other theory.

-

m

So, though it is true that the
passages I quote
above seem prima facie to cast doubt
on my attribulon.of claims (3; and (4) to Quine, my
total discussion shows that this is in fact not the
case, since
i
provides an explanation of the passages in
question.
.

Quine (1960

11.

) ,

p.

9

.

12.
For example, Quine and Ullian say that
"learning
by ostension depends on no prior acquisitions.
By ostension we learn to use and react to observation
sentences"
[Quine and Ullian (1970), p. 14].
See also Quine (1960),

Chapter

*

I.

13.
See my discussion above and Quine (1960), p. 45
P
and (1970a), p. 4.
’

’

14.
Quine (1969a), pp. 78-83, 89.
Similar claims are
made, for example, in Quine (1961c).
See especially
sections 1 and. 2 of Quine (1961c).
In his summary at
the end of "Epistemology Naturalized," Quine says,
"Also, it [the observation sentence] is where meaning is
firmest.
Sentences higher up in theories have no empirical consequences they can call their own; they confront
the tribunal of sensory evidence only in more or less inclusive aggregates.
The observation sentence, situated
at the sensory periphery of the body scientific, is the
minimal verifiable aggregate; it has an empirical content
all its own and wears it on its sleeve"
[Quine (1969a),
.

p.

89].
15.

See Quine (1961c) and Quine (1969a).

16.

Quine (1970a), p.

17

Quine (1969c)

.

6.

.

.
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18.
See Quine (I960),
For
cussion on innateness, see pp. 8 3ff.
Quine (1969h).
19.
p.

7.

20.
21.

Quine (1969c), p. 125; cf.
Quine
Quine (1970a)
Quine (1970a)

,

p.

7

.

,

p.

7

.

22.

Quine (I960), p. 44; my emphasis.

23.

Quine (1969a), p. 87; my
emphasis

24.

Quine (1970a), p.

3

Quine (1970a)

4

25.

p.

,

;

my emphasis.

.

26.

See Chapter II.

27.

See Quine and Ullian (1970),
p. 15.

28.

Quine (1960), p.

7

Quine (1960)

7

90-95.
29.
30

.

matter.

,

p.

.

See also Quine (1960), pp.

See Quine (1971) for a recent
discussion of this

31.
See Section
of this claim, which
tion of theones

I
I

of my Chapter II for a discussion
cal the thesis of underdetermina-

32. .For discussion of this position, the thesis
of
indeterminacy of translation, see my Chapter II.
_

33.

We cannot account for the learner's picking
up

a theory, as we do in the case of translation,
by reference
to a manual of translation.
The child has, by

no language in which to make up that manual.

hypothesis,

34.
It would not help to suppose that the second
account of observation sentences, that which I discuss
Subsection B,.is the primary account.
On that account,
the theory of objects is already supposed.
But observation sentences would still have to be learned ostensively,
and the same difficulties would arise for Quine:
Stimulus-

m

.

.
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S

1

n
hiS ° ther VieWS
result L°the aoquisition of
’theory

’

,

35

Quine (1960), p. 28.

P
thosfsentenppq^w^n COI

queried after

‘

42
Occasion sentences are
a nd assent or dissent only
if
*

P

Stimulation "
[Quine (1960 ), pp^S 5f
the
lnpent
of the definition is clear it i^dn ff?
. 0 S6e h W
1 "^
lt
could be
clarified.
?
Note that the
35 g ven in " Epi stemology Naturalized" do e ^ [^
;
that
° bSerVation
sentencts be occasion sentences
:

d^

^

.

-

37

Quine (1960

38
39

,

.

40.

41.

)

p.

,

43

.

Quine (1960), p. 45; my emphasis.
See Chapter II, Section I.

Quine (1969a)

,

p.

85.

Quine (1970a)

,

p.

3

.

42

Uine ^b970a), P* 85. The process
envisaged
O^ect, one of query and assent or § dis-is
i?
sent, thus ''our verdict."

“

‘

.

5

’

Glven Quine's account of how one learns
observatence
s> the phrase "storing information"
?
seems
° ne need not have knowledge
or information
order to assent to or dissent from queried"
observation
sentences in the appropriate ways.
One need only to have
developed the appropriate habits of response.
(See
Section I.)
Our storing of information in this context
mus l be something like the storing of
information done
y a computer.
Neither of us have knowledge, but both of
us have pretty good sets of habits.
Perhaps this is
Quine s reason for choosing this phrase from
cybernetics.
43

j_

*

•

sai

.

44.

Quine (1969a), p. 86.

45.
Quine (1961d).
See also the discussion of
collateral information" in his (1960), Chapter II.
46.

Quine (1969a), p. 87.

47.

Quine (1970b)

,

p.

94

,,

.
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48
S< e m y Section
I and Quine (1969a)
r
n
85
the criterion
5
where
P
is exulainpH
7
TT
piained.
See also
he
Word and Obiect
n
•

*

.

49

.

Quine (1969a)

.

and 40ff.

p.

,

See> f ° r exam P le
e

5

,

U

>

86.
Q uine

(1960)

,

pp.

36f

.

,

00nunents on such oases ir> hi®

S

especially pp? S'f!

-y
r

S*; subseS?

mS and

““

dealt With

Quine (1960), p. 41.

53.

(1970d),

t

•

.

39,

lately

e

fn

nt

thf

Note that this

^servationality makes use of the secondary discussion
account
of
f observation sentences
according

to which these sentences are "about" objects.
It would be interesting to
P
aCC ° Unt Quine haS ° f de rees of
observationality
§
for the primary account.
See my Section I of this chapter^
,

?h^

•

84
^ee my discussion of the criteria for
nition of 'observation sentence in Subsection the defiB.
58.
*

.

,

1

55.

Quine (1969a), p.

87.

Both quotations are from Quine (1969a),
87.
hat ° n Q uil e s Primary view of observation p.
sentences
?
J
they have no subject matter, corporeal or otherwise.
Here
he is viewing the observation sentences from
within a
theory of objects.
SeeSeSection I of this chapter.
56.

te
!_°

’

57.

Quine (1969a), pp. 87f.

Quine (1969a), p. 88.
In Subsection C I consider
the role of observation sentences as repositories of evidence for science in more detail. A footnote contains
a reference to Hanson s (1971)
1

59.

Quine (1969a)

p

CD

o

•

Quine (1969a)

p.

88; my emphasis

CD

1

•

Quine (1969a)

p

8 7.

1

.

.

88

.
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62.

Kuhn (1962)

63.

Aune (1967).

Although the objects are
lations that prompt the utterance different, the stimumay be the same
The
Sre *2 bS des ^ibed in terms of
?he
iesl
bl th V of the Physiology of
perception.
Such
a theory would
iA l
be,
the ideal state of science dependent
on the theory of physical objects.
67.

m
.

’

68.
65.
66.

Kuhn (1962), p. 101

.

Kuhn (1962).

Aune (1967

),

p.

171'.

See Section I and Subsection A of this
section
for discussion of Quine s characterization
of observation sentences.
T

69.

See Aune (1967), pp.

70.

See Aune (1967), especially pp.

71.

Sellars (1963c).

54 and 100-106.

52-55.

72.
What is important for the present argument is
that one be able to make moves from the positions that
are observation sentences.
Sellars also accounts for
the way in which one can come to occupy observationsentence positions.
These positions are peculiar in
that one moves to them without making a move in the
game.
Coming to occupy such a position is what Sellars
calls a "language-entry transition." One enters the
language by asserting (etc.) observation sentences in
response to stimuli.
See pp.
238 ff. of his (1963c).

73.

Quine (1969a), p. 88.

74.

See Chapter II, Section II.

.

.

.

.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER II
1.

Quine (I960

)

p.

,

2.

Quine (1970c).

3.

Quine (1970c)

4.

(1963)

,

,

78.

178.

p

See for example
and Hempel (1966)

Ackermann (1963), Scheffler

,

5.

Goodman (1965)

6.

Quine (1970c)

,

p.

179.

Quine (1969a)

,

p.

89

Quine (1970c)

,

p.

179

Quine (1970c)

,

p.

179

7
8

9

.

10.
11.

section

Quine (1970c), p. 179.
See Quine (1961d)
Quine (1966).

,

especially p. 16; Quine (1960),

*

6;

For a discussion of the difference between Feyerviews. and those of Sellars, see Sellars (1967).
For a discussion of the treatment of the common-sense
framework as a theory, see Sellars (1963a).
12.

abend

s.

13.

Harre (1964), p.

14.

Harre (1964), pp. 8f.

8.

15.
See Feyerabend (1962).
Though Feyerabend says
that Newton's theory is a universay theory, he is not speaking there of Newtonian dynamics (Harre 's example of a reticular theory) but of the theory of gravitation, and the
corpuscular theory as a whole, which Harre uses as an example of an explanatory theory.
#

Not every philosopher would accept this distinction.
Hempel, for example, in his treatment of the paradoxes of
confirmation, supposes that theories are all reticular
theories whose hypotheses are of the form 'All ravens
are black'.
This supposition seems to be implicit in

°

251
f ex P 1 nation as prediction
as well.
?
See
especial
and 12 in
(1965)
and
Chapter
^
(1966 ).
Feyerabend criticizes tin'c
approach.
Some of Quine's discussions sugges?
thal all
theories are explanatory theories,
involving posi?s.

^

’

,

e
•

a.

,

,

dUCed
110

Plilnnlhi
of these

™
^
'

6

re t:Lcu la.r theories are just
those terms
ake the s y stem atization of facts
possible.
u
themselves
observation concepts but are
termS ° f obser vation concepts, or
clusters
s

'

17.

Harre (1964), pp. 20f.

18

Harre (1964).

.

19.
23.

Hempel (1965e),

p.

182.

20.

Hempel (1965e)

p.

186.

21.

,

See footnote 15.

amPle
and his (19 61b)

S ° me Pai>tS

’

° f hiS

<1966)

>

his <1961d)

,

For discussion of curve-fitting, see Hempel
(1966)
especially Chapter III and Chapter IV; Ackermann
(1963)*
and Scheffler. (1963)
Ackermann argues that curve-fitting
does not provide a non-circular solution to problems
about
simplicity.
.

24.

Carnap (1958), Chapter VI.

25.

Quine (1960), p. 42.

26.
Quine (19 60)
p. 33.
There, the point was to allow
for the possibility that a speaker might "change his ways"
responding to sentences.
.

,

m

27.
Or at le'ast dated sentences, since no position is
given, but, this can be altered by including all places.
28.

Quine (1960), pp. 170-173.

29.
See Lectures 2 and 3 of "The Roots of Reference,"
in which he argues on this ground against a substitution
interpretation of quantifiers.

, .

30

H

,,

.

.

.

.,

.
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See Chapter I.

31.
See the first section of my
Chapter
of this chapter.

For further discussion of this
point
Subsection B of this section.
33.

above
34.
35.

See above, and Quine (1970c)

Quine (1960), Section 12

.

Quine (1969a)

38

.

and Section
see also

See my Chapter. I, especially
Section I.
See
section I of this chapter; Quine
(1970c).

36
See Quine (1970c)
this chapter.

37

I

Smart (19 68

)

p.

,

,

p.

179

Quine (1971), pp.

1- 4

.

179; and the early part of

88
80

p.

,

p.

,

;

,

39.
He is explicating objections of Feyerabend
to
the Hempelian account of explanation,
not discussing his
own views

.It. does raise difficulties for his
40
criterion for
membership
a linguistic community.
See Chapter I
Section 11(B).

m

5

41.

In his discussion of Hanson in his
Note that the recognition of the x-ray
instrument (and not, for example, a modern
requires some degree of knowledge about its
88.

(1969a), p
tube as ’an
sculpture)
function.

42
?ee Chapter III, Section I for discussion of
Quine's views of reference and quantification.
•

.

43.

Quine (1970c)

44.

Quine (1960)

45.

Quine (1960), P- 73.

46

.

Quine (1960)

P*

29.

47.

Quine (1960)

P*

27.

48.

Quine (1967)

P*

52.

5

P
P-

,

.

181; my emphasis.
27.

Quine is arguing against

)

.
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49.
50.

Quine (1970d)

,

p.

8.

Quine (1970d)

,

p.

8.

views on language-learning do,
however affect
his approach to the translation
case.
For
example
’those
items most readily translated by
the linguist (i e
obBe
nc
the items first ieir^ed by
the'child
Quine takes this to be an important
fact.
’

•u._

,

^ ^

.

52.

Quine (I960), p. 28.

53

Quine (I960

.

)

,

p.

28.

1960 }
68
In later works, Quine notes
P
that only negation, and not
conjunction or
translatable by these methods. See below and QuiSe^lSjot? 6
pp. 12f; (1969b), and (1969i), p. 314.
5

55.

*

’

Quine (1960), p. 68.

56.
This aspect of translation is discussed in Quine
(1961b).
That essay, presented as a lecture in 1951, contains an early formulation of the second part of the indeterminacy thesis. The problems of discovering what the
significant sequences of a language are is an "offspring”
of the problem of meaning.
See also my Chapter I, Section

I.

57.
Quine (1960), p. 30.
As we will see below, Quine's
use of "guess again" is misleading, since these hypotheses
are analytical hypotheses.

Quine (1960), pp. 57-61. And, as Quine thought at
58.
the time of writing Word and Object
translations of other
logical connectives, but not of the quantifiers.
See also
his ( 19 70d
pp. 14-16
.

,

,

59.

Quine (1970d), p. 16.

60.
Quine (1960), p. 74.
For further discussions of
such principles, see Landesman (1970), Young (1972), and
Hintikka (1969).
See also Quine (1969i) and (1970d).
61.

Quine (1960), p. 29; my emphasis.

..

.
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62.

Quine (1960), p. 29; my
emphasis.

64.

Quine (1960

)

,

p.

30.

Quine (1960

) ,

p.

30

65

.

66

.

Quine (1969i)

p.

,

67.

Hintikka (1969).

68

Quine (1960

.

)

,

,

70.
71.
76.
72.

Quine (1960

)

,

p.

.

32.

p.

69.
Quine (1960), p.
his ( 19 69g)
and Lecture
related issues.

312

See Chapter I of his (1960),
of his (1971) for discussion of

31.
1

31.

See Quine (1960), Section

Quine (1960

) ,

p.

2

,

especially pp. 7f

33.

73,
uine ( 19t^), p. 42.
For discussion of Quine's
_9
later refinements of this definition, see
Chapter I, Section
-i

74.
75.

Quine (1960

)

,

p.

Quine (1960), p.

42
57.

This statement requires refinement, of course.
In
the example, the speaker would no longer assent
after sufficient time had passed for the crocuses to wither and
die.
Quine notes that the distinction is a rough one and
that
standing sentences grade off toward occasion sentences as
the interval between possible repromptings diminishes.
."
LQuine (1960), p. 36],
Nonny Burack informs me that the
example should be "The crocuses are up."
,

.

.

77.

Quine (1960), p.

78.

The example is given in Quine (1970d).

79.

Quine (1960), p. 55.

80.

Quine (1960), p. 66.

58.

.

,

.

.
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Quine"*” (1970d)
9 7na
gume

^U

82

ne
960 ^ Section 14; Quine
(1961d)*
u;
especially pp 7f.
"*"

^-i-

( 1

’

,

.

Quine (1960

)

,

p.

43.

Quine (1960

)

,

p.

43.

84

Quine (1960

) ,

p.

46.

85

Quine (1960

)

,

p.

51.

Quine (1960

)

,

p.

51.

83

86

,

87,

88

See his (1969i) and his

(1970d).

Q u ine notes that we- should not expect
1
thS nat Ve lan S ua S e that perform
function^ In
T
functions.
generalt analytical
.

to find conexactly these
,
hypotheses won't be
See his (I960), pp. 52-54.

.

.

equational

m

form.

89

Quine (1960

90.

See Quine (1960), p.

) ,

p.

95.
91.

Quine (1960

92.

Quine (1960), pp.

93

Quine (1960

.

)

)

,

,

p.

p.

70

54, and Quine (1969d)

p.

32.

54.

52f.
43

.

94.. Though this translation is subject to inductive
uncertainty and to the residual indeterminacy that attaches
to translations of native speakers' assent and dissent.
.

For discussion of the related issue of the connection
99. of indeterminacy of transaltion of the referential
apparatus of the language and indeterminacy of reference
see Bruce Aune (1973) and Section I of my Chapter III.
96.

Quine (1960), p. 27.

97.

Both quotations are from his (1970d)

,

p.

8.

98.
Step (1) is a fairly direct paraphrase from his
(1960), p. 28.
The suggestion that stimulus meaning is a
crude concept of empirical meaning is given in Word and
Object p. 33.
Step (7) is the thesis of underdetermination
The quotation in Step (9) is from his (1960), p. 70.
,

Quine (1960), p. 26.

I

. ..
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100

Quine (19 60

) ,

p.

8

101.

Quine (1960

) ,

p.

8

102.

Chomsky (1969), p. 61.

103.

Chomsky (1969), pp. 66f.

104.

Quine (1970c).

105.

Quine (1960), p. 27.

106

Quine (1960

.

.

107.

)

73

p.

,

.

Chomsky supposes that "what distinguishes

the caqp
p ysics from the case of language is that we
are
for
some reason, not permitted to have
a 'tentative theory? in
the case of language.
"[Chomsky (1969), p. 62].
o

.

.

108.

109

Quine (19 69d)

.

110.

p

,

.

47

Quine (I960), p.

69

Quine (1960)

70.

p.

,

111.

Quine (1960), p

112.

Quine (1960), p

.

.

72.

.

73.

113.
Such a principle wou
be something like:
"A
syarement nas empirical content if and only if there is
(m principal) objective evidence for that statement."
Compare one of Ayer's formulations of a verif icationist
principle
"A sentence is factually signficiant to a given
person if, and only if, he knows 'how to verify the proposition which it purports to express." [Ayer (1946),
.

:

.

p

.

35.]

114.

Quine (1960), p. 77; my emphasis.

115.

Quine (1970c), pp. 180f.

116.

Quine (1969d), pp. 48f.

117.

Quine (1969a)

118.

Quine (1960

119

Quine (1961c)

.

)

,

,

p.
p.

89

32

..
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120.

Quine (1961c), p. 61.

121.

Quine (1961c), p. 61.

122.

Quine (1961c)

,

61.

p.

Q uine s moves here seem to me to be
a bit unsatisfactory.
It is not clear why we must
suppose
the hv
potheses to purport to be about some
y~
conlenl?hat
„two
conceptualizations share. Given that Quine
is willing
in this passage, to speak of
different ways of conceiving
®
hy could ” e not claim that the
hypotheses
are abo,!t’rh
C ° n0eiVinE th
Y
world and th at they
?
hypothesizl
ypotnesize that
tha? the
?hI two
t
ways are similar
in certain
respects.
These hypotheses could still turn out
to be
f th m W Uld perhaps be wrong in
the cases
of°rldicallv°d?ff
S
different+ modes
of conceiving the world.
S
If
the Vlew under consideration would
conflict with the second part of the thesis.
(See subsection (i) of this section.)
'

>

5

124.
125.

126.

Quine (1960

)

,

p.

72.

Quine (1960)

,

p.

77

Quine

(

1969d)

,

;

(1970d)

26-29

pp.

;

,

pp.

(1970d)

127.

See Section 1(B) of Chapter III.

128

Quine (1971)

,

p.

1.

Quine (1971)

,

p.

1.

Quine (1971)

,

p.

2.

.

129

.

130

.

131.

Quine

132.

Section 1(C) of Chapter

133.

Quine (1969a), p

(

19 69a)

,

p

.

.

89

89

I.

.

,

.
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3.
1
4.

Quine (1969d)

2

Quine (1969d)

.

.

5.

,

p.

48

.

p.

47

.

Quine (1969d), p. 47

Quine (1960), pp 90-95
(section 19) and p. 108
arS
ntraSted
both
with
singular terms and
£°
witn mass tennis
Mass terms are said by Quine to refer
"cumulatively"
.

.

Quine (1960), pp

.

190f.

6
Singular terms which do not divide their
reference
are also subject to indeterminacy of
translation. Mass
erms may not be subject to indeterminacy,
however.
That
they are not is suggested by some of Quine's
remarks,
such as that the child can learn 'mamma', 'red',
and
water (as mass terms) "before he has mastered
the ins
and outs of our adult conceptual scheme or
endurmg physical objects, identical from timemobile,
to time and
[Quine (1960 ), p. 92].
Quine's discussion of quantification and mass terms in "The Roots of Reference"
(Lectures 2 and 3) also suggests that mass terms are
not
subject to indeterminacy. Questions about the translation
of mass terms are still open, however; some of Quine's
remarks seem to depend on ambiguities in the use of such
words as 'mamma', 'water', and so on.
,

.

_

7*. See Chapter II, Section 11(B) for a detailed
discussion of analytical hypotheses.

Quine (1971), p. 7.
8.
The earlier mention of pronouns, copulas, and suffixes is on p. 4.
9.

See Burge (1972) and Parsons (1970).

10.
But see his discussion of 'red' on p. 121 of
his (1960).
,

—

—

11.
Thus, all terms mass terms included are treated
in the same way in the regimentation, and mass terms
are thus treated as though they had the same referential
function as do general terms and singular terms
If this
.

’

.

.

0

^/^

Qu±ne

t0
are nor suh^ect to indeterminacy.
te^rSfnot'subiect'to
t " ee

^

;,

~

Suppose *«* -ss
The
distinrtion
mass and ot her terms would be
a semantic one
It

?°:s

~-n,

^ume

has said about translation:
12.

Quine (1960), p. 243.

dn dds (I960 ), Section
,,
19, Quine suggests that
there xs a grammatical, i.e.,
syntactical® §fs?iSoS"
n
ral ermS
the ° n ® hand and sin ular terms
S
on tne
the other.
other
Co
Compare °l
the passage from "The Roots of
Reference" quoted above. There Ihe
general and singular terms is said tocontras? Setwlen
be
mechanism of the language's referential part of the
apparatus
The
referenda! apparatus is it seems part of ?he
^ntax
of the language.
See Section of this chapter for further discussion.
!

,

,

14.
For the details of the elimination of
names
and singular jterms see Word and Object
[Quine (1960 )1
Chapter V.
For a discussion of Quine's views on
reference and quantification, see Hooker
(1971).
Hooker
points out that it is not always clear what
the
erential function or functions of bound variablesrefquantifiers are. He discerns "three mutually con- and
f
Ctl S models fo] the referential character
of varif
it
n
ables,
none of which he finds to be satisfactory by
itself (p. 496).
See also Sicha (1973).
,

15.
Though I don't discuss the latter views in detail,
some19.
of my remarks in the course of the discussion of
Quine's vies on the interpretation of the quantifiers
bear on these views.
See Subsection B of this section.
_

16.

See Quine (1961b); Jubien (1972); and Parsons (1970).

17

Quine (1971)

,

p

.

7

18.
There may be other manuals of translation that
provide different translations of the semantical terms
of a language.
Quine does not discuss this matter, and
I do not consider the additional complication.

Quine (1969d), p. 35.
Punctuation and use of
quotation marks follow Quine's use. Quoted by Aune (1973),
p

.

13

.

.

.

.
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Aune (1973

20

)

pp

,

i3f

.

vt s ririf

in

rel a te terms of thrSblirt theory
to terms of ?he background theory; for we have the
inscrutability
of reference
to allow for." He thinks
'-‘i-J-iiJXO
_
that
LUtiL his interpretation
IS further supported by remakrs
of Quine s on page 48
of that essay
:

Aune (1973)

22.

14

.

At
ast in Philosophical discussions
of
Tr ordinary ^?
In
discourse, the classification is more reference
likely
y
to be an interlinguistic one.
.

2L[
’

j

.

P

onoehh
th

er

pleted
25

(1973), p. 15.
Aune's reasons for introase relatively speaking' will become
dlscusslon of ontological relativity is clearcom-

^

Qune (1973

.

)

p

,

.

16

2 ®:
S e the n xt section for an
explanation of sub?
stitutional? and objectual
quantification.
.

.

,

27

Quine (1971)

.

p.

,

2

.

28.
Aune suggested a similar explication in an early
version of his paper
He did not make use of substitutional quantification, however.
Rather, he made use of objectual quantification where the variables ranged over linguistic items
The Quinean objections to substitutional
quantification I discuss in the next subsection apply
equally. to objectual quantification of this sort. Aune's
suggestion about 'is co-extensive with' has since been
revised
^

.

^

.

^

29

.

30

.

Quine

(

1969b)

,

p

.

104

Dunn and Belnap (1968).

31.

Thomason (1971).

32.

Quine (1960)

,

p.

242

.

.

..

.

.

.
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33

.

34.

Quine (1969b)

104

p.

,

.

Quine (1969b), p. ioB.

i

U

of substi?t^

^^“oSe^ers^f

“Ff

^orrnf'

reQt
Ud 11 the use of quantification
?
without bringinr;
about commitment
o
to abstract or otehr entities
though?
to be undesirable.
See, for example, Wilfrid SeUaS'
use of quantification in
"Abstract Entities" (1967a).
36

.

37.

38

.

39

.

40

.

Quine (1969b), p. 97* my emphasis.

Quine (1969b)

,

p.

107

Quine (1969b)

,

p

.

107

pp

.

Quine (1971)

,

32-36

Quine (1971), p. 36; my emphasis.

41.

Quine (1971), p. 41.

42

Quine (1971)

,

p.

47.

Quine (1971)

,

p.

47.

.

43

.

44.

C.

Parsons (1971)

45.
See, for example, his discussion in his ('
^bjectual and substitutional quantification
(pp
46

.

Aune (19 73

p

14

)

,

47.

Quine (1960

)

,

p.

242

48.

Quine (1971)

,

p.

10.

49

.

Quine (1971)

,

p.

38

50

.

Quine (1969b)

,

.

p

.

.

94

51.

Quine (1971), p. 36.

52

Quine (1971)

,

p.

48.

Quine (1971)

,

p.

43

.

53.

.

s

,

..

T

.

.
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54.

Aune
account is, of
intended as an
analysis of the logical form of course,
'0 refers' TO *
k s
It
might be that 'reW'
U
1
C
is a word-word relation,
even though tL Sverall °account
e e
nC reqUlreS word - w °rld relationsSee^ Subsec?ion A
^ for discussion of
tion
reference and general terms.
'

V

.

^ i

•

!

1S 1 ™P° r :ant to remember that
I have argued
It different
for two
points.
I argued first that the
fusJ
tification for premises (2)-(4) under
consideratio
n
d no
b ® acceptable to Quine.
I showed that Quine
T
lea ^’.° f that justification beaa
cause
s ®. it'refl^’
re l!es on the substitution
of
quantification. Then I tried to makeinterpretation
it plausible that
Q "? ne ® vlew
reference is a relation between words
C°
Pary t0 the view that Aune attributes
him?

fh

™

'i

,

£

’

’

'

S

’

6
Questions about the reference of terms in
the
ground language may of course, be raised.
The
background language is itself subject to
indeterminacy,
as
we shall see in ejection 11(A).
We can, nevertheless,
assume
59. that the reference of the items in the
ground language has been established in some backway.
This
assumption does n °t presuppose determinateness
of reference
the background language.
The background language
6
is discussed
Section II.
‘

,

c

,

.

m

57

.

58.

,

m

Quine (1971)

p

Quine (1969d)

,

3

p.

47.

My talk here of the "extension" of the thesis
shou
should not mislead the reader.
From the first statements
of the thesis in Word and Ob j ect
Quine intends the
application of the thesis to the home case. He did not
first propose the thesis for the interlinguistic case and
then extend it to the intralinguistic cases
It is
clear that he wished to make a quite general claim and
couched this cla
in terms of radical translation in an
attemp to make clear the issues involved in the claim.
At the oeginning of Chapter II of Word and Object, he
says, after making the general claim, that he will put
the point "less abstractly and more realistically by
switching to translation." [p. 27 of Quine's (I960).]
,

60

Quine

(

1960

)

,

p

28.

263
I

h

n

d
hat Mhile in the ab °ve
quotation tte linguist
u“uist
?f
1 ?
J to
is allowed
make use of "obsew.hio k
otherwise,"
of the native
speaker^ it aT^saenUaS “S'
behavior
that is discussed by Quine
attempt to discover the
limits of this method.

7

62.

Grice (1957) and (1969).

63.

Quine discusses a view of this
sort hin his (1970b)

2

“d

Sat

C

derdetermination and inde?e™fnac;.
65

Quine (1969d)

,

p.

47

i0

Un '

Section ?I°of
C° nne0ti0n b6tWeen

.

Obvious ly .not every philosopher
who holds a view
COI atlble with the sketches
I have offered
£
^.
wi1 ^
^
f?
lme.
Many who hold something like the
second view, for example, would either
holds for the neighbor’s case or agree deny that the thesis
that it holds for
his own.
Moreover, the second critic will have
to be
U
abOUt l:7ha1: he 1S cl * imin in claiming
g
that
one
knnw^ ih e a PPli ca "tions of his own
rules
or
conventions.
p robably none
would want to claim that such
explicitly known in the sense that a speaker rules are
of a language
S
ean state these rules or even that one
must always bf
able to determine whether it is
appropriate to apply
a given rule or convention or that
one cannot make errors in their application.
See Quine's criticisms of a
view like the second in his (1970b).
f

e

S

,

en

*7

,

-

n

,

_

57

.

68.
69

.

70

.

Quine (1969d)

,

Quine (1969d)

,

Quine (1960

)

,

Quine (1969d)

49

,

.

71.
Quine (19 70c)
180; Quine's emphasis,
tnai
in general, descriptions of propositional a
are subject to indeterminacy of translation.
,

.

Note

,

72.

which

I

This is the interpretation of the thesis for
have argued in Chapter II.

)

.

.

,

.

73.
74.

264

See, for example, Quine (1961c).

By similar argument
acceptance in the interlinguistic case should be extended to all
cases.
Thus
refusing to accept the thesis for the
intralingiistic
case would not be any more reasonable
than refusing to
case, given .that one accepts it
or the inter linguistic case.
Quine seems to have some
such argument in mind in his (1969d),
p. 47.
,

’

.

75.

Quine (1969d), p. 47.

76.

Quine (1969d)

48.

p.

/

.

77.

Quine (1969d), p. 48.

78.

See, for example, Quine (1969d), p. 27.

79.

A. condition on 'overlaps' is that if neither
predicate is true of anything, they do not overlap, They
are, of course, coextensive in that condition.

83.
80.

The condition on this sentence is like the one
giyen in footnote 79
(3) is false in the case that
neither predicate is true of anything.
:

81.
And that which appears below as well, with appropriate changes.

See above

82

(10

Similarly, under such manuals, (3') ais false and

is true

'

84.

Quine (1969d), pp

.

48f.

85.
A similar argument can be reconstructed by using
Aune s justification of the premises of the argument for
indeterminacy of reference.
'

86.

Quine (1969d), pp

.

48f.

Punctuation is Quine's.

87.
If sentences like (2") are understood to provide
only inclusion and not coextensiveness there is no difficulty in getting the needed conclusion. We simply add
additional manuals of translation: for example, the
manual in which
(5')
'rabbit stage' is translated as 'rabbit'.
,

.

.

This gives us
(5!,)
'rabbit stage' is true of rabbits
and so the conclusion.
,

88.
89

90

.

.

91.
92

.

93.

Quine (1969d)

,

p.

49

.

Quine (19S9d)

,

p

49

.

Quine (1969d)

,

p.

49

.

,

p.

49

.

Quine

(

19 6 9d)

Quine (1971)

,

p.

4.

Quine (1971)

,

p.

4
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NOTE TO CONCLUDING REMARK
1.

Schuldenf rei (1972).
r

’.

.

.
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APPENDIX
Objections and Replies
>

Since the material which follows is
no doubt some\

what unusual as part of a doctoral
dissertation,

I

have

provided a brief introduction explaining
its inclusion.
To understand the issues discussed, the
reader should
be familiar with at least Chapter I, and
perhaps

Chapter II, of the dissertation.
The inclusion of this appendix was suggested
by

Professor Robert Ackermann

,

a member of my dissertation

committee, as a way of resolving disagreements between
us about some of the material in my Chapter 1.

It resolves

these disagreements, however, only in the sense that it

provides him with the opportunity to record his rather
serious objections to the material and me with an op-

portunity to respond to these objections.
Essentially, the objections involve a denial that

what

I

call the first or primary account of observation

sentences can reasonably be attributed to Quine.

Professor

Ackermann first raised objections to this attribution,
though in rather different form, in January 1973 after
I

had submitted a draft of the dissertation to the

members of my committee.
then© firat objections.

I

wrote detailed responses to

Though ho did not find my defense

11

of my interpretation of Quine
convincing, Professor

Ackermann did approve my dissertation
for the oral
examination in May.
In response to Ackermann'

criticisms,

s

I

revised

the first subsection of Chapter
I, the subsection in

which

attribute the primary account to Quine.

I

In

support of my attribution of this view to
Quine in the
earlier version, I had made use of material
that

Ackermann believed to be inappropriate, namely,
The Web
of B elief [Quine and Ullian (1971)].
I

In the revision,

deleted all textual references to that material and

expanded my discussion of other texts, also used in
the earlier version, to support my interpretation.

Ackermann

comments here are directed to this

's

revised material and to some of my responses to his

earlier objections.

The latter involve claims made in

the dissertation about the role of the primary account

of observation sentences in, for example, the statement
of the underdetermination thesis.

Ackermann'

s

comments

here are based on two of the questions he asked at my
oral examination.

Professor Ackermann did not find my

responses to these questions satisfactory, and
asked to prepare written answers to them.
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answers were thought by Ackermann to
be inadequate.

Nevertheless, Ackermann proposed, as a
compromise,
that a more formal statement of his
objections and my
replies be included in the dissertation

as an appendix.

This proposal seemed to me to be a
reasonable solution.
These objections and replies follow:
TWO COMMENTS ON THOMASON’S THESIS

COMMENT ONE:
I

don't think that Quine is committed to your first

account of observation sentences.

My attention is

directed particularly to the third claim, which says that
on the first account observation sentences do
or contain referring items.

not refer

Observation sentences do

refer; a person learning a language simply doesn't yet

understand their reference.
Whether or not I'm correct in my view,

I

don't think

that you have established your interpretation as a scholarly
and reasonable reading of passages from Quine.

textual source is page 42 of Word and Object

.

Your major
The

sen-

tences you quote do not state the third claim in any

straightforward way, since they are about stimulus meanings and the claim is about reference.

Further,

1

don't

think any claim should be based on what you quote because

iv

your quotation is immediately followed
by a sentence
beginning "Or, better, we may speak.
which
suggests that the sentence you quote in
support of your
claim is not a full statement of Quine's
views.

..."

The accuracy of your reading is also
brought into

question by the fact that you draw consequences
from it
that seem to contradict clear claims made
elsewhere by
Quine.

You say "Since translation of observation sen-

tences is not indeterminate.

..."

but this seems wrong.

It i£ indeterminate as Quine plainly says

in his replies to Hintikka (p.
in Words and Objections

.

I

312

)

,

for example

and Stroud (p.

317

)

realize that later in the

thesis you mention this indeterminacy.

It seems more

relevant to the legitimacy of ascribing the first account
to Quine than you take note of here.

COMMENT TWO:
As a general philosophical defense of ascribing

the first account of observation sentences to Quine, you

argue that he must use the first account to state the

problems associated with the indeterminacy and under-

determination of theories.

I

believe this is wrong;

and also that you have not provided sufficient argument
to make your views plausible.

V

Underdetermination and indeterminacy appear for
fully mature speakers who understand some
native language and reference in it.

They are part of the logic

of the relationship between sentences strong
in observa-

tionality and more theoretical sentences which are
not.
If the referring structure of sentences was not
pre-

supposed, underdetermination would be trivial and unin-

teresting.

Quine can suppose a contextual distinction

between observation and theoretical sentences for some
competent speaker of a language and still coherently
state the theses about underdetermination and indeter-

minacy.

Nothing like the first account need be mentioned

in this connection.

You suggest that the first account must be involved
in how we ’’catch on” to our first theories in learning

our native language or getting to know a strange language.
It seems to me that this involves certain problems

,

not problems susceptible to philosophical analysis.

but

Quine

does not give an account of how we initially "catch on”
to our first theories.

This is part of our natural his-

tory and is to be described by empirical psychology which

will gradually fill in the outlines of the innate quality
spaces that causes initial entry to the theory of reference
of our native language.

VI

REPLY TO ACKERMANN

COMMENT ONE:
i

Before turning to Ackermann

'

s

specific objections,

want to say a few things about the interpretation
of
Quine's work to which he objects.
In the first section
I

of Chapter I,

I

distinguish what

of observation sentences.

I

call two accounts

These "accounts" are recon-

structed from Quine's characterizations, in various
places, of observation sentences.

I

distinguish these

two accounts because they involve claims that are dif-

ficult to reconcile.

Some of Quine's important claims

about, for example, evidence hold only if one takes him
to be discussing what

I

call the first account; other

claims hold only if one takes him to be discussing what
I

call the second account.

Quine would have difficulty

in reconciling these different accounts--or

,

if you will,

the different claims he makes about observation sentences.

There are difficulties in maintaining the claims he makes
if one considers his total view of observation sentences.

Ackermann 's objections are directed toward my attribution to Quine of the first account of observation
sentences.

I

characterize this account by seven claims

about observation sentences that

I

find in Qnine's works.

In this set of comments, Ackermann concentrates on the

.
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the third of these claims

Observation sentences do not refer or
contain referring items.
It is important to remember that we
are not here discussing

Quine's complete views on observation
sentences.

This is

important because the claims that characterize
the first
account do not hold for the total view.
Ackermann's first

comment tends to obscure this fact.

He says,

Observation sentences do refer; a person learning
a language simply doesn
t yet understand their
*

reference

On my view, this statement is ambiguous.

It is

ambiguous because it doesn't specify which aspects of
Quine's views (or which account of observation sentences)
is under discussion.

If he is discussing what I call

the second account or the reconciled view, he is surely

correct.

He is then not disagreeing with anything

said, however.

I

have

My discussion of the second account of

observation sentences makes it quite clear that, on this
account

,

observation sentences do have structure and

refer or contain referring items.

Ackermann's objection

must then be directed at my discussion of what

I

have

called the first or primary account of observation sentences, and not at my discussion of Quine's total views
on such sentences.
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His more specific remarks are directed
at part of
the textual support

I

offer for my attribution of claim

(3) to Quine as part of the
characterization of observation

sentences on the first account.

I

quote the following

sentence from Word and Object and support my
attribution
of claim (3) to Quine in a discussion of this
sentence:
their [observation sentences'] stimulus
meanings may without fear of contradiction be
said to do full justice to their meanings.
[Quine (1960) , p. 42]
•

•

:

Ackermann

'

s

first objection to my discussion of this

passage is that the sentences

I

quote "do not state the

claim in any straightforward way, since they are about
stimulus meanings and the claim is about reference."

Obviously, this is correct.

The issue, however, is

whether sentences whose meanings are their stimulus
meanings refer or contain referring items.
Chapter

I

that they do not.

I

argued in

Ackermann does not address

himself to this issue, or to the argument

I

offered there.

Consider what Quine has to say about stimulus meanings and radical translation.

Once the linguist has ac-

cepted initial analytical hypotheses about native speakers'
signs of assent and dissent, he is in a position to identify
the stimulus meanings of native sentences.

He can then

develop and test genuine hypotheses about these stimulus

(

;

ix

meanings.

Because this is so, he is capable of
providing
a translation of any sentences
whose meanings consist
of their stimulus meanings (i.e.,
observation sentences)
-i-thout accepting an^ additional analytical hypotheses
This is why Quine includes the translations
of observation
sentences among the "possible yield" of the
linguist's
.

method.

It is also why he says in "Epistemology
Naturalized"

that
The predicament of the indeterminacy of
translation has little bearing on observation
sentences.
The equating of an observation
sentence of our language to an observation
sentence of another language is mostly a
matter of identity between the range of
stimulations that would prompt assent to
the other
[Quine (1969a), p. 89.]

This does not by itself show that observation sentences
do not refer or contain referring items.

Quine also says,

however, that translation of the referential apparatus
of the language requires the acceptance by the linguist
of additional analytical hypotheses

,

which are not re-

quired for the translation of the observation sentences
of the language.

This seems sufficient to show that

observation sentences are not and do

not contain part

of the referential apparatus of the language.

They do

not refer or contain referring items.

Quine does not, of course, state claim (3) in the

passage
did so.

I

quote and discuss

nor did

I

suggest that he

Nevertheless, given his views on translation

"

X

which

do discuss, the passage provides
strong support
for my attribution to Quine of claim
(3).
X

Ackermann, however, does not think that
any claim
should be based on this passage.
Even if he believed
the line of argument pursued above to be
otherwise correct, he would not be willing to accept
my attribution
of claim (3) insofar as it depends on the
passage from

—? rc

Object

*

-

[In fact, I discuss some material from

.

"The Roots of Reference" as additional support
for the

claim.]

Ackermann's second objection is based on the

fact that the passage

I

discuss is followed by a sentence

which, he says, suggests that the sentence

I

quote in

support of claim (3) "is not a full statement of Quine's
views

.

This objection is rather odd.

Since

I

spend about

eighty pages of the thesis discussing Quine's rather

complicated views on observation sentences
be obvious that

I

,

it should

would not expect a single sentence to

be a full statement of Quine's views on the subject.

Moreover,

I

am here discussing only the first account

of observation
of them.
a full

sentences, and not Quine's total view

It is true that the sentence I quote is not

statement of Quine's views.

But

I

do not see

,
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why Ackermann thinks it follows
that the passage should
not be used as the basis for any
claim.

His earlier remarks on my discussion
of this passage
suggest an explanation of this view.
In those remarks
he took the sentence beginning
"Or, better,..." to be
a qualification of the passage I
discuss, thereby making

it inappropriate to use the passage
in support of

claim (3).
It might be helpful to the reader
to have the

complete passage before him:
Occasion sentences whose stimulus
meanings vary none under the influence of collateral information
may naturally be called observation
sentences and their stimulus
meanings may without fear of contradiction be said to do full justice
to their meanings
These are the
occasion sentences that wear their
meanings on their sleeves.
Or better,
we may speak of degrees of observationality; for even the stimulus
meaning of 'Red' can, we noted, be
made to fluctuate a little from
occasion to occasion by collateral
information on lighting conditions.
What we have is a gradation of
observationality from one extreme
at 'Red* or above, to the other extreme at 'Bachelor' or below. [Quine
(1960), p. 42.]
,

.

The question one should ask,

I

think, is why it

is better to speak of degrees of observationality than

of observation sentences.

Ackermann

's

comments suggest

that it is better to speak of degrees of observationality

•

xii

because the previous statement about the
meanings of
observation sentences was somehow mistaken and
requires
qualification.
This seems wrong to me, since what
follows is not a qualification of the claim about
the

meaning of observation sentences.

Rather, it is the

notion of degrees of observationality is, in
practice, a
more useful one than that of observation sentence.
Few,

if any

,

sentences will count as observation sentences under

the stringent requirements Quine sets up in this
passage-

collateral information may always (or almost always)
affect speakers' dispositions to respond to stimuli.

ii,,

1

i

,

,

Moreover, Quine thinks it important to introduce the

notion of degrees of observationality because he thinks
no hard and fast line can be drawn between observation

sentences and theoretical sentences.
"

•

•

He also thinks that

no systematic experimental sense is to be made of a

distinction between usage due to meaning and usage due to

generally shared collateral information".
p.

43.]

[Quine (1960),

This belief throws doubt on whether the notion

of observation sentence as described in the passage quoted

can be analyzed in the spirit of empirical science.

Thus, it is more reasonable--or better

— to

speak of

degrees of observationality simply because even the most

highly observational sentences may (for some persons, in

"

,
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some circumstances) be responded
to not only because of
the sensory stimulations the
speaker undergoes but also
because of other information the speaker
has which is
relevant to his verdict about a queried
sentence.
Quine's
example in the passage quoted above is a
case in point.
But this is not a qualification of the
statement about the

meaning of observation sentences.

It is merely a reminder

that the notion of an observation sentence,
so described,

will not be terribly useful in practice.

This is so, in

part, because it is the second (and not the first)
account
of observation sentences that describes the practice
of

full-fledged speakers of the language.

Thus,

I

tend to

agree with Ackermann's earlier statement that the view
I

want to impute to Quine is an idea one never encountered

in practice.
I

disagree with Ackermann

,

however, about the con-

sequences of all this for my discussion of observation
sentences.

Ackermann seems to take one consequence to be

that the statement about observation sentences that

I

quote is weakened or discarded by Quine when he goes on
to say "Or better, we may speak of degrees of observationality
I

take it that the statement about observation sentences

holds

,

that it is not in any qualified by what follows

.
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but that Quine wants the reader to
be clear that he is
not— by providing this characterization or
definition of
'observation sentence --committing himself
to the view
that one can, in general, parcel
out sentences into observational and theoretical ones. Thus,
I see no reason
why the sentence I quote and discuss
ought not to be
used as the basis for any claim. And
as I argued above,
I think that the sentence,
along with the discussion of
'

,

radical translation, supports my attribution to
Quine of
claim (3).

Ackermann’s final objection in this comment is that,
he claims
I draw consequences from my reading
of the
,

passage in question that seem to contradict clear
claims
made elsewhere by Quine.
I

He quotes a sentence in which

say that translation of observation sentences is not

indeterminate.
take.

This is, as Ackermann points out, a mis-

In Chapter II of the dissertation, I discussed in

rather boring detail the fact that the linguist's hypotheses
about signs of assent and dissent are analytical hypotheses.
The identification of stimulus meanings

lation of observation sentences
of such hypotheses.

,

,

and so the trans-

depends on the acceptance

Thus, they have what Quine calls a

residual indeterminacy due to the indeterminacy attaching

.
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to »ign« of assent and dissent.

Since

I

treated this indeterminacy as
negligible

for the purpose at hand (distinguishing
the treatment of
observation sentences from that of other
linguistic items),
I concluded that the
translation of observation sentences
is not indeterminate.
I was
I think, following Quine
in this treatment both of problems
about assent and dissent
and of translation of observation sentences.
He does,
,

for example, say that the yield of the
linguist's method

included determinate translations of observation
sentences.

This is because he was concerned, not with
the

problems about attributing signs of assent and
dissent
to native speakers, but with the more interesting
result

that he arrived at once he assumed that the problem
was

settled

Neither Quine nor

I

should have been so careless.

If indeterminacy comes in with the attribution of
assent

and dissent

,

then the translation of observation sentences

will be indeterminate.

It will depend on the arbitrary

acceptance of analytical hypotheses
not genuine hypotheses.

pointed this out to me

,

I

,

hypotheses that are

appreciate Ackermann's having

and have made the appropriate

changes in the text of the dissertation.
These facts do not, however, undermine my use of the
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passage as support for my attribution
of claim (3) to
Quine.
I am puzzled by Ackermann
s statement that
I

*

draw

as a consequence of my reading
of that passage that

translation of observation sentences is
determinate. The
latter (mistaken) claim was made in the
course of my
discussion of the passage.
I can see no way in which it
could be taken to be a consequence of the
passage, or my
reading of the passage.
Moreover, the argument that

appropriate changes are made.

I

offered holds when the

What brought about my

carelessness was an emphasis on the differences in the

treatment of observation sentences and sentences that
involve reference.
I

That difference still remains.

Here

will give an abbreviated form of the argument offered

above in support of my attribution to Quine of claim (3),

Given the acceptance of hypotheses concerning signs
of assent and dissent, the linguist can identify stimulus

meanings of sentences (with only ordinary inductive uncertainty).

If stimulus meanings do full justice to the

meanings of observation sentences

,

as Quine says

,

then

the translation of observation sentences involves only in-

ductive uncertainty, and not (additional) indeterminacy.
The acceptance hypotheses concerning assent and dissent

xvii

ie sufficient to enable the
linguist to translate the

observation sentences of the language.

The same is not

true of general terms and the
rest of the referential
apparatus
Additional analytical hypotheses must be
accepted if the linguist is to translate
these.
Translation of the referential apparatus of
the language is
.

indeterminate, even given the acceptance of
analytical
hypotheses concerning signs of assent and
dissent. Translation of observation sentences is determinate,
given
the acceptance of those analytical
hypotheses.
The indeterminacy of translation of
observation

sentences is due to indeterminacy involved in
"identification" of native speakers' signs of assent and
dissent.
The indeterminacy where reference is involved
goes beyond
So it seems reasonable to conclude that observations

th_is.

sentences do not contain referring items.

COMMENT TWO:

Ackermann calls my discussions of the uses Quine makes
of the first account of observation sentences "a general

philosophical defense of ascribing" this account to Quine.
This description attributes to me something more compli-

cated than what

claimed

— in

I

have actually done.

I

have merely

several places in my dissertation and in my

xviii

replies to his earlier ob jections--that
some of Quine's
important remarks hold only_ if he is
discussing observation
sentences as characterized by the first
account. Among
these are Quine's statement of the
underdetermination
thesis and his claim that the observation
sentences of a
language but none of its referential
apparatus are
,

,

translatable once hypotheses concerning native
speakers'
signs of assent and dissent are accepted.
Note
that

I

do

not claim that this account is sufficient for
explaining

underdetermination.

—ome

I'm inclined to agree that, for

w hat is involved, the referring structure of

observation sentences is presupposed.

If this is correct,

then it is very important to find a means of reconciling
the different accounts of observation sentences to be

found in Quine's work.

I

am not at all convinced that

this can be done.
I

will summarize here my reasons for holding that

the first account is used by Quine in his discussions of
the underdetermination and indeterminacy theses.
The underdetermination thesis is supposed to apply

not only to what one might ordinarily call scientific

theories, but to common sense theories as well.

Quine

does not distinguish between the theory of ordinary en-

during bodies, for example, and other sorts of theories.
The former are scientific theories for him.

The point
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that Quine makes in "On The Reasons
for Indeterminacy of
Translation" that indeterminacy can be
thought of as

underdetermination in second intension depends
on this,
and on the related claim that
underdetermination applies
to common sense theories as well as
to "higher-level"

theories.

Different theories, theories that posit

radically different sorts of objects are compatible
with
all possible observation sentences, according
to
these

claims.

All possible observation sentences do not de-

termine a choice among theories that posit ordinary
en-

during bodies, time-slices of bodies, exemplifications
of
Forms, and so on.

(Nor do they enable one to choose

among "higher-level" theories.)
It is clear that Quine holds that the reference of

terms (via the range of the quantifiers) does force a

choice of theories.

Reference and theoretical (or

ontological) commitment are, for him, bound together.

If

observation sentences were supposed to have structure and
to be or contain seems that referred, they would already

involve ontological or theoretical commitment.

It would

not be true that all possible observation sentences do
not determine a choice among theories that posit ordinary

enduring bodies, time-slices, exemplifications of Forms,
and so on.
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This sort of eons idarat ion leads me to
oiaim that
Quine needs the first account of observation
sentences
for his statement of the underdetermination
thesis.

Quine distinguishes, in Word and Object,
"Philosophical
Progress in Language Theory," "Epistemology
Naturalized,"
and

Methodological Reflections on Current Linguistic

Theory," between linguistic items that can be
translated
(given the linguist's acceptance of hypotheses
concerning

assent and dissent) with only normal inductive uncertainty
and other linguistic items that can be translated (given
the acceptance of those initial hypotheses) only if

additional analytical hypotheses are accepted.

There

are, with the qualifications noted above, behavioral

criteria for translation of the former but not for translation of the latter.
The linguistic items for which there are behavioral

criteria are observation sentences.

The remaining items

are those items translation of which attributes to the

native speakers some theory (say, the theory of ordinary,

enduring bodies).

Among these items are what might be

said to function as the copula, the identity sign and

general terms.

Quine notes in the articles mentioned

above and in "The Roots of Reference" that it is only

.

xxi

when these items are considered that
it is appropriate
to attribute to the speaker a theory.
It is only on the first account of
observation

sentences that their translation does not
attribute a
theory to the speakers whose language is being
translated.
Quine thus appears to make use of the first
account of

observation sentences in his discussions of radical
translation

Ackermann says that Quine can "suppose a contextual
c

^ s ^ nc ^ on

between observation and theoretical sentences

for some competent speakers of the language and still

coherently state the theses" in question.

He suggests

that a consequence of his view is that the first account
of observation sentences is not required for Quine’s

discussions of the theses, that is, that a theory-neutral
account is not required.
import of the phrase

’

Ackermann has not explained the

contextual distinction'.

Nor has

he explained how Quine can, by using some such distinction,

avoid the problems

I

have raised.

I

do not, therefore,

think it necessary to comment further on his claims.
Ackermann* s final objection concerns my discussion
of Quine's views on the role of observation sentences in

language-learning.

He says both that

I

suggest that the

first account must be involved in how we "catch on" to a
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theory and that Quine gives no account
of how we catch on
to our first theories.
My actual view is that Quine's
description of language
learning, and in particular of how one
"catches on" to
theories, makes use of the first account.
Surely, Quine
does give an account— though perhaps not
an adequate one
of how one catches on to one’s first
theories.
Whether

—

or not the problems involved are in fact
susceptible to

philosophical analysis
and effort (e.g.

,

,

Quine spends considerable time

in Word and Ob j ect

,

Chapter

I:

"Natural

Kinds," and "The Roots of Reference") in discussing
such
problems.

He describes the Carus Lectures ("The Roots
of

Reference") this way:

In these lectures

I

shall speculate

on the steps by which the child might progress from that

primitive stage [in which "there is no sense in ascribing
reference at all"] until we are satisfied by his easy

communication with us that he has mastered our apparatus
of reference" (p.

3).

And, of course, the child's mastery

of the apparatus of reference goes hand-in-hand with his

mastery of a theory.
Quine’s assimilation of the language-learner and the

field linguist might be a partial explanation of this
interest.
1

I

#

In "Epistemology Naturalized" he says "What
#

II

I

have said of infant learning applies equally to the lin-
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guist's learning of a new language in
the field.” (p. 81)
Here, and again on p. 89, where he says
that "observation
sentences are the ones we are in a position
to learn to

understand first, both as children and as field
linguists,"
he is concerned primarily with the
learning of observation
sentences.
But part of the point of the discussions
of

observation sentences in Word and Object and elsewhere
is
to show how they differ from more theoretical
sentences.
And the point is not merely to consider problems
about

methodology in linguistics.

The point is also to eluci-

date matters about the nature of language and meaning.
But even if my construal of Quine's reasons for interest
in language-learning and theory is mistaken, it seems

clear that he does have that interest.

Ackermann's statement that Quine relegates the
problems involved in the acquisition of theories to our

natural history and empirical psychological is mistaken
in several respects.

It suggests a dichotomy between

philosophy and science that Quine explicitly rejects.
(See, especially, "Epistemology Naturalized" and "Philo-

sophical Progress in Language Theory".)

Moreover, he says

that Quine's positing of innate quality spaces is to explain
the acquisition of theories.

It is true that Quine posits

.
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innate quality spaces, and that he takes
them to be
"obviously a prerequisite to learning". (Reply
to Chomsky).
His discussion of quality spaces, however,
concern the

requisites for learning observation sentences

.

He does

not, to my knowledge, discuss innate quality
spaces in

connection with the acquisition of theories

